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5 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2001 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hunter v. Stategreen2 sentences1985Appellant’s reliance on Channell v. State, 172 Ga. App. 156 ( 322 SE2d 356 ) (1984), is misplaced, as in that case the sole evidence of appellant’s intoxication was based on the roadside sobriety test, whereas in Hunter, supra, the screening test results were merely cumulative of the results of an intoximeter test administered to the defendant showing his blood alcohol content. 1984Compare Hunter v. State, 143 Ga. App. 541 (5) ( 239 SE2d 212 ) (1977), wherein the State "emphasized" that a roadside sobriety test was not designed to measure the amount of alcohol in the blood but that it was used to confirm the arresting officer's belief that alcohol was present in the driver's body systems. | 1 | 2 |
Wessels v. Stategreen2 sentences1984It was failed." The officer then testified that, based upon his observations of appellant at roadside and while in his custody on the night in question, he believed "that she was definitely under the influence of alcohol, appeared to be very drunk, and stated that she had been drinking beer that night." Although the State did not attempt to rely on the screening test as a measure of appellant's degree of intoxication, this court has found that "the public is generally aware of the standard procedures attendant to arrest for [D.U.I.], i.e., that chemical tests are administered by law enforcemen 1984It was failed." The officer then testified that, based upon his observations of appellant at roadside and while in his custody on the night in question, he believed "that she was definitely under the influence of alcohol, appeared to be very drunk, and stated that she had been drinking beer that night." Although the State did not attempt to rely on the screening test as a measure of appellant's degree of intoxication, this court has found that "the public is generally aware of the standard procedures attendant to arrest for [D.U.I.], i.e., that chemical tests are administered by law enforcemen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Channell v. State
green
2 sentences2001Channell v. State, 172 Ga.App. 156 , 322 S.E.2d 356 (1984), upon which Baker relies, is inapposite because in that case, the officer testified that the defendant "failed" the roadside sobriety test. 2001Channell v. State, 172 Ga.App. 156 , 322 S.E.2d 356 (1984), upon which Baker relies, is inapposite because in that case, the officer testified that the defendant "failed" the roadside sobriety test. | 3 | 1985–2001 |
Turrentine v. State
green
1 sentence1996The Court held, “[b]ecause the required foundation was not laid in the case before us, we hold *629 that the trial court erred in admitting the officer’s testimony that the appellant ‘failed’ the roadside sobriety test which he had administered to her.” Channell v. State, 172 Ga. App. 156, 157 , supra. In Turrentine v. State, 176 Ga. App. 145 , supra, the Court held that the alco-sensor did not come within the ambit of OCGA § 40-6-392, because the test did not measure the amount of alcohol or drugs in the blood but was merely a screening device to show the presence of alcohol in the body. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Olgaard
green
1 sentence1984Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P2d 992 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Olgaard, 248 NW2d 392 (S.D. 1976). 2 The Colorado Supreme Court, apparently the only other court in the nation to consider this precise issue, recently reached a contrary conclusion in People v. Carlson, _ Colo. — (52 LW 2465, decided Jan. 30, Í984), wherein it held that a roadside sobriety test may not be constitutionally administered unless there is already probable cause to arrest the driver for DUI or the driver voluntarily consents to perform the test. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State Ex Rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Ct. of State
green
1 sentence1984Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P2d 992 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Olgaard, 248 NW2d 392 (S.D. 1976). 2 The Colorado Supreme Court, apparently the only other court in the nation to consider this precise issue, recently reached a contrary conclusion in People v. Carlson, _ Colo. — (52 LW 2465, decided Jan. 30, Í984), wherein it held that a roadside sobriety test may not be constitutionally administered unless there is already probable cause to arrest the driver for DUI or the driver voluntarily consents to perform the test. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.