Second Amendment challenge in California

2025(Id. at pp. 28–29.) But the Supreme Court recognized that “the Second Amendment is [not] a regulatory straightjacket” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 30 ) and stressed that “nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of . . . licensing regimes” that “require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety course” because these “are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the 17 jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’ ” (Id. at pp. 38–39, fn. 9.) Finally, in United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 , 69

2025(Id. at pp. 28–29.) But the Supreme Court recognized that “the Second Amendment is [not] a regulatory straightjacket” (Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. at p. 30 ) and stressed that “nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of . . . licensing regimes” that “require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety course” because these “are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the 17 jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’ ” (Id. at pp. 38–39, fn. 9.) Finally, in United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 , 69

2024We will, however, consider Fernandez’s facial challenge to the DVPA, which Fernandez contends “is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the state’s interest in protecting victims of domestic violence.” (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 [a facial constitutional challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal].) Fernandez raises a Second Amendment issue as to the DV- 130 Restraining Order After Hearing form’s mandatory provision prohibiting a restrained person from possessing a firearm (which is based on section 6389).

2024Read properly, and as applied to the context of Farca’s Second Amendment challenge, In re Sheena K. requires us to conclude that Farca forfeited his Second Amendment challenge by failing to raise it below. 9 In In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 878 , the defendant did not challenge in the trial court a probation condition that she not associate with anyone disapproved of by the probation officer.

2025So even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” (Id. at p. 30.) More recently, in United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 (Rahimi) the United States Supreme Court cautioned that its Second Amendment “precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.” (Id. at pp. 691, 700 [holding a federal statute prohibiting a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm withstands a Second Amendment challenge and rejecting argument that the historical analogu

2025So even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” (Id. at p. 30.) More recently, in United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 (Rahimi) the United States Supreme Court cautioned that its Second Amendment “precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.” (Id. at pp. 691, 700 [holding a federal statute prohibiting a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm withstands a Second Amendment challenge and rejecting argument that the historical analogu

2024This issue was addressed in Altafulla v. Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 571 (Altafulla), where the court 19 upheld section 6389 following a Second Amendment challenge to the statute.

2024This issue was addressed in Altafulla v. Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 571 (Altafulla), where the court 19 upheld section 6389 following a Second Amendment challenge to the statute.

2025Accordingly, and for the sake of readability, we discuss only Eller’s battery conviction in the remainder of this opinion. 7 disarms persons who have proven unable to control violent criminal impulses.” (Flores, at p. 575, italics added.) In People v. Delacy (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1481 (Delacy), the majority opinion rejected a Second Amendment challenge to former section 12021, subdivision (c)(1), brought by a criminal defendant whose prior predicate offense was misdemeanor battery.

2025Accordingly, and for the sake of readability, we discuss only Eller’s battery conviction in the remainder of this opinion. 7 disarms persons who have proven unable to control violent criminal impulses.” (Flores, at p. 575, italics added.) In People v. Delacy (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1481 (Delacy), the majority opinion rejected a Second Amendment challenge to former section 12021, subdivision (c)(1), brought by a criminal defendant whose prior predicate offense was misdemeanor battery.

2024(People v. Bocanegra (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1236 , 1239 (Bocanegra); see also People v. James (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 662, 667 [rejecting Second Amendment challenge to § 30605’s predecessor].) A. Bruen The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The Supreme Court has found this language protects an individual right to possess and carry arms for self-defense (District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570, 592, 595, 620 (Heller)) and, under the Fourteenth Amendm

2014This court said that the Second Amendment right “is the right to possess and carry weapons typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes such as self-defense. [Citation.] It protects the right to possess a handgun in one’s home because handguns are a ‘class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society’ for the lawful purpose of self-defense.” (James, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 676 , italics added.) *463 In People v. Zondorak (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 829 [ 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 491 ] (Zondorak), Division One of the Fourth Appellate District also addressed a Second Ame

2026In Heller, the Court explained the Second Amendment does not entail “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 626 .) Based on United States v. Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 174 [ 83 L.Ed. 1206 ] (Miller), Heller recognized the Second Amendment protects only “the sorts of weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time.’” ( Heller, supra, at p. 627 .) In Miller, the Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to a federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce. ( Miller

2026In Heller, the Court explained the Second Amendment does not entail “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 626 .) Based on United States v. Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 174 [ 83 L.Ed. 1206 ] (Miller), Heller recognized the Second Amendment protects only “the sorts of weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time.’” ( Heller, supra, at p. 627 .) In Miller, the Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to a federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce. ( Miller

2025So even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” (Id. at p. 30.) More recently, in United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 (Rahimi) the United States Supreme Court cautioned that its Second Amendment “precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.” (Id. at pp. 691, 700 [holding a federal statute prohibiting a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm withstands a Second Amendment challenge and rejecting argument that the historical analogu

2025So even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” (Id. at p. 30.) More recently, in United States v. Rahimi (2024) 602 U.S. 680 (Rahimi) the United States Supreme Court cautioned that its Second Amendment “precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.” (Id. at pp. 691, 700 [holding a federal statute prohibiting a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm withstands a Second Amendment challenge and rejecting argument that the historical analogu

2020(See Worman v. Healey (1st Cir. 2019) 922 F.3d 26, 36 (Worman) [rejecting challenge to Massachusetts law proscribing sale, transfer, and possession of certain semiautomatic assault weapons 3 Defendant asserts this argument has not been forfeited for failure to assert it in the trial court because “the challenged law may be evaluated without reference to the facts of the instant case.” (See People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 310 [considering Second Amendment claim on the merits because the issue was one of law, would avert any claim of inadequate assistance of counsel, and Heller w

2011(E.g., U.S. v. White (11th Cir. 2010) 593 F.3d 1199, 1205-1206 ; U.S. v. Rene E. (1st Cir. 2009) 583 F.3d 8, 12-16 [possession by minor]; In re U.S. (10th Cir. 2009) 578 F.3d 1195 , 1200; U.S. v. McCane (10th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 ; U.S. v. Anderson (5th Cir. 2009) 559 F.3d 348, 352 .) In People v. Yarbrough (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 303, 312-314 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 674 ] (Yarbrough), this court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to the prohibition on carrying concealed firearms in section 12025, subdivision (a)(2), based on Heller’s approval of certain traditional regulations.

2014(Id. at p. 627, fn. 26; see People v. Ellison (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1348 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ] (Ellison).) The Heller court also indicated the Second Amendment’s protection does not extend to all types of guns but instead to firearms “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful” nonmilitary purposes such as self-defense. ( Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 625-626.) The Heller court discussed United States v. Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 174 [ 83 L.Ed. 1206 , 59 S.Ct. 816 ] (Miller), which rejected a Second Amendment challenge to federal statutory restrictions on transporting unregi

2014(Id. at p. 627, fn. 26; see People v. Ellison (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1348 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 245 ] (Ellison).) The Heller court also indicated the Second Amendment’s protection does not extend to all types of guns but instead to firearms “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful” nonmilitary purposes such as self-defense. ( Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 625-626.) The Heller court discussed United States v. Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 174 [ 83 L.Ed. 1206 , 59 S.Ct. 816 ] (Miller), which rejected a Second Amendment challenge to federal statutory restrictions on transporting unregi

2013(People v. Villa (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 [considering a Second Amendment challenge based on Heller because "defendant's trial predated Heller, making a timely objection impossible"].) Here, both Heller and McDonald were decided years before the proceedings in Corsini's case.

2013(People v. Villa (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 443, 448 [considering a Second Amendment challenge based on Heller because "defendant's trial predated Heller, making a timely objection impossible"].) Here, both Heller and McDonald were decided years before the proceedings in Corsini's case.

2026In Heller, the Court explained the Second Amendment does not entail “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 626 .) Based on United States v. Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 174 [ 83 L.Ed. 1206 ] (Miller), Heller recognized the Second Amendment protects only “the sorts of weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time.’” ( Heller, supra, at p. 627 .) In Miller, the Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to a federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce. ( Miller

2026In Heller, the Court explained the Second Amendment does not entail “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” (Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 626 .) Based on United States v. Miller (1939) 307 U.S. 174 [ 83 L.Ed. 1206 ] (Miller), Heller recognized the Second Amendment protects only “the sorts of weapons . . . ‘in common use at the time.’” ( Heller, supra, at p. 627 .) In Miller, the Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to a federal indictment for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce. ( Miller

2020(U.S. v. Chovan, supra, 735 F.3d at p. 1138 .) “Heller tells us that the core of the Second Amendment is ‘the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.’ ” (Ibid.) “Unlike the law held unconstitutional in Heller, the laws at issue here do not prohibit the possession of ‘the quintessential self-defense weapon,’ to wit, the handgun.” (Heller v. District of Columbia (D.C.

2014(District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) 554 U.S. 570, 626-627 .) In United States v. Chovan (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3d 1127, 1141 [distinguishing United States v. Chester (4th Cir. 2010) 628 F.3d 673 ], the Ninth Circuit recently held that prohibiting domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing firearms did not violate rights protected by the Second Amendment under the test of intermediate scrutiny, since prohibition on gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants is substantially related to the important government interest of preventing domestic gun violence.

2025Cir. 2024) 124 F.4th 218, 228, 223, 232 , (en banc) [ruling the government did not carry its burden to demonstrate that application of a federal firearm regulation to a man challenging the law was consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, in part because “[m]ore than two decades after he was convicted” of a crime that was “classified as a Pennsylvania misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment,” the record contained “no evidence that [he] pose[d] a physical danger to others”].) Such a result may seem counterintuitive at first glance, due to the gene

2025Cir. 2024) 124 F.4th 218, 228, 223, 232 , (en banc) [ruling the government did not carry its burden to demonstrate that application of a federal firearm regulation to a man challenging the law was consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, in part because “[m]ore than two decades after he was convicted” of a crime that was “classified as a Pennsylvania misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment,” the record contained “no evidence that [he] pose[d] a physical danger to others”].) Such a result may seem counterintuitive at first glance, due to the gene

2024(See People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 668 [federal court of appeal decisions are not binding on California courts].) E.

2024(See Range, supra, 69 F.4th at p. 98 [discussing 18 U.S.C. § 922 , subd. (g)(1)].) In a decision the Third Circuit is now reconsidering in light of Rahimi, the Range majority found the statute unconstitutional as applied to a man whose prior conviction was for a nonviolent crime unrelated to firearms, a crime denominated a misdemeanor under state law, albeit one punishable by up to five years in prison.

2024(See Range, supra, 69 F.4th at p. 98 [discussing 18 U.S.C. § 922 , subd. (g)(1)].) In a decision the Third Circuit is now reconsidering in light of Rahimi, the Range majority found the statute unconstitutional as applied to a man whose prior conviction was for a nonviolent crime unrelated to firearms, a crime denominated a misdemeanor under state law, albeit one punishable by up to five years in prison.

2023Take, for instance, the freedom of speech in the First Amendment, to which Heller repeatedly compared the right to keep and bear arms. [( Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 582, 595, 606, 618, 634-635.)] In that context, ‘[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.’ [(United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. (2000) 529 U.S. 803, 816 ; see also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986) 475 U.S. 767, 777 .)] In some cases, that burden includes showing whether the expressive conduct falls outside of the categor

2023Take, for instance, the freedom of speech in the First Amendment, to which Heller repeatedly compared the right to keep and bear arms. [( Heller, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 582, 595, 606, 618, 634-635.)] In that context, ‘[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.’ [(United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. (2000) 529 U.S. 803, 816 ; see also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps (1986) 475 U.S. 767, 777 .)] In some cases, that burden includes showing whether the expressive conduct falls outside of the categor

2023(See JMS Air Conditioning & Appliance Service, Inc. v. Santa Monica Community College Dist. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 945, 962, fn. 6 .) 10 IV Second Amendment Claim R.T. has also forfeited his Second Amendment challenge to the order requiring him to relinquish his firearm.