insecurity clause in Illinois

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Court held that, in order to enforce an insecurity clause, “the party invoking the clause must reasonably and in good faith believe that the prospect of payment or performance has somehow been impaired.” In support of this conclusion, the court looked to article 2, and cited Sheppard Federal Credit Union v. Palmer (5th Cir. 1969), 408 F.2d 1369 .

1990The Sheppard court came to the following conclusion: “In his excellent treatise on security interests, Professor Gilmore indicates that the language of UCC § 1 — 208 means in substance that ‘[t]he creditor has the right to accelerate if, under all the circumstances, a reasonable man, motivated by good faith, would have done so.’ ” ( 408 F.2d at 1371 n.2, quoting 2 G.

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990This test, which at least one court has termed “the pure heart and empty head” test, appears potentially draconian “because of the great latitude it gives the creditor and the onerous burden of proof it imposes on the debtor.” (Black v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. (Miss. 1983), 437 So. 2d 26, 29 .) While the debtor’s burden of proof may be difficult because the debtor must delve into the creditor’s state of mind, the burden is not impossible.

1990(Richards, 745 P.2d at 1032 .) We are not convinced, as was this Colorado appellate court, that the context of an insecurity clause mandates that we abandon the definition provided in article 1, which is also the definition to which section 1 — 208 is specifically cross-referenced in the Uniform Commercial Code comment.

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1990Quest v. Barnett Bank (Fla. App. 1981), 397 So. 2d 1020 ; Builders Transport, Inc. v. Hall (1987), 183 Ga. App. 812 , 360 S.E.2d 60 ; Ginn v. Citizens & Southern National Bank (1978), 145 Ga. App. 175 , 243 S.E.2d 528 ; Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank (Iowa 1975), 236 N.W.2d 674 ; Van Bibber v. Norris (1981), 275 Ind. 555 , 419 N.E.2d 115 (apparently applying a subjective test); Karner v. Willis (1985), 238 Kan. 246 , 710 P.2d 21 ; Fort Knox National Bank v. Gustafson (Ky. 1964), 385 S.W.2d 196 ; Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen’s Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 517 ; Salsb

1949Robinson v. Peterson, 40 Ill.

1912In the case of Ashley Wire Co. v. Illinois Steel Co., 164 Ill. 149 , the court had before it a case involving the foreclosure of a mortgage, and it was there held that the defense that a meeting of the directors of a corporation at which a mortgage of its property was made was held under an irregular notice and at an unauthorized place is not available in a suit to foreclose the mortgage, where no action has been taken in disaffirmance of the proceedings at the meeting or in repudiation of the note or mortgage, and that irregularities in the meeting of a corporation at which a mortgage is exec

1888Boy v. Goings, 96 Ill. 361 .

1885Appellants claiming under a mortgage from the execution defendants, and seeking to avail themselves of the insecurity clause therein, were the general owners within the meaning of the rule declared in Lamping v. Payne, 83 Ill. 466 ; as against the sheriff, Simmons v. Jenkins, 76 Ill. 479 ; and in that case the judgment for defendant should be in the alternative, that plaintiffs pay the amount due upon the valid execution in his hands against the goods or return them to the defendant, and not absolute for a return, as it was in this case.