time for trial rule in Washington

2021State v. Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d 130, 135 , 216 P.3d 1024 (2009).

2019State v. Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d 130, 135 , 216 P.3d 1024 (2009).

2021State v. Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d 130, 135 , 216 P.3d 1024 (2009).

2019State v. Kenyon, 167 Wn.2d 130, 135 , 216 P.3d 1024 (2009).

2007Id. ¶ 17 To determine whether application of CrRLJ 3.3(c)(2)(ii) requires a showing of due diligence by the State, it is helpful to trace the history of that standard as applied to the time-for-trial rule.

2007Id. ¶17 To determine whether application of CrRLJ 3.3(c)(2)(ii) requires a showing of due diligence by the State, it is helpful to trace the history of that standard as applied to the time-for-trial rule.

2024“A defendant waives the right to assert a time-for-trial violation by failing 9 No. 38437-3-III State v. Howard to object within 10 days after receiving notice of a trial date.” State v. George, 160 Wn.2d 727, 733 , 158 P.3d 1169 (2007).

2012State v. George, 160 Wn.2d 727, 736-37 , 158 P.3d 1169 (2007) (quoting State v. Anderson, 121 Wn.2d 852, 864 , 855 P.2d 671 (1993)). ¶24 In 2002, the Supreme Court created the Time-for-Trial Task Force (Task Force) to clarify and simplify the time for trial rule.

1988In its opinion the Pacheco court made no reference to its earlier decision in State v. Peterson, 90 Wn.2d 423 , 585 P.2d 66 (1978) (decided before the amended version of the rule) which declared that in the application of State v. Striker, 87 Wn.2d 870 , 557 P.2d 847 (1976) to the time for trial rule, there was no legal significance in the distinction between charges initiated by complaint in district court rather than by information.

1988In its opinion the Pacheco court made no reference to its earlier decision in State v. Peterson, 90 Wn.2d 423 , 585 P.2d 66 (1978) (decided before the amended version of the rule) which declared that in the application of State v. Striker, 87 Wn.2d 870 , 557 P.2d 847 (1976) to the time for trial rule, there was no legal significance in the distinction between charges initiated by complaint in district court rather than by information.

2022Id. at 822–23. 11 No. 83438-0-I/12 The time-for-trial rule “is not a constitutional mandate.” State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 651 , 716 P.2d 295 (1986).

2021State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 823 , 312 P.3d 1 (2013).

2015Id.

2015Id. ¶13 On appeal, the Supreme Court was persuaded by State v. Dolman, 22 Wn.

2013App. 307 , 254 P.3d 883 (2011). 1 Ollivier was originally charged with additional counts, but the State agreed to dismissal of several counts in light of State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870 , 204 P.3d 916 (2009). 4 No. 86633-3 ANALYSIS Right to a Speedy Trial Under CrR 3.3 Mr. Ollivier maintains that the time-for-trial rule in CrR 3.3 was violated when the trial court granted 22 continuances without, he asserts, making sufficient inquiry into the reasons for the delays.

2013App. 307 , 254 P.3d 883 (2011). 1 Ollivier was originally charged with additional counts, but the State agreed to dismissal of several counts in light of State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870 , 204 P.3d 916 (2009). 4 No. 86633-3 ANALYSIS Right to a Speedy Trial Under CrR 3.3 Mr. Ollivier maintains that the time-for-trial rule in CrR 3.3 was violated when the trial court granted 22 continuances without, he asserts, making sufficient inquiry into the reasons for the delays.

2013App. 307 , 254 P.3d 883 (2011). 1 Ollivier was originally charged with additional counts, but the State agreed to dismissal of several counts in light of State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870 , 204 P.3d 916 (2009). 4 No. 86633-3 ANALYSIS Right to a Speedy Trial Under CrR 3.3 Mr. Ollivier maintains that the time-for-trial rule in CrR 3.3 was violated when the trial court granted 22 continuances without, he asserts, making sufficient inquiry into the reasons for the delays.

2013App. 307 , 254 P.3d 883 (2011). 1 Ollivier was originally charged with additional counts, but the State agreed to dismissal of several counts in light of State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870 , 204 P.3d 916 (2009). 4 No. 86633-3 ANALYSIS Right to a Speedy Trial Under CrR 3.3 Mr. Ollivier maintains that the time-for-trial rule in CrR 3.3 was violated when the trial court granted 22 continuances without, he asserts, making sufficient inquiry into the reasons for the delays.

2013App. 307 , 254 P.3d 883 (2011). 1 Ollivier was originally charged with additional counts, but the State agreed to dismissal of several counts in light of State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870 , 204 P.3d 916 (2009). 4 No. 86633-3 ANALYSIS Right to a Speedy Trial Under CrR 3.3 Mr. Ollivier maintains that the time-for-trial rule in CrR 3.3 was violated when the trial court granted 22 continuances without, he asserts, making sufficient inquiry into the reasons for the delays.

2013App. 307 , 254 P.3d 883 (2011). 1 Ollivier was originally charged with additional counts, but the State agreed to dismissal of several counts in light of State v. Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870 , 204 P.3d 916 (2009). 4 No. 86633-3 ANALYSIS Right to a Speedy Trial Under CrR 3.3 Mr. Ollivier maintains that the time-for-trial rule in CrR 3.3 was violated when the trial court granted 22 continuances without, he asserts, making sufficient inquiry into the reasons for the delays.

2013State v. Kindsvogel, 149 Wn.2d 477, 480 , 69 P.3d 870 (2003); State v. Nelson, 131 Wn.

2013State v. 3 Kindsvogel, 149 Wn. d 477, 480, 69 P. d 870 ( 003); 2 3 2 State v. Nelson, 131 Wn.

2008Lau, J. ¶1 This case presents the sole question of whether the 2003 amendments to the time-for-trial rule supersede the decision in State v. Fulps, 141 Wn.2d 663 , 9 P.3d 832 (2000).

2008Id. at 670 . ¶10 In 2003, the Washington Supreme Court amended the time-for-trial rule and several related rules based on the recommendations of the Time-for-Trial Task Force.

2008Thomas cites State v. Chhom, 162 Wn.2d 451 , 173 P.3d 234 (2007), in support of his argument that we have authority to judicially interpret the new time-for-trial rule to allow dismissal for reasons that are beyond the express terms of the rule.

2008B. [6] Thomas cites State v. Chhom, 162 Wash.2d 451 , 173 P.3d 234 , review granted, 162 Wash.2d 451 , 173 P.3d 234 (2007), in support of his argument that we have authority to judicially interpret the new time-for-trial rule to allow dismissal for reasons that are beyond the express terms of the rule.

2008Lau, J. ¶1 This case presents the sole question of whether the 2003 amendments to the time-for-trial rule supersede the decision in State v. Fulps, 141 Wn.2d 663 , 9 P.3d 832 (2000).

2008LAU, J. ¶ 1 This case presents the sole question of whether the 2003 amendments to the time-for-trial rule supersede the decision in State v. Fulps, 141 Wash.2d 663 , 9 P.3d 832 (2000).

2008Thomas cites State v. Chhom, 162 Wn.2d 451 , 173 P.3d 234 (2007), in support of his argument that we have authority to judicially interpret the new time-for-trial rule to allow dismissal for reasons that are beyond the express terms of the rule.

2008B. [6] Thomas cites State v. Chhom, 162 Wash.2d 451 , 173 P.3d 234 , review granted, 162 Wash.2d 451 , 173 P.3d 234 (2007), in support of his argument that we have authority to judicially interpret the new time-for-trial rule to allow dismissal for reasons that are beyond the express terms of the rule.

2007State v. Williams, 87 Wn.2d 916, 920 , 557 P.2d 1311 (1976) (noting that the time-for-trial rule was patterned after the ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial).

2007State v. Williams, 87 Wn.2d 916, 920 , 557 P.2d 1311 (1976) (noting that the time-for-trial rule was patterned after the ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial).

2007State v. Stewart, 130 Wash.2d 351, 361 , 922 P.2d 1356 (1996). ¶ 19 For purposes of the time-for-trial rule for courts of limited jurisdiction, a different county is treated as a foreign jurisdiction akin to a different state.

2007State v. Stewart, 130 Wn.2d 351, 361 , 922 P.2d 1356 (1996). ¶19 For purposes of the time-for-trial rule for courts of limited jurisdiction, a different county is treated as a foreign jurisdiction akin to a different state.

2007We have no indication, as the State seems to suggest, that a court that has already convicted and sentenced a defendant would attempt to interfere with another court’s prosecution of an unrelated charge. ¶42 In accord with our conclusion that the exclusion of time under former CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5) is limited to time during which a defendant is detained by another county or one of its subdivisions (or in prison outside the county, in a federal jail or prison, or subjected to conditions of release not imposed by a court of the state of Washington), we hold that the rule does not apply when a defendan

2007We have no indication, as the State seems to suggest, that a court that has already convicted and sentenced a defendant would attempt to interfere with another court’s prosecution of an unrelated charge. ¶42 In accord with our conclusion that the exclusion of time under former CrRLJ 3.3(g)(5) is limited to time during which a defendant is detained by another county or one of its subdivisions (or in prison outside the county, in a federal jail or prison, or subjected to conditions of release not imposed by a court of the state of Washington), we hold that the rule does not apply when a defendan

2007State v. Stewart, 130 Wash.2d 351, 361 , 922 P.2d 1356 (1996). ¶ 19 For purposes of the time-for-trial rule for courts of limited jurisdiction, a different county is treated as a foreign jurisdiction akin to a different state.

2007State v. Stewart, 130 Wn.2d 351, 361 , 922 P.2d 1356 (1996). ¶19 For purposes of the time-for-trial rule for courts of limited jurisdiction, a different county is treated as a foreign jurisdiction akin to a different state.

2005State v. Flinn, 152 Wn.2d 1013 , 101 P.3d 108 (2004).

2005State v. Flinn, 152 Wash.2d 1013 , 101 P.3d 108 (2004).

2026PRP at 7*; RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809 , 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (courts will not consider claims raised in passing or without argument). *We note that the PRP does not contain page numbers.

2026PRP at 7*; RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809 , 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (courts will not consider claims raised in passing or without argument). *We note that the PRP does not contain page numbers.

2025Determining whether a time for trial violation has occurred 4 No. 39830-7-III State v. Lumpkin “requires an application of court rules to particular facts.” State v. Swenson, 150 Wn.2d 181, 186 , 75 P.3d 513 (2003).

2025Determining whether a time for trial violation has occurred 4 No. 39830-7-III State v. Lumpkin “requires an application of court rules to particular facts.” State v. Swenson, 150 Wn.2d 181, 186 , 75 P.3d 513 (2003).

2024App. 136, 144 , 347 P.3d 1096 (2015). 9 7 Our Supreme Court amended the time-for-trial rule in 2003 based on the recommendations of the Time-for-Trial Task Force.