80 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1989–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mendoza v. Highpoint Associates, IX, LLCgreen2 sentences2012Shopping Ctr., 27 NY2d 103 [1970].) In other words, a claim arising pursuant to the provision is “tantamount to a common-law negligence claim in a workplace context.” (Mendoza v Highpoint Assoc., IX, LLC, 83 AD3d 1, 9 [1st Dept 2011].) Unlike Labor Law §§ 240 and 241, section 200 does not exempt one- and two-family homeowners from its scope. 2012Shopping Ctr., 27 NY2d 103 [1970].) In other words, a claim arising pursuant to the provision is “tantamount to a common-law negligence claim in a workplace context.” (Mendoza v Highpoint Assoc., IX, LLC, 83 AD3d 1, 9 [1st Dept 2011].) Unlike Labor Law §§ 240 and 241, section 200 does not exempt one- and two-family homeowners from its scope. | 3 | 3 |
Russin v. Louis N. Picciano & Songreen2 sentences2012To be held liable under the statute, which is the codification of the common-law negligence standard, an owner must have had the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury (Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317 [1981]), or actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition (see Buckley v Columbia Grammar & Preparatory, 44 AD3d 263, 272-273 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 710 [2008]; Griffin v New York City Tr. 2012To be held liable under the statute, which is the codification of the common-law negligence standard, an owner must have had the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury (Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317 [1981]), or actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition (see Buckley v Columbia Grammar & Preparatory, 44 AD3d 263, 272-273 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 710 [2008]; Griffin v New York City Tr. | 3 | 3 |
Gordon v. American Museum of Natural Historygreen2 sentences2024“To constitute constructive notice, a defect must be visible and apparent and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit defendant's employees to discover and remedy it” (Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 838 [1986] [citations omitted]). 2001We further find no evidence to support a common-law negligence claim based upon the allegation that there existed a dangerous condition of which the State should have had either actual or constructive notice (see, Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 ; Wilson v Proctors Theater & Arts Ctr. & Theater, supra, at 828). | 2 | 3 |
D'Amico v. Christiegreen2 sentences2013We agree with the Tavern, however, that the common-law negligence claim against it should have been dismissed as the accident occurred off its premises and the Tavern owed decedent no duty beyond that set forth in General Obligations Law § 11-101 (see D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 85 [1987]). 2013We agree with the Tavern, however, that the common-law negligence claim against it should have been dismissed as the accident occurred off its premises and the Tavern owed decedent no duty beyond that set forth in General Obligations Law § 11-101 (see D’Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76, 85 [1987]). | 2 | 3 |
Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co.green2 sentences2024Co. , 81 NY2d 494, 505-506 [1993]). 2024Co. , 81 NY2d 494, 505-506 [1993]). | 2 | 2 |
Debellas v. Verrillgreen2 sentences2013Here, the accident occurred when defendant’s dog collided with plaintiff, and defendant’s alleged negligence in calling the dog does not provide a basis to depart from the strict liability rule recognized by the Court of Appeals in Petrone, Bard and Collier {see Bloomer v Shauger, 94 AD3d 1273, 1274 [3d Dept 2012] [“Although . . . defendant’s conduct on the day in question indeed may have evidenced some negligence on her part . . . , the Court of Appeals has made its position clear . . . ; therefore, we are constrained to view this matter solely in the context of strict liability” (citations o 2013Here, the accident occurred when defendant’s dog collided with plaintiff, and defendant’s alleged negligence in calling the dog does not provide a basis to depart from the strict liability rule recognized by the Court of Appeals in Petrone, Bard and Collier {see Bloomer v Shauger, 94 AD3d 1273, 1274 [3d Dept 2012] [“Although . . . defendant’s conduct on the day in question indeed may have evidenced some negligence on her part . . . , the Court of Appeals has made its position clear . . . ; therefore, we are constrained to view this matter solely in the context of strict liability” (citations o | 2 | 2 |
Curbelo v. Walkergreen2 sentences2013Here, the accident occurred when defendant’s dog collided with plaintiff, and defendant’s alleged negligence in calling the dog does not provide a basis to depart from the strict liability rule recognized by the Court of Appeals in Petrone, Bard and Collier {see Bloomer v Shauger, 94 AD3d 1273, 1274 [3d Dept 2012] [“Although . . . defendant’s conduct on the day in question indeed may have evidenced some negligence on her part . . . , the Court of Appeals has made its position clear . . . ; therefore, we are constrained to view this matter solely in the context of strict liability” (citations o 2013Here, the accident occurred when defendant’s dog collided with plaintiff, and defendant’s alleged negligence in calling the dog does not provide a basis to depart from the strict liability rule recognized by the Court of Appeals in Petrone, Bard and Collier {see Bloomer v Shauger, 94 AD3d 1273, 1274 [3d Dept 2012] [“Although . . . defendant’s conduct on the day in question indeed may have evidenced some negligence on her part . . . , the Court of Appeals has made its position clear . . . ; therefore, we are constrained to view this matter solely in the context of strict liability” (citations o | 2 | 2 |
Bloomer v. Shaugergreen2 sentences2013Here, the accident occurred when defendant’s dog collided with plaintiff, and defendant’s alleged negligence in calling the dog does not provide a basis to depart from the strict liability rule recognized by the Court of Appeals in Petrone, Bard and Collier {see Bloomer v Shauger, 94 AD3d 1273, 1274 [3d Dept 2012] [“Although . . . defendant’s conduct on the day in question indeed may have evidenced some negligence on her part . . . , the Court of Appeals has made its position clear . . . ; therefore, we are constrained to view this matter solely in the context of strict liability” (citations o 2013Here, the accident occurred when defendant’s dog collided with plaintiff, and defendant’s alleged negligence in calling the dog does not provide a basis to depart from the strict liability rule recognized by the Court of Appeals in Petrone, Bard and Collier {see Bloomer v Shauger, 94 AD3d 1273, 1274 [3d Dept 2012] [“Although . . . defendant’s conduct on the day in question indeed may have evidenced some negligence on her part . . . , the Court of Appeals has made its position clear . . . ; therefore, we are constrained to view this matter solely in the context of strict liability” (citations o | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2013As plaintiff concedes, the “firefighter’s rule” bars his common-law negligence claim against the City of New York, his municipal employer (see General Obligations Law § 11-106; Williams v City of New York, 2 NY3d 352, 363 [2004]). 2013As plaintiff concedes, the “firefighter’s rule” bars his common-law negligence claim against the City of New York, his municipal employer (see General Obligations Law § 11-106; Williams v City of New York, 2 NY3d 352, 363 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
Buckley v. Columbia Grammar & Preparatorygreen2 sentences2012To be held liable under the statute, which is the codification of the common-law negligence standard, an owner must have had the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury (Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317 [1981]), or actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition (see Buckley v Columbia Grammar & Preparatory, 44 AD3d 263, 272-273 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 710 [2008]; Griffin v New York City Tr. 2012To be held liable under the statute, which is the codification of the common-law negligence standard, an owner must have had the authority to control the activity bringing about the injury (Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317 [1981]), or actual or constructive notice of the hazardous condition (see Buckley v Columbia Grammar & Preparatory, 44 AD3d 263, 272-273 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 710 [2008]; Griffin v New York City Tr. | 2 | 2 |
Bard v. Jahnkegreen2 sentences2017The Court of Appeals addressed this question in Bard v Jahnke ( 6 NY3d 592 [2006], supra), where a carpenter who was working on the defendant’s farm was attacked and injured by the defendant’s breeding bull. 2011We reject the plaintiffs argument that this Court should recognize a common-law negligence claim based on the defendant’s actions in allegedly releasing six dogs in a public place, in light of the clear constraints against recognizing such claims imposed by the Court of Appeals holdings in Petrone v Fernandez ( 12 NY3d 546 [2009]), Bard v Jahnke ( 6 NY3d 592 [2006]), and Collier v Zambito ( 1 NY3d 444 [2004]), as well as this Court’s recent precedents of Wright v Fiore ( 77 AD3d 821 [2010]) and Egan v Hom ( 74 AD3d 1133 [2010] ). | 1 | 3 |
Karoon v. New York City Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences2013Auth. ( 286 AD2d 648 [1st Dept 2001]), the majority bases its reversal of the judgment entered solely on the premise that the trial court improperly allowed a New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) investigator to testify as to his conclusions and opinions which were based on NYCTA’s operating criteria which exceeded the common-law negligence standard of care. 2013Auth. ( 286 AD2d 648 [1st Dept 2001]), the majority bases its reversal of the judgment entered solely on the premise that the trial court improperly allowed a New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) investigator to testify as to his conclusions and opinions which were based on NYCTA’s operating criteria which exceeded the common-law negligence standard of care. | 1 | 3 |
Petrone v. Fernandezgreen2 sentences2015This Court reversed in Petrone , invoking the Bard dissent’s description of the Bard rule as being “that the strict liability involved in Collier is the only kind of liability the owner of a domestic animal may face — that, in other words, there is no such thing as negligence liability where harm done by domestic animals is concerned” (Petrone v Fernandez, 12 NY3d 546, 550 [2009], quoting Bard, 6 NY3d at 601 [R.S. 2011We reject the plaintiffs argument that this Court should recognize a common-law negligence claim based on the defendant’s actions in allegedly releasing six dogs in a public place, in light of the clear constraints against recognizing such claims imposed by the Court of Appeals holdings in Petrone v Fernandez ( 12 NY3d 546 [2009]), Bard v Jahnke ( 6 NY3d 592 [2006]), and Collier v Zambito ( 1 NY3d 444 [2004]), as well as this Court’s recent precedents of Wright v Fiore ( 77 AD3d 821 [2010]) and Egan v Hom ( 74 AD3d 1133 [2010] ). | 1 | 2 |
Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp.green2 sentences2011In any event, the argument is unavailing, since the standard of proof required to establish causation on the statutory claim is lower than that required on the common-law negligence claim (see Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72 [2003]; Cerati v Berrios, 61 AD3d 915 [2009]). 2004In any event, appellant does not specifically challenge the sufficiency or weight of the evidence concerning the verdict on the common-law negligence claim, whose required proof is more stringent than that for a Code violation and supports any implicit finding of statutory violations by the jury (see Giuffrida v Citibank, 100 NY2d 72, 81 [2003]). | 1 | 2 |
Capasso v. Kleen All of America, Inc.green2 sentences2011Defendant met its initial burden of establishing that it did not supervise or control plaintiff’s manner or method of work (cf. Capasso v Kleen All of Am., Inc., 43 AD3d 1346, 1348 ), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect thereto (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 ). 2011Defendant met its initial burden of establishing that it did not supervise or control plaintiffs manner or method of work (cf. Capasso v Kleen All of Am., Inc., 43 AD3d 1346, 1348 [2007]), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect thereto (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). | 1 | 2 |
Zuckerman v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2011Defendant met its initial burden of establishing that it did not supervise or control plaintiff’s manner or method of work (cf. Capasso v Kleen All of Am., Inc., 43 AD3d 1346, 1348 ), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect thereto (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 ). 2011Defendant met its initial burden of establishing that it did not supervise or control plaintiffs manner or method of work (cf. Capasso v Kleen All of Am., Inc., 43 AD3d 1346, 1348 [2007]), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect thereto (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). | 1 | 2 |
Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transportation Commissiongreen2 sentences2010By contrast, a common-law negligence claim may proceed where an officer is injured in the line of duty merely because he or she happened to be present in a given location, but was not engaged in any specific duty that increased the risk of receiving that injury” ( 85 NY2d at 439-440 [emphasis added]). 2010By contrast, a common-law negligence claim may proceed where an officer is injured in the line of duty merely because he or she happened to be present in a given location, but was not engaged in any specific duty that increased the *197 risk of receiving that injury " ( 85 NY2d at 439-440 [emphasis added]). | 1 | 2 |
| Gilson v. Metropolitan Operagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Weisbrod-Moore v. Cayuga Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Early v. Hilton Hotels Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Nazario v. 222 Broadway, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sarmiento v. C & E Associatesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ridolfi v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'Leary v. S&A Electrical Contracting Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Quiroz v. Wells Reit-222 East 41st Street, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mullins v. Center Line Studios, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| De Rosa v. Slattery Contracting Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cuffy v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Berger v. Dykstragreen | 1 | 1 |
| Decotes v. Merritt Meridian Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rice v. City of Cortlandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hutchins v. Finch, Pruyn & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Cook v. Thompkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hyland v. Cobbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Medina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Urbina v. 26 Court Street Associates, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contracting Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Ortega v. Pucciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hess v. Bernheimer & Schwartz Pilsener Brewing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alicea v. Medjugorje Realty, LLC
green
2 sentences2024The indemnification provision in CH2M's contract with the Port Authority is triggered by claims [*2]"to the extent arising from the negligent or willful intentional acts or omissions of the [CH2M or its subcontractors] in the performance of services." The Port Authority and PATH maintain that under the Second Department's decision in Alicea v Medjugorje Realty, LLC ( 210 AD3d 835 [2d Dept 2022]), the motion court should not have dismissed their cross-claim for contractual indemnification. 2024The indemnification provision in CH2M's contract with the Port Authority is triggered by claims [*2]"to the extent arising from the negligent or willful intentional acts or omissions of the [CH2M or its subcontractors] in the performance of services." The Port Authority and PATH maintain that under the Second Department's decision in Alicea v Medjugorje Realty, LLC ( 210 AD3d 835 [2d Dept 2022]), the motion court should not have dismissed their cross-claim for contractual indemnification. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Hechter v. New York Life Insurance
green
2 sentences2024Hechter held only that "a cause of action against a bank for collecting an instrument over a forged indorsement is not time-barred if it is styled in contract and commenced within six years of accrual." ( Id. at 39-40 .) The Hechter Court explained that New York's adoption of the UCC was not intended impliedly to abrogate the existing common-law contract cause of action with respect to forged indorsements of negotiable instruments, and that cause of action's corresponding six-year limitations period. ( Id. at 38-39 .) Hechter did not, however, have occasion to address whether a common-law negl 2024Hechter held only that "a cause of action against a bank for collecting an instrument over a forged indorsement is not time-barred if it is styled in contract and commenced within six years of accrual." ( Id. at 39-40 .) The Hechter Court explained that New York's adoption of the UCC was not intended impliedly to abrogate the existing common-law contract cause of action with respect to forged indorsements of negotiable instruments, and that cause of action's corresponding six-year limitations period. ( Id. at 38-39 .) Hechter did not, however, have occasion to address whether a common-law negl | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Scavetta v. Wechsler
green
2 sentences2023Liability in this case is examined under the vicious propensity rule ( Scavetta v Wechsler , 149 AD3d 202 [1st Dept 2017]). 2023Liability in this case is examined under the vicious propensity rule ( Scavetta v Wechsler , 149 AD3d 202 [1st Dept 2017]). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
In re Barron
neutral
2 sentences2013Contrary to the tavern’s contention, the assault, if intentional, did not serve to sever potential liability under either the Dram Shop Act (see Catania v 124 In-To-Go, Corp., 287 AD2d 476 [2d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 699 [2002]), or under a common-law negligence claim (see Wilder, 254 AD2d at 819 ; Panzera, 253 AD2d at 865 ). 2013Contrary to the tavern’s contention, the assault, if intentional, did not serve to sever potential liability under either the Dram Shop Act (see Catania v 124 In-To-Go, Corp., 287 AD2d 476 [2d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 699 [2002]), or under a common-law negligence claim (see Wilder, 254 AD2d at 819 ; Panzera, 253 AD2d at 865 ). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Panzera v. Johnny's II
green
2 sentences2013Contrary to the tavern’s contention, the assault, if intentional, did not serve to sever potential liability under either the Dram Shop Act (see Catania v 124 In-To-Go, Corp., 287 AD2d 476 [2d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 699 [2002]), or under a common-law negligence claim (see Wilder, 254 AD2d at 819 ; Panzera, 253 AD2d at 865 ). 2013Contrary to the tavern’s contention, the assault, if intentional, did not serve to sever potential liability under either the Dram Shop Act (see Catania v 124 In-To-Go, Corp., 287 AD2d 476 [2d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 699 [2002]), or under a common-law negligence claim (see Wilder, 254 AD2d at 819 ; Panzera, 253 AD2d at 865 ). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Wilder v. Nickbert Inc.
green
2 sentences2013Contrary to the tavern’s contention, the assault, if intentional, did not serve to sever potential liability under either the Dram Shop Act (see Catania v 124 In-To-Go, Corp., 287 AD2d 476 [2d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 699 [2002]), or under a common-law negligence claim (see Wilder, 254 AD2d at 819 ; Panzera, 253 AD2d at 865 ). 2013Contrary to the tavern’s contention, the assault, if intentional, did not serve to sever potential liability under either the Dram Shop Act (see Catania v 124 In-To-Go, Corp., 287 AD2d 476 [2d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 699 [2002]), or under a common-law negligence claim (see Wilder, 254 AD2d at 819 ; Panzera, 253 AD2d at 865 ). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Hastings v. Sauve
green
2 sentences2013Although plaintiffs contended at oral argument that the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Hastings v Sauve (supra) — decided on May 2, 2013, just weeks before oral argument — permits a common-law negligence claim in this case, we need not reach that issue in light of our decision herein. . 2013Although plaintiffs contended at oral argument that the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Hastings v Sauve (supra) — decided on May 2, 2013, just weeks before oral argument — permits a common-law negligence claim in this case, we need not reach that issue in light of our decision herein. . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Catania v. 124 In-To-Go, Corp.
green
2 sentences2013Contrary to the tavern’s contention, the assault, if intentional, did not serve to sever potential liability under either the Dram Shop Act (see Catania v 124 In-To-Go, Corp., 287 AD2d 476 [2d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 699 [2002]), or under a common-law negligence claim (see Wilder, 254 AD2d at 819 ; Panzera, 253 AD2d at 865 ). 2013Contrary to the tavern’s contention, the assault, if intentional, did not serve to sever potential liability under either the Dram Shop Act (see Catania v 124 In-To-Go, Corp., 287 AD2d 476 [2d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 699 [2002]), or under a common-law negligence claim (see Wilder, 254 AD2d at 819 ; Panzera, 253 AD2d at 865 ). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Crosland v. New York City Transit Authority
green
2 sentences2013Crosland involved the application of a specific rule, “rule 85,” which imposed a duty higher than that actually owed in the exercise of ordinary care (Crosland, 68 NY2d at 168-169 ). 2013Crosland involved the application of a specific rule, “rule 85,” which imposed a duty higher than that actually owed in the exercise of ordinary care (Crosland, 68 NY2d at 168-169 ). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Rusin v. Jackson Heights Shopping Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012Shopping Ctr., 27 NY2d 103 [1970].) In other words, a claim arising pursuant to the provision is “tantamount to a common-law negligence claim in a workplace context.” (Mendoza v Highpoint Assoc., IX, LLC, 83 AD3d 1, 9 [1st Dept 2011].) Unlike Labor Law §§ 240 and 241, section 200 does not exempt one- and two-family homeowners from its scope. 2012Shopping Ctr., 27 NY2d 103 [1970].) In other words, a claim arising pursuant to the provision is “tantamount to a common-law negligence claim in a workplace context.” (Mendoza v Highpoint Assoc., IX, LLC, 83 AD3d 1, 9 [1st Dept 2011].) Unlike Labor Law §§ 240 and 241, section 200 does not exempt one- and two-family homeowners from its scope. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Griffin v. New York City Transit Authority
green
2 sentences2012Auth., 16 AD3d 202 [1st Dept 2005]). 2012Auth., 16 AD3d 202 [1st Dept 2005]). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Ryder v. Mount Loretto Nursing Home, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005“There are issues of fact whether [their] excavation . . . created an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff and was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries” (Davis, 299 AD2d at 929 ; see Marano v Commander Elec., Inc., 12 AD3d 571, 572-573 [2004]; Ryder, 290 AD2d at 894 ). 2002There are issues of fact whether Fennell’s excavation of the hole created an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff and was a proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries (see Ryder, 290 AD2d at 894 ). | 2 | 2002–2005 |
Jock v. Fien
green
1 sentence2026Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law negligence standard ( see Samperi v City Safety Compliance Corp. , 225 AD3d at 724), while Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) "subject contractors and owners to absolute strict liability" ( Jock v Fien , 80 NY2d 965, 968 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Justin Nazario v. 222 Broadway, LLC, 222 Broadway, LLC v. Knight Electrical Services Corp. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| De Rosa v. SLATTERY CONTRACTING CO., INC. neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Berger v. Dykstra green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Marshall v. Glenman Industrial & Commercial Contractor Corp. neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| DaSilva v. Haks Engineers, Architects & Land Surveyors green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| King v. New York City Transit Authority neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Richardson v. Campanelli neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Fanning v. Rockefeller University green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Petrone v. Fernandez green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| In re Schutzman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Carafano v. metrosplash.com, Inc. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| cluster 782479 green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| O'Connor-Miele v. Barhite & Holzinger, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Lusenskas v. Axelrod green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Chiara v. Town of New Castle green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Smith v. Sherwood neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Egan v. Hom green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Wright v. Fiore neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Leon v. Martinez green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Collier v. Zambito green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.