common-law negligence claim in Texas

2013See Nall v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.Sd 552, 554-56 (Tex.2013) (holding that summary-judgment grounds were broad enough to cover both social-host and undertaking theories of negligence) (per curiam); Williams v. Sable, No. 14-09-00806-CV, 2011 WL 288288 , at *3 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 25, 2011, no pet.) (concluding that negligence per se is not a separate claim that exists independently of a common-law negligence claim, rather it is merely one method of proving a breach of duty) (mem. op.); Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (same as Wil

2013See Nall v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.3d 552 , 554–56 (Tex. 2013) (holding that summary-judgment grounds were broad enough to cover both social-host and undertaking theories of negligence) (per curiam); Williams v. Sable, No. 14-09-00806-CV, 2011 WL 238288 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 25, 2011, no pet.) (concluding that negligence per se is not a separate claim that exists independently 11 of a common-law negligence claim, rather it is merely one method of proving a breach of duty) (mem. op.); Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (sam

2026Co. v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137 , 144 (Tex. 2022) (citing Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1998)).

2022Discussion The elements of a common-law negligence claim are (1) a legal duty; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages proximately resulting from the breach. 24 “The threshold inquiry in a negligence case is duty.” 25 This inquiry encompasses several questions of law: the existence, scope, and elements of a duty. 26 Here, the central dispute and the controlling 24 See, e.g., Praesel v. Johnson, 967 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1998). 25 Greater Hous.

2023It may be, as other courts have held, that a common-law claim could so directly seek to control, manage, or govern the core operational functions of a rail carrier that it could only be said to seek a “remedy with respect to regulation of rail transportation.”19 But in our view, negligence claims based on railroad-crossing safety will rarely meet that standard. of a subject matter, much less “with respect to” such “regulation.” Because the federal law at issue in Garmon provided essentially no guidance on the scope of its preemptive effect, the Court based its decision in that case on its own

2023It may be, as other courts have held, that a common-law claim could so directly seek to control, manage, or govern the core operational functions of a rail carrier that it could only be said to seek a “remedy with respect to regulation of rail transportation.”19 But in our view, negligence claims based on railroad-crossing safety will rarely meet that standard. of a subject matter, much less “with respect to” such “regulation.” Because the federal law at issue in Garmon provided essentially no guidance on the scope of its preemptive effect, the Court based its decision in that case on its own

2022Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2002) (citations omitted). 22 The main difference between a common-law negligence claim and a FELA claim is the element of causation: The causation element of a FELA action is a sharp departure from the common-law requirement of proximate cause.

2017Negligence per se is not a separate claim that exists independently of a common-law negligence claim; rather, negligence per se is 3 In Marshall v. Renne, the Supreme Court adopted § 509 of the Restatement (First) of Torts which states: Except as stated in §517, a possessor of a domestic animal which he has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm caused thereby to others, except trespassers on his land, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing harm. 511 S.W.2d 255, 258 (1974). 7 merely one method of proving a b

2014Section 22.0511 grants immunity to a professional school district employee but creates an exception to the immunity when the employee “uses excessive force in the discipline of students or negligence resulting in bodily injury to students.” Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 22.0511(a); Robinson v. Brannon, 313 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).

2013See Williams v. Sable, No. 14-09-00806-CV, 2011 WL 238288 , at *3 (Tex.App.Houston [14 Dist.] Jan. 25, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)); see also Zavala v. Trujillo, 883 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).

2013See Nall v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.3d 552 , 554–56 (Tex. 2013) (holding that summary-judgment grounds were broad enough to cover both social-host and undertaking theories of negligence) (per curiam); Williams v. Sable, No. 14-09-00806-CV, 2011 WL 238288 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 25, 2011, no pet.) (concluding that negligence per se is not a separate claim that exists independently 11 of a common-law negligence claim, rather it is merely one method of proving a breach of duty) (mem. op.); Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (sam