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5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Davis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1977"Strong tactical considerations would militate in favor of delaying the raising of the claim in hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did not *738 materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time where reprosecution might well be difficult.” Davis v. United States, 411 U. S. 233, 241 (93 SC 1577, 36 LE2d 216) (1973). 11. 1976The basis of this principle was explained in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States where the Court noted the probable result of allowing such a point to be raised after the verdict: "Strong tactical considerations would militate in favor of delaying the raising of the claim in hopes of an acquittal, with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when reprosecution might well be difficult." Davis v. United States, 411 U. S. 233, 241 (1973). | 2 | 3 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abernathy v. State
green
2 sentences2016In response, the defense asserted that because Otis would not be calling an expert witness to support the defense, he was not required to give advance notice pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 31.1 1 and what is now Rule 31.5 (B) 2 (formerly Rule 31.4), and relied upon the holding in Abernathy v. State, 265 Ga. 754 ( 462 SE2d 615 ) (1995). 2016In response, the defense asserted that because Otis would not be calling an expert witness to support the defense, he was not required to give advance notice pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 31.1 1 and what is now Rule 31.5 (B) 2 (formerly Rule 31.4), and relied upon the holding in Abernathy v. State, 265 Ga. 754 ( 462 SE2d 615 ) (1995). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
green
1 sentence1975Even more recently that Court has held that "Our cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 235 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Gainesville, Jefferson & Southern Railroad v. Edmondson
green
2 sentences1907Co. v. Edmondson, 101 Ga. 747 ( 29 S. E. 213 ), Mr. Justice Little in the opinion said, that, after proof of damage from sparks from a running locomotive and the raising of the presumption of negligence, the burden was on the company to show that the emission- of such sparks, or the escape of the fire from the engine, “was not due to the want of ordinary diligence on the part of itself or its servants, either as to the condition of the locomotive or in its management and operation.” See also Southern Railway Co. v. Williams, 113 Ga. 335 ( 38 S. E. 744 ). 1907Co. v. Edmondson, 101 Ga. 747 ( 29 S. E. 213 ), Mr. Justice Little in the opinion said, that, after proof of damage from sparks from a running locomotive and the raising of the presumption of negligence, the burden was on the company to show that the emission- of such sparks, or the escape of the fire from the engine, “was not due to the want of ordinary diligence on the part of itself or its servants, either as to the condition of the locomotive or in its management and operation.” See also Southern Railway Co. v. Williams, 113 Ga. 335 ( 38 S. E. 744 ). | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Southern Railway Co. v. Williams
green
2 sentences1907Co. v. Edmondson, 101 Ga. 747 ( 29 S. E. 213 ), Mr. Justice Little in the opinion said, that, after proof of damage from sparks from a running locomotive and the raising of the presumption of negligence, the burden was on the company to show that the emission- of such sparks, or the escape of the fire from the engine, “was not due to the want of ordinary diligence on the part of itself or its servants, either as to the condition of the locomotive or in its management and operation.” See also Southern Railway Co. v. Williams, 113 Ga. 335 ( 38 S. E. 744 ). 1907Co. v. Edmondson, 101 Ga. 747 ( 29 S. E. 213 ), Mr. Justice Little in the opinion said, that, after proof of damage from sparks from a running locomotive and the raising of the presumption of negligence, the burden was on the company to show that the emission- of such sparks, or the escape of the fire from the engine, “was not due to the want of ordinary diligence on the part of itself or its servants, either as to the condition of the locomotive or in its management and operation.” See also Southern Railway Co. v. Williams, 113 Ga. 335 ( 38 S. E. 744 ). | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.