common-law negligence claim in Oregon

2025We indicated that the elements of a common-law negligence claim include “a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff and conduct by the defendant that is unreasonable in light of that risk.” Id. (emphasis added).

2025We indicated that the elements of a common-law negligence claim include “a foreseeable risk of harm to the plaintiff and conduct by the defendant that is unreasonable in light of that risk.” Id. (emphasis added).

2024See Fazzolari, 303 Or at 14 (explaining that the court’s deci- sion in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603 , 469 P2d 783 (1970), “made foreseeable risk the test both of negligent conduct and of liability for its consequences without phras- ing the test in terms either of causation or of duty”); accord Piazza 360 Or at 70 (noting that foreseeability’s two roles in the common-law negligence framework are “overlapping”). 728 Stone v. Witt There is a fairly well-developed body of case law regarding the second role of foreseeability in special- relationship cases, i.e., what was once refer

2024See Fazzolari, 303 Or at 14 (explaining that the court’s deci- sion in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603 , 469 P2d 783 (1970), “made foreseeable risk the test both of negligent conduct and of liability for its consequences without phras- ing the test in terms either of causation or of duty”); accord Piazza 360 Or at 70 (noting that foreseeability’s two roles in the common-law negligence framework are “overlapping”). 728 Stone v. Witt There is a fairly well-developed body of case law regarding the second role of foreseeability in special- relationship cases, i.e., what was once refer

2025See Deckard, 358 Or at 758-59 (emphasizing that serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest who then drives a car and injures a third person states a common-law negligence claim for liability to the third person if that risk was reasonably foreseeable); see also Haas v. Estate of Mark Steven Carter, 370 Or 742, 753 , 525 P3d 451 (2023) (emphasizing rule that “there may be many causes of a plaintiff’s harm and that, when multiple tortfeasors contribute to that harm, all may be held liable for it”).

2025See Deckard, 358 Or at 758-59 (emphasizing that serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest who then drives a car and injures a third person states a common-law negligence claim for liability to the third person if that risk was reasonably foreseeable); see also Haas v. Estate of Mark Steven Carter, 370 Or 742, 753 , 525 P3d 451 (2023) (emphasizing rule that “there may be many causes of a plaintiff’s harm and that, when multiple tortfeasors contribute to that harm, all may be held liable for it”).

2024See Fazzolari, 303 Or at 14 (explaining that the court’s deci- sion in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603 , 469 P2d 783 (1970), “made foreseeable risk the test both of negligent conduct and of liability for its consequences without phras- ing the test in terms either of causation or of duty”); accord Piazza 360 Or at 70 (noting that foreseeability’s two roles in the common-law negligence framework are “overlapping”). 728 Stone v. Witt There is a fairly well-developed body of case law regarding the second role of foreseeability in special- relationship cases, i.e., what was once refer

2024See Fazzolari, 303 Or at 14 (explaining that the court’s deci- sion in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603 , 469 P2d 783 (1970), “made foreseeable risk the test both of negligent conduct and of liability for its consequences without phras- ing the test in terms either of causation or of duty”); accord Piazza 360 Or at 70 (noting that foreseeability’s two roles in the common-law negligence framework are “overlapping”). 728 Stone v. Witt There is a fairly well-developed body of case law regarding the second role of foreseeability in special- relationship cases, i.e., what was once refer

2025We again analyzed the foreseeable risk element of a common-law negligence claim in the context of harm result- ing from a third-party’s criminal conduct in Piazza v. Kellim, 360 Or 58 , 377 P3d 492 (2016).

2025We again analyzed the foreseeable risk element of a common-law negligence claim in the context of harm result- ing from a third-party’s criminal conduct in Piazza v. Kellim, 360 Or 58 , 377 P3d 492 (2016).

2016See Chartrand, 298 Or at 694-95 (“Judicial notice cannot replace the need for proof of an essential element of the tort claim as alleged in this case, i.e., proof that the defendant knew or should have known that the customer would drive a vehicle from the tavern.”).

2015The court concluded that “the case was pled as a common-law negligence claim and the instruction did not inform the jury that the plaintiff must prove that it was reasonably foreseeable to defendant that its customer, on leaving the tavern, would drive a car.” Id. at 692, 695 .

2023Deckard, 358 Or at 761 n 7 (“[A] claim created by the legislature is not necessarily even a tort claim.”); Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or 630, 635 , 762 P2d 997 (1988) (“[s]tatutory liability is not necessarily ‘tort’ liability”). 792 Moody v. Oregon Community Credit Union Here, the claim that plaintiff alleges is not a statutory tort; rather, it is a common-law negligence claim.

2023Deckard, 358 Or at 761 n 7 (“[A] claim created by the legislature is not necessarily even a tort claim.”); Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or 630, 635 , 762 P2d 997 (1988) (“[s]tatutory liability is not necessarily ‘tort’ liability”). 792 Moody v. Oregon Community Credit Union Here, the claim that plaintiff alleges is not a statutory tort; rather, it is a common-law negligence claim.

2025See Hefty v. Comprehensive Care Corporation, 307 Or 247, 253 , 766 P2d 1026 (1988) (affirming grant of summary judgment and noting that “a court can decide that no reasonable fact- finder could find the risk foreseeable” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bock v. Vigor Works LLC, 343 Or App 514, 518 , ___ P3d ____ (2025) (affirming trial court’s Cite as 344 Or App 204 (2025) 211 grant of summary judgment to a defendant on the plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim because the plaintiff did not adduce evidence creating a jury question on foreseeability).

2025See Hefty v. Comprehensive Care Corporation, 307 Or 247, 253 , 766 P2d 1026 (1988) (affirming grant of summary judgment and noting that “a court can decide that no reasonable fact- finder could find the risk foreseeable” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bock v. Vigor Works LLC, 343 Or App 514, 518 , ___ P3d ____ (2025) (affirming trial court’s Cite as 344 Or App 204 (2025) 211 grant of summary judgment to a defendant on the plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim because the plaintiff did not adduce evidence creating a jury question on foreseeability).

2025See, e.g., 2 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 comment h (2012) (explaining that the general duty to avoid unreasonably creating risks of physical harm covers cases in which “care provided to a patient may create risks to others,” such as “prescribing an inappropriate medication that impairs the patient”); Medina v. Hochberg, 465 Mass 102, 109, 987 NE2d 1206, 1212 (2013) (“In prescribing the medication, a physician has created the possibility that the patient might decide to operate a motor vehicle while taking it, experi- ence a known side effect, an

2025See, e.g., 2 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 41 comment h (2012) (explaining that the general duty to avoid unreasonably creating risks of physical harm covers cases in which “care provided to a patient may create risks to others,” such as “prescribing an inappropriate medication that impairs the patient”); Medina v. Hochberg, 465 Mass 102, 109, 987 NE2d 1206, 1212 (2013) (“In prescribing the medication, a physician has created the possibility that the patient might decide to operate a motor vehicle while taking it, experi- ence a known side effect, an

2025See Hefty v. Comprehensive Care Corporation, 307 Or 247, 253 , 766 P2d 1026 (1988) (affirming grant of summary judg- ment and noting that “a court can decide that no reasonable factfinder could find the risk foreseeable” (internal quota- tion marks omitted)); see also Bock v. Vigor Works LLC, 343 Or App 514, 518 , ___ P3d ___ (2025) (affirming trial court’s Cite as 344 Or App 204 (2025) 211 grant of summary judgment to a defendant on the plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim because the plaintiff did not adduce evidence creating a jury question on foreseeability).

2025See Hefty v. Comprehensive Care Corporation, 307 Or 247, 253 , 766 P2d 1026 (1988) (affirming grant of summary judgment and noting that “a court can decide that no reasonable fact- finder could find the risk foreseeable” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bock v. Vigor Works LLC, 343 Or App 514, 518 , ___ P3d ____ (2025) (affirming trial court’s Cite as 344 Or App 204 (2025) 211 grant of summary judgment to a defendant on the plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim because the plaintiff did not adduce evidence creating a jury question on foreseeability).

2025See Deckard, 358 Or at 758-59 (emphasizing that serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest who then drives a car and injures a third person states a common-law negligence claim for liability to the third person if that risk was reasonably foreseeable); see also Haas v. Estate of Mark Steven Carter, 370 Or 742, 753 , 525 P3d 451 (2023) (emphasizing rule that “there may be many causes of a plaintiff’s harm and that, when multiple tortfeasors contribute to that harm, all may be held liable for it”).

2025See Deckard, 358 Or at 758-59 (emphasizing that serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest who then drives a car and injures a third person states a common-law negligence claim for liability to the third person if that risk was reasonably foreseeable); see also Haas v. Estate of Mark Steven Carter, 370 Or 742, 753 , 525 P3d 451 (2023) (emphasizing rule that “there may be many causes of a plaintiff’s harm and that, when multiple tortfeasors contribute to that harm, all may be held liable for it”).

2025We further explained that a special sta- tus, relationship, or standard of conduct may “create * * * the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.” Id. at 341 (emphasis added) 4 The majority opinion points out that Fazzolari described harm from “a bystander’s failure to rescue” as one of the “traditionally excluded categories of quite predictable injuries and claimants.” 374 Or at 535; see also Cramer v. Mengerhausen, 275 Or 223, 227 , 550 P2d 740 (1976) (stating that “[t]here is no duty to aid one in peril in the absence of some special relation between the parties which affords a justification for

2025We further explained that a special sta- tus, relationship, or standard of conduct may “create * * * the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.” Id. at 341 (emphasis added) 4 The majority opinion points out that Fazzolari described harm from “a bystander’s failure to rescue” as one of the “traditionally excluded categories of quite predictable injuries and claimants.” 374 Or at 535; see also Cramer v. Mengerhausen, 275 Or 223, 227 , 550 P2d 740 (1976) (stating that “[t]here is no duty to aid one in peril in the absence of some special relation between the parties which affords a justification for

2025See Hefty v. Comprehensive Care Corporation, 307 Or 247, 253 , 766 P2d 1026 (1988) (affirming grant of summary judg- ment and noting that “a court can decide that no reasonable factfinder could find the risk foreseeable” (internal quota- tion marks omitted)); see also Bock v. Vigor Works LLC, 343 Or App 514, 518 , ___ P3d ___ (2025) (affirming trial court’s Cite as 344 Or App 204 (2025) 211 grant of summary judgment to a defendant on the plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim because the plaintiff did not adduce evidence creating a jury question on foreseeability).

2025See Hefty v. Comprehensive Care Corporation, 307 Or 247, 253 , 766 P2d 1026 (1988) (affirming grant of summary judgment and noting that “a court can decide that no reasonable fact- finder could find the risk foreseeable” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bock v. Vigor Works LLC, 343 Or App 514, 518 , ___ P3d ____ (2025) (affirming trial court’s Cite as 344 Or App 204 (2025) 211 grant of summary judgment to a defendant on the plaintiff’s common-law negligence claim because the plaintiff did not adduce evidence creating a jury question on foreseeability).

2014See Lewis, 274 Or at 298 (officers); Felton, 72 Or at 357-58 (directors). 16 In this case, a reasonable juror could infer that Swanson “participated” in worksite safety at Sun Studs in three respects: Swanson formulated a general safety policy that it directed Sun Studs to implement; it delegated primary authority for safety at Sun Studs to Sun Studs’ HR director and mill manager; and Swanson undertook to oversee those persons’ implementation of Swanson’s general safety policies.

2014See Lewis, 274 Or at 298 (officers); Pelton, 72 Or at 357-58 (directors).16 In this case, a reasonable juror could infer that Swanson “participated” in worksite safety at Sun Studs in three respects: Swanson formulated a gen- eral safety policy that it directed Sun Studs to implement; it delegated primary authority for safety at Sun Studs to Sun Studs’ HR director and mill manager; and Swanson under- took to oversee those persons’ implementation of Swanson’s general safety policies.

2014See Lewis, 274 Or at 298 (officers); Felton, 72 Or at 357-58 (directors). 16 In this case, a reasonable juror could infer that Swanson “participated” in worksite safety at Sun Studs in three respects: Swanson formulated a general safety policy that it directed Sun Studs to implement; it delegated primary authority for safety at Sun Studs to Sun Studs’ HR director and mill manager; and Swanson undertook to oversee those persons’ implementation of Swanson’s general safety policies.

2014See Lewis, 274 Or at 298 (officers); Pelton, 72 Or at 357-58 (directors).16 In this case, a reasonable juror could infer that Swanson “participated” in worksite safety at Sun Studs in three respects: Swanson formulated a gen- eral safety policy that it directed Sun Studs to implement; it delegated primary authority for safety at Sun Studs to Sun Studs’ HR director and mill manager; and Swanson under- took to oversee those persons’ implementation of Swanson’s general safety policies.

2022There, the existing civil liability was a common-law negligence claim “against alcohol providers for serving visibly intoxicated persons who then injure third parties in drunk driving accidents [that] already existed when the statute was enacted.” Id. (citing Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or 237, 243-44 , 566 P2d 893 (1977)).

2022There, the existing civil liability was a common-law negligence claim “against alcohol providers for serving visibly intoxicated persons who then injure third parties in drunk driving accidents [that] already existed when the statute was enacted.” Id. (citing Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or 237, 243-44 , 566 P2d 893 (1977)).

2024Id. at 279 .

2024Id. at 279 .

2023As Harris explains, the economic loss doctrine in Oregon is reflected in the rule that “ ‘one ordinarily is not liable for negligently causing a stranger’s purely economic loss’ ” in the absence of “ ‘some source of duty outside the common law of negligence,’ * * * such as a special relation- ship or status that imposed a duty on the defendant beyond the common-law negligence standard.” Id. at 308 (quoting Hale, 304 Or at 284 ) (internal citation omitted; brackets from Harris omitted).

2023As Harris explains, the economic loss doctrine in Oregon is reflected in the rule that “ ‘one ordinarily is not liable for negligently causing a stranger’s purely economic loss’ ” in the absence of “ ‘some source of duty outside the common law of negligence,’ * * * such as a special relation- ship or status that imposed a duty on the defendant beyond the common-law negligence standard.” Id. at 308 (quoting Hale, 304 Or at 284 ) (internal citation omitted; brackets from Harris omitted).

2025Cite as 374 Or 524 (2025) 569 In summary, under our prior cases, liability on a common-law negligence claim does not depend on alleging and proving that the defendant’s conduct had created a risk of the type of harm that ultimately befell the plaintiff.

2025Cite as 374 Or 524 (2025) 569 In summary, under our prior cases, liability on a common-law negligence claim does not depend on alleging and proving that the defendant’s conduct had created a risk of the type of harm that ultimately befell the plaintiff.

2023Deckard, 358 Or at 761 . 7 We sometimes refer interchangeably to “statutory liability” and “statutory tort.” Compare Doyle, 356 Or at 344 (“statutory liability” arises when statute creates private right of action), with Scovill v. City of Astoria, 324 Or 159, 163 , 921 P2d 1312 (1996) (referring to such claims as “statutory tort” claims), and Gattman v. Favro, 306 Or 11, 15 , 757 P2d 402 (1988) (same).

2023Deckard, 358 Or at 761 . 7 We sometimes refer interchangeably to “statutory liability” and “statutory tort.” Compare Doyle, 356 Or at 344 (“statutory liability” arises when statute creates private right of action), with Scovill v. City of Astoria, 324 Or 159, 163 , 921 P2d 1312 (1996) (referring to such claims as “statutory tort” claims), and Gattman v. Favro, 306 Or 11, 15 , 757 P2d 402 (1988) (same).