Second Amendment challenge in Illinois

2011See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98-101 (a statute forbidding possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers did not severely limit the right to possess firearms, survived intermediate scrutiny and would pass muster even under strict scrutiny). ¶ 73 In Aguilar, this court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard to review the defendant’s second amendment challenge to his AUUW conviction, which was based on his carrying a loaded firearm at a time when he was not in his own home or place of business.

2011See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98-101 (a statute forbidding possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers did not severely limit the right to possess firearms, survived intermediate scrutiny and would pass muster even under strict scrutiny). ¶ 73 In Aguilar , this court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard to review the defendant's second amendment challenge to his AUUW conviction, which was based on his carrying a loaded firearm at a time when he was not in his own home or place of business.

2026Constitutionality of UPWF statute ¶ 62 Defendant also claims that the UPWF statute violates the Second Amendment under the test established in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

2025Bruen, 597 U.S. at 22 ; see McDonald, 561 U.S. at 790-91 (the second amendment does not permit “judges to assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions” under means-end scrutiny). ¶ 27 Bruen clarified and applied the text-and-history standard in the context of a second amendment challenge to New York’s firearm licensing regime, which 4 The United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.

2011See, e.g., Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 145 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (rejecting strict scrutiny), 146 ("we find intermediate scrutiny to be the appropriate standard in the present case" for the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Mimes, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d at 75 ("We find that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the second amendment challenge at issue here," the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 ("Recently, this district in Aguilar [cit

2011See, e.g., Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 145 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (rejecting strict scrutiny), 146 ("we find intermediate scrutiny to be the appropriate standard in the present case" for the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Mimes, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d at 75 ("We find that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the second amendment challenge at issue here," the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 ("Recently, this district in Aguilar [cit

2025See People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 27 (finding that firearms with defaced serial numbers “are not covered by the plain text of the second amendment because they are not typically used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”); Hatcher, 2024 IL App (1st) 220455, ¶¶ 55-61 (upholding the constitutionality of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute when the defendant did not possess a valid FOID card, did not have a CCL 13 No. 1-23-1795 license, and was under the age of 21); Mobley, 2023 IL App (1st) 221264, ¶¶ 27-29 (rejecting the defendant’s second amendment challenge of the un

2024In Burns, we found the second amendment protects the right of “law-abiding citizens” to possess firearms, agreeing with the First District’s decision in People v. Baker, 2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶ 37 .

2011May 25, 2011), and in People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747 . ¶ 54 In Aguilar and in Mimes, this court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard to review the defendants’ second amendment challenge to their AUUW convictions, which were based on them carrying loaded firearms at a time when they were not in their own homes or places of business.

2011May 25, 2011), and in People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747 , 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d 55 . *570 ¶ 54 In Aguilar and in Mimes , this court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard to review the defendants' second amendment challenge to their AUUW convictions, which were based on them carrying loaded firearms at a time when they were not in their own homes or places of business.

2017See Wiggins, 2016 IL App (1st) 153163, ¶¶ 75, 87 . 3 ¶ 68 We apply a two-step approach to a second-amendment challenge.

2017It is hard to imagine a person who falls more squarely into the group of individuals who “pose[ ] a particular danger to the - 19 ­ No. 1-16-0706 public” (internal quotation marks omitted) (id.) than one who is found by the Board, by a preponderance of the evidence, to “pose[ ] a danger to himself or herself or others” or to be a “threat to public safety.” 430 ILCS 66/20(g) (West 2014). ¶ 72 But while plaintiff does not object to a licensure regimen, or to the denial of licenses to people who are truly dangerous, he maintains that section 20(g) violates the second amendment because the standar

2011See, e.g., Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 145 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (rejecting strict scrutiny), 146 ("we find intermediate scrutiny to be the appropriate standard in the present case" for the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Mimes, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d at 75 ("We find that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the second amendment challenge at issue here," the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 ("Recently, this district in Aguilar [cit

2011See, e.g., Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 145 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (rejecting strict scrutiny), 146 ("we find intermediate scrutiny to be the appropriate standard in the present case" for the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Mimes, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d at 75 ("We find that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the second amendment challenge at issue here," the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 ("Recently, this district in Aguilar [cit

2011App.3d 747, 749 , 349 Ill.Dec. 799 , 947 N.E.2d 813 (2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and the armed habitual criminal statute); Wilson, 407 Ill.App.3d at 768 , 348 Ill.Dec. 160 , 943 N.E.2d 768 (applying intermediate scrutiny to uphold a statute banning assault weapons). [3] Again, defendant offers us no new argument about why we should depart from our well-established precedent. ¶ 30 Respondent's third argument is that the statute cannot survive any heightened level of scrutiny, whether it be strict scrutiny or an intermediate level of scrutiny.

2011See, e.g., Aguilar, 408 Ill.App.3d at 145 , 348 Ill.Dec. 575 , 944 N.E.2d 816 (rejecting strict scrutiny), 146 ("we find intermediate scrutiny to be the appropriate standard in the present case" for the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Mimes, ___ Ill.App.3d ___, 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d at 75 ("We find that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the second amendment challenge at issue here," the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute); Ross, 407 Ill.App.3d at 939 , 349 Ill.Dec. 762 , 947 N.E.2d 776 ("Recently, this district in Aguilar [cit

2011May 25, 2011), and in People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747 , 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d 55 . *570 ¶ 54 In Aguilar and in Mimes , this court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard to review the defendants' second amendment challenge to their AUUW convictions, which were based on them carrying loaded firearms at a time when they were not in their own homes or places of business.

2011May 25, 2011), and in People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747 , 352 Ill.Dec. 119 , 953 N.E.2d 55 . *570 ¶ 54 In Aguilar and in Mimes , this court adopted intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard to review the defendants' second amendment challenge to their AUUW convictions, which were based on them carrying loaded firearms at a time when they were not in their own homes or places of business.

2011In People v. Marin, 342 Ill.App.3d 716, 723-24 , 277 Ill.Dec. 285 , 795 N.E.2d 953 (2003), this court looked at the history and language of the AUUW statute and determined that its overall purpose is to protect the public and police enforcement officers from the inherent dangers and threats to safety posed by any person carrying in public a loaded and immediately accessible firearm on his person or in his vehicle.

2011In People v. Marin, 342 Ill.App.3d 716, 723-24 , 277 Ill.Dec. 285 , 795 N.E.2d 953 (2003), this court looked at the history and language of the AUUW statute and determined that its overall purpose is to protect the public and police enforcement officers from the inherent dangers and threats to safety posed by any person carrying in public a loaded and immediately accessible firearm on his person or in his vehicle.

2025Bruen, 597 U.S. at 22 ; see McDonald, 561 U.S. at 790-91 (the second amendment does not permit “judges to assess the costs and benefits of firearms restrictions” under means-end scrutiny). ¶ 27 Bruen clarified and applied the text-and-history standard in the context of a second amendment challenge to New York’s firearm licensing regime, which 4 The United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment.

2025See People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 27 (finding that firearms with defaced serial numbers “are not covered by the plain text of the second amendment because they are not typically used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”); Hatcher, 2024 IL App (1st) 220455, ¶¶ 55-61 (upholding the constitutionality of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute when the defendant did not possess a valid FOID card, did not have a CCL 13 No. 1-23-1795 license, and was under the age of 21); Mobley, 2023 IL App (1st) 221264, ¶¶ 27-29 (rejecting the defendant’s second amendment challenge of the un

2025See Atkinson, 70 F.4th at 1022-23 (noting Bruen left unresolved the “complicated issue” of whether the second amendment’s plain text covers felons).

2025See Thompson, 2025 IL 129965, ¶ 3 ; see also 430 ILCS 66/1 et seq.

2025People v. Velazquez, 2025 IL App (1st) 230449, ¶ 83 (reminding trial court how courtroom etiquette reflects shared set of norms benefitting all in open pursuit of truth). ¶ 114 Second Amendment ¶ 115 Because the evidence is insufficient, I would not reach the second amendment challenge.

2025See People v. Ramirez, 2023 IL 128123, ¶ 27 (finding that firearms with defaced serial numbers “are not covered by the plain text of the second amendment because they are not typically used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes”); Hatcher, 2024 IL App (1st) 220455, ¶¶ 55-61 (upholding the constitutionality of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute when the defendant did not possess a valid FOID card, did not have a CCL 13 No. 1-23-1795 license, and was under the age of 21); Mobley, 2023 IL App (1st) 221264, ¶¶ 27-29 (rejecting the defendant’s second amendment challenge of the un

2025See People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (1st) 232120, ¶ 22 (finding the AHC statute constitutional on its face “because the second amendment only protects the right of law-abiding citizens to bear arms, the Bruen test does not apply to the armed habitual criminal statute”); People v. Gray, 2025 IL App (1st) 191086-B, ¶ 20 (finding that statutes prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons, including the AHC statute, generally fell “outside [the] scope” of the second amendment); People v. Kelley, 2024 IL App (1st) 230569, ¶ 17 (upholding the AHC and concluding that “by its plain language, the Supr

2025See People v. Lopez, 2025 IL App (1st) 232120, ¶ 22 (finding the AHC statute constitutional on its face “because the second amendment only protects the right of law-abiding citizens to bear arms, the Bruen test does not apply to the armed habitual criminal statute”); People v. Gray, 2025 IL App (1st) 191086-B, ¶ 20 (finding that statutes prohibiting the possession of firearms by felons, including the AHC statute, generally fell “outside [the] scope” of the second amendment); People v. Kelley, 2024 IL App (1st) 230569, ¶ 17 (upholding the AHC and concluding that “by its plain language, the Supr

2025Bruen, 597 U.S. at 37 ; Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 93 (2020) (“incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights bear the same content when asserted against States as they do when asserted against the federal government”).