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5 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1990–1992 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anthony v. City of Chicagogreen2 sentences1992(See, e.g., Anthony, 168 Ill.App.3d at 737 [ 119 Ill.Dec. 554 , 523 N.E.2d 22 ]; Gardner, 71 Ill. 1992(See, e.g., Anthony, 168 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
Gardner v. Village of Chicago Ridgegreen1 sentence1992(See, e.g., Anthony, 168 Ill.App.3d at 737 [ 119 Ill.Dec. 554 , 523 N.E.2d 22 ]; Gardner, 71 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Krska v. Allstate Insurance Co.green1 sentence1990See Krska v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1987), 162 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Cloninger v. National General Insurancegreen2 sentences1990However, the form failed to explain the nature of the coverage and thus failed to satisfy the fourth part of the test. ( 109 Ill. 2d at 428 .) The supreme court noted that, had the form included an explanation of the offer as discussed in Orolin, it would have cured the improper offer in Cloninger. ( 109 Ill. 2d at 428 .) Justice Miller, in his concurring opinion, also noted that the Hartford form in Orolin was insufficient because it failed to explain how uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverages were related. ( 109 Ill. 2d at 430 (Miller, J., specially concurring).) In addition, 1990However, the form failed to explain the nature of the coverage and thus failed to satisfy the fourth part of the test. ( 109 Ill. 2d at 428 .) The supreme court noted that, had the form included an explanation of the offer as discussed in Orolin, it would have cured the improper offer in Cloninger. ( 109 Ill. 2d at 428 .) Justice Miller, in his concurring opinion, also noted that the Hartford form in Orolin was insufficient because it failed to explain how uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverages were related. ( 109 Ill. 2d at 430 (Miller, J., specially concurring).) In addition, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Poliny v. Soto
neutral
2 sentences1990We further recognize that numerous appellate court decisions have embraced all four parts of the test with regularity ( Fessler, 161 Ill.App.3d at 297 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists ( Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 241, 248 , 132 Ill.Dec. 602 , 540 N.E.2d 342 ; Poliny, 178 Ill.App.3d at 207 , 127 Ill.Dec. 397 , 533 N.E.2d 15 ; Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 404 1990We further recognize that numerous appellate court decisions have embraced all four parts of the test with regularity ( Fessler, 161 Ill.App.3d at 297 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists ( Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 241, 248 , 132 Ill.Dec. 602 , 540 N.E.2d 342 ; Poliny, 178 Ill.App.3d at 207 , 127 Ill.Dec. 397 , 533 N.E.2d 15 ; Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 404 | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Fessler v. R.E.J. Inc.
green
2 sentences1990Inc. (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 290, 296-98 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 ; Luber v. City of Highland (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 758, 762-63 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 .) Specifically, the Fessler court also addressed the alleged ambiguity in Brooks and held that the factual setting of Brooks (where the police directed decedent to use his automobile as part of roadblock) was an example of the kind of direct control the fourth part of the test generally has been held to contemplate. 1990Inc. (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 290, 296-98 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 ; Luber v. City of Highland (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 758, 762-63 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 .) Specifically, the Fessler court also addressed the alleged ambiguity in Brooks and held that the factual setting of Brooks (where the police directed decedent to use his automobile as part of roadblock) was an example of the kind of direct control the fourth part of the test generally has been held to contemplate. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven
green
2 sentences1990We further recognize that numerous appellate court decisions have embraced all four parts of the test with regularity ( Fessler, 161 Ill.App.3d at 297 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists ( Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 241, 248 , 132 Ill.Dec. 602 , 540 N.E.2d 342 ; Poliny, 178 Ill.App.3d at 207 , 127 Ill.Dec. 397 , 533 N.E.2d 15 ; Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 404 1990App. 3d at 297 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists (Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Brooks v. Lundeen
green
2 sentences1992Specifically, he asserted that the court should adopt the language of Brooks v. Lundeen (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 1 , 7 Ill.Dec. 262 , 364 N.E.2d 423 , which would find a special relationship based on traditional concepts of duty and foreseeability in negligence law. 1992Specifically, he asserted that the court should adopt the language of Brooks v. Lundeen (1977), 49 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
League General Insurance Co. v. Tvedt
green
1 sentence1991(See League General Insurance Co. v. Tvedt (Minn. 1982), 317 N.W.2d 40, 42-43 ; Holman v. All Nation Insurance Co. (Minn. 1980), 288 N.W.2d 244, 250 .) The Minnesota court was addressing a concern that the customer was seldom given enough information to make an intelligent decision about optional coverage and that even a customer who asks for the minimum coverage might decide to increase his limits if told that the additional protection was available at minimal cost. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Holman v. All Nation Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1991(See League General Insurance Co. v. Tvedt (Minn. 1982), 317 N.W.2d 40, 42-43 ; Holman v. All Nation Insurance Co. (Minn. 1980), 288 N.W.2d 244, 250 .) The Minnesota court was addressing a concern that the customer was seldom given enough information to make an intelligent decision about optional coverage and that even a customer who asks for the minimum coverage might decide to increase his limits if told that the additional protection was available at minimal cost. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Kavanaugh v. Midwest Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990We further recognize that numerous appellate court decisions have embraced all four parts of the test with regularity ( Fessler, 161 Ill.App.3d at 297 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists ( Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 241, 248 , 132 Ill.Dec. 602 , 540 N.E.2d 342 ; Poliny, 178 Ill.App.3d at 207 , 127 Ill.Dec. 397 , 533 N.E.2d 15 ; Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 404 1990We further recognize that numerous appellate court decisions have embraced all four parts of the test with regularity ( Fessler, 161 Ill.App.3d at 297 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists ( Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 241, 248 , 132 Ill.Dec. 602 , 540 N.E.2d 342 ; Poliny, 178 Ill.App.3d at 207 , 127 Ill.Dec. 397 , 533 N.E.2d 15 ; Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 404 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Galuszynski v. City of Chicago
green
2 sentences1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au 1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Curtis v. County of Cook
green
2 sentences1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au 1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hernandez v. Village of Cicero
green
2 sentences1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au 1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Luber v. City of Highland
green
2 sentences1990Inc. (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 290, 296-98 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 ; Luber v. City of Highland (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 758, 762-63 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 .) Specifically, the Fessler court also addressed the alleged ambiguity in Brooks and held that the factual setting of Brooks (where the police directed decedent to use his automobile as part of roadblock) was an example of the kind of direct control the fourth part of the test generally has been held to contemplate. 1990Inc. (1987), 161 Ill.App.3d 290, 296-98 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 ; Luber v. City of Highland (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 758, 762-63 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 .) Specifically, the Fessler court also addressed the alleged ambiguity in Brooks and held that the factual setting of Brooks (where the police directed decedent to use his automobile as part of roadblock) was an example of the kind of direct control the fourth part of the test generally has been held to contemplate. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Mallder v. Rasmussen
green
2 sentences1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au 1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Marvin v. Chicago Transit Authority
green
2 sentences1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au 1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Long v. Soderquist
green
2 sentences1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au 1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Jackson v. Chicago Firefighters Union
green
2 sentences1990We further recognize that numerous appellate court decisions have embraced all four parts of the test with regularity ( Fessler, 161 Ill.App.3d at 297 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists ( Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 241, 248 , 132 Ill.Dec. 602 , 540 N.E.2d 342 ; Poliny, 178 Ill.App.3d at 207 , 127 Ill.Dec. 397 , 533 N.E.2d 15 ; Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 404 1990We further recognize that numerous appellate court decisions have embraced all four parts of the test with regularity ( Fessler, 161 Ill.App.3d at 297 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists ( Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 241, 248 , 132 Ill.Dec. 602 , 540 N.E.2d 342 ; Poliny, 178 Ill.App.3d at 207 , 127 Ill.Dec. 397 , 533 N.E.2d 15 ; Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 404 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Marshall v. Ellison
green
2 sentences1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au 1990Dec. 393 , 513 N.E.2d 1002 ; Luber, 151 Ill.App.3d at 762 , 104 Ill.Dec. 583 , 502 N.E.2d 1243 ; Hernandez v. Village of Cicero (1986), 151 Ill.App.3d 170, 175 , 104 Ill.Dec. 566 , 502 N.E.2d 1226 ; Mallder v. Rasmussen (1986), 145 Ill.App.3d 809, 812 , 99 Ill.Dec. 621 , 495 N.E.2d 1356 ; Marshall v. Ellison (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 732, 737 , 87 Ill.Dec. 704 , 477 N.E.2d 830 ; Galuszynski v. City of Chicago (1985), 131 Ill.App.3d 505, 508 , 86 Ill.Dec. 581 , 475 N.E.2d 960 ; Long v. Soderquist (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1064-65 , 82 Ill.Dec. 80 , 467 N.E.2d 1153 ; Marvin v. Chicago Transit Au | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield
green
2 sentences1990We further recognize that numerous appellate court decisions have embraced all four parts of the test with regularity ( Fessler, 161 Ill.App.3d at 297 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists ( Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 241, 248 , 132 Ill.Dec. 602 , 540 N.E.2d 342 ; Poliny, 178 Ill.App.3d at 207 , 127 Ill.Dec. 397 , 533 N.E.2d 15 ; Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 404 1990We further recognize that numerous appellate court decisions have embraced all four parts of the test with regularity ( Fessler, 161 Ill.App.3d at 297 , 112 Ill.Dec. 852 , 514 N.E.2d 515 (and cases cited therein)), and that a plethora of appellate opinions has decided, exclusively by reference to the fourth part of the test, whether a special relationship exists ( Trepachko v. Village of Westhaven (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 241, 248 , 132 Ill.Dec. 602 , 540 N.E.2d 342 ; Poliny, 178 Ill.App.3d at 207 , 127 Ill.Dec. 397 , 533 N.E.2d 15 ; Vasconcelles v. City of Springfield (1988), 170 Ill.App.3d 404 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Rutter v. Horace Mann Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1990(Rutter, 190 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.