merit claim in Pennsylvania

2014As said in Babcock v. Jackson, supra, 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 191 N.E.2d at 283, ‘The merit of such a rule is that ‘it gives to the place ‘having the most interest in the problem’ paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context’ and thereby allows the forum to apply ‘the policy of the jurisdiction ‘most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation’.’ (Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161 , 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 , supra.)’” (footnote omitted) The Griffith Rule... “a workable, fair and flexible approach to choice of law....” 20

2014As said in Babcock v. Jackson, supra, 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 191 N.E.2d at 283, ‘The merit of such a rule is that ‘it gives to the place ‘having the most interest in the problem’ paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context’ and thereby allows the forum to apply ‘the policy of the jurisdiction ‘most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation’.’ (Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161 , 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 , supra.)’” (footnote omitted) The Griffith Rule... “a workable, fair and flexible approach to choice of law....” 20

2005As said in Babcock v. Jackson, supra, 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 191 N.E.2d at 283, “The merit of such a rule is that ‘it gives to the place “having the most interest in the problem” paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context’ and thereby allows the forum to apply ‘the policy of the jurisdiction “most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation”.’ (Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161 , 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 , supra.)” Id. at 805-06 (footnote omitted). ¶ 10 Our Supreme Court further clarified the Griffith rule six years la

2005As said in Babcock v. Jackson, supra, 12 N.Y.2d at 481, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749, 191 N.E.2d at 283, “The merit of such a rule is that ‘it gives to the place “having the most interest in the problem” paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context’ and thereby allows the forum to apply ‘the policy of the jurisdiction “most intimately concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation”.’ (Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161 , 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 , supra.)” Id. at 805-06 (footnote omitted). ¶ 10 Our Supreme Court further clarified the Griffith rule six years la

2017Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943 (Pa.Super. 2000).

2017Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943 (Pa.Super. 2000).

2026Specifically, we are unable to determine the merit of his claim that the Commonwealth failed to satisfy its burden of justifying the firearm regulations at issue at the hearing “by demonstrating that [the regulations are] consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 24 .

2025Loner, supra. In sum, our independent review of Tucker’s issue supports PCRA counsel’s opinion that Tucker’s claim on appeal lacks merit.

2021Hughes, 977 A.2d at 25 -26 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).

2020Without speaking to the merit of such a claim, we note that this Court is limited to the issue as it was framed in the petition for allowance of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 1115(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341 , 347 n.4, 633 A.2d 125 , 127 n.4 (1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2 , 5 n.3, 493 A.2d 1346 , 1348 n.3 (1985)), and Southwestern has not articulated any reason an exception should be made in the present dispute.

2020Without speaking to the merit of such a claim, we note that this Court is limited to the issue as it was framed in the petition for allowance of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 1115(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341 , 347 n.4, 633 A.2d 125 , 127 n.4 (1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2 , 5 n.3, 493 A.2d 1346 , 1348 n.3 (1985)), and Southwestern has not articulated any reason an exception should be made in the present dispute.

2020Without speaking to the merit of such a claim, we note that this Court is limited to the issue as it was framed in the petition for allowance of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 1115(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341 , 347 n.4, 633 A.2d 125 , 127 n.4 (1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2 , 5 n.3, 493 A.2d 1346 , 1348 n.3 (1985)), and Southwestern has not articulated any reason an exception should be made in the present dispute.

2020Without speaking to the merit of such a claim, we note that this Court is limited to the issue as it was framed in the petition for allowance of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 1115(a)(3); Commonwealth v. Metz, 534 Pa. 341 , 347 n.4, 633 A.2d 125 , 127 n.4 (1993) (citing Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2 , 5 n.3, 493 A.2d 1346 , 1348 n.3 (1985)), and Southwestern has not articulated any reason an exception should be made in the present dispute.

2017See Laird, supra at 978 ; Robinson, supra at 439 .

2017See Appellant’s Brief at 9-10; Abu Jamal, supra. Rather, as the PCRA court notes, and Appellant concedes, the storyboards contained only pictures of the various co- defendants—information known to Appellant before his original trial in 1980.

2016See Moore, supra at 1366 ; Faust, supra at 1266 .

2016Nevertheless, we do not reach this level of merit analysis since Appellant does not meet an applicable timeliness exception. -7- J-S29012-16 noted, “[t]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] claim may nevertheless be lost should it be raised ... in an untimely PCRA petition for which no time-bar exception applies, thus depriving the court of jurisdiction over the claim.” [Commonwealth v.] Seskey, [ 86 A.3d 237 ,] 242 [(Pa. Super. 2014)].

2015This Court further noted in Franklin that “counsel’s failure [i]s not overcome by the lower court’s review of the [issue raised in the] original appeal.” Id.

2014McAndrew, 56 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 9 (quoting Pa. R.C.P. 4003.3).