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5 Iowa opinions name it 1 courts 1911–1982 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Associationgreen2 sentences1974However, as this court noted in Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 260 Iowa 1061, 1066 , 152 N.W.2d 293, 296 (1967), we have never held presence of this “underlying reason” is an indispensable requirement for the application of the doctrine. 1974However, as this court noted in Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 260 Iowa 1061, 1066 , 152 N.W.2d 293, 296 (1967), we have never held presence of this “underlying reason” is an indispensable requirement for the application of the doctrine. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Carneygreen1 sentence1982Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, at 123,125-26, § 1396, at 127 (1940); see State v. Strabie, 313 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Iowa 1981); State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1978) (“the primary interest secured by the confrontation clause ... is the right of cross-examination”); State v. Carney, 236 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1975) (same); C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Strablegreen1 sentence1982Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, at 123,125-26, § 1396, at 127 (1940); see State v. Strabie, 313 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Iowa 1981); State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1978) (“the primary interest secured by the confrontation clause ... is the right of cross-examination”); State v. Carney, 236 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1975) (same); C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen1 sentence1982Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, at 123,125-26, § 1396, at 127 (1940); see State v. Strabie, 313 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Iowa 1981); State v. Davis, 269 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 1978) (“the primary interest secured by the confrontation clause ... is the right of cross-examination”); State v. Carney, 236 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1975) (same); C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DeMoss Ex Rel. DeMoss v. Darwin T. Lynner Construction Co.
green
1 sentence1973Lynner Construction Co., 159 N.W.2d at 467 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Golden v. Iowa City State Bank
green
1 sentence1927In re Estate of Rich, supra, declares on this subject: “It is true that declarations or admissions deliberately made, clearly remembered, and correctly given, are often satisfactory evidence.” On this phase of the contention, for the sake of distinguishment, it is well to note that", if the indispensable factors' exist, the relief may be granted, even though there is mixed with satisfactory and adequate testimony in the record that which culminates in only a proposition or contemplation of doing something in the future. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Lynch v. Coolahan
neutral
1 sentence1927Applicable at this juncture is this quotation from Lynch v. Coolahan, supra: ‘ ‘ Considerable of the evidence related to what decedent declared he would do, or expected to do, which, when without suggestion of so doing in pursuance of any contract obligation, could have little probative force. * * * There was quite enough, however, not only to prove the agreement alleged, but that decedent vras being boarded and cared for in pursuance thereof. ’ ’ V. | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Mattox v. United States
green
2 sentences1911Accordingly, supposing that the indispensable requirement of cross-examination has been satisfied, the only remaining inquiry is whether the demeanor evidence, to be obtained by the witness’ production before the tribunal, is available.” In Mattox v. U. S., 156 U. S. 237 (15 Sup. Ct. 337, 39 L. 1911Accordingly, supposing that the indispensable requirement of cross-examination has been satisfied, the only remaining inquiry is whether the demeanor evidence, to be obtained by the witness’ production before the tribunal, is available.” In Mattox v. U. S., 156 U. S. 237 (15 Sup. Ct. 337, 39 L. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.