codal requirement in Louisiana

2017App. 1 Cir. 9/23/09), 28 So.3d 1057, 1060 , writ not considered, 2010-0480 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1256 ; Succession of Slay, 99-1753, p. 6-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/17/00), 764 So.2d 102 , writ denied, 00-2481 (La. 11/13/00), 774 So.2d 144 ; and Evans v. Evans, 410 So.2d 729, 733 (La. 1982) ("The fact that there is no fraud, or even suggestion or intimation of it, will not justify the courts in departing from the codal requirements, even to bring about justice in the particular instance, since any material relaxation of the codal rule will open up a fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and impos

2017App. 1 Cir. 9/23/09), 28 So.3d 1057 , writ not cons. , 2010-0480 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1256 : The fact that there is no fraud, or even a suggestion or intimation of it, will not justify the courts in departing from the codal requirements, even to bring about justice in the particular instance, since any material relaxation of the codal rule will open up a fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and imposition.

2017App. 1 Cir. 9/23/09), 28 So.3d 1057, 1060 , writ not considered, 2010-0480 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1256 ; Succession of Slay, 99-1753, p. 6-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/17/00), 764 So.2d 102 , writ denied, 00-2481 (La. 11/13/00), 774 So.2d 144 ; and Evans v. Evans, 410 So.2d 729, 733 (La. 1982) ("The fact that there is no fraud, or even suggestion or intimation of it, will not justify the courts in departing from the codal requirements, even to bring about justice in the particular instance, since any material relaxation of the codal rule will open up a fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and impos

2017App. 1 Cir. 9/23/09), 28 So.3d 1057 , writ not cons. , 2010-0480 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1256 : The fact that there is no fraud, or even a suggestion or intimation of it, will not justify the courts in departing from the codal requirements, even to bring about justice in the particular instance, since any material relaxation of the codal rule will open up a fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and imposition.

2003As stated in State v. Cottingin, 476 So.2d 1184 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985), appeal after remand, 496 So.2d 1379 (La.App. 3 Cir.1986): There are two underlying purposes of the codal requirement that the sentencing court articulate the specific reasons based on particular facts and considerations for imposing a sentence.

2003As stated in State v. Cottingin, 476 So.2d 1184 (La.App. 3 Cir.1985), appeal after remand, 496 So.2d 1379 (La.App. 3 Cir.1986): There are two underlying purposes of the codal requirement that the sentencing court articulate the specific reasons based on particular facts and considerations for imposing a sentence.

1998Luman, supra ; Petitto, supra .

1996Luman, supra ; Petitto, supra .

1996Kennedy v. Bearden, supra. The codal presumption is expressed in La.C.C. art. 2480 and is applicable where the vendor retains corporeal possession.

1987Kennedy v. Bearden, supra. The codal presumption is expressed in LSA-C.C.

1989One guilty of fault is not due indemnity." As stated in Truxillo [ v. Gentilly Medical Bldg., Inc. ] [ 225 So.2d 488 (La.App. 4th Cir.1969) ]: "`The key to the applicability of the codal principle of indemnity is of course the determination that the affair "concerns" only one of two or more solidarily liable parties within the meaning of LSA-C.C. art. 2106 and therefore, as between themselves, the other or others are only the sureties of that one.

1989As stated in Truxillo, supra: "The key to the applicability of the codal principle of indemnity is of course the determination that the affair `concerns' only one of two or more solidarity liable parties within the meaning of LSA-C.C. art. 2106 and therefore, as between themselves, the other or others are only the sureties of that one.

1986Observing that the Supreme Court had "elaborated on the methodology of appellate review of awards for general damages in Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1977)," Justice Tate quoted from Coco, 341 So.2d at 335-36 , as follows: We do re-emphasize, however, that before a Court of Appeal can disturb an award made by a trial court that the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award.

1986Justice Tate observed in Reck that the Supreme Court had “elaborated on the methodology of appellate review of awards for general damages in Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc.,” and quoted from Coco, 341 So.2d 332 at 335 , as follows: We do re-emphasize, however, that before a Court of Appeal can disturb an award made by a trial court that the record must clearly reveal that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award.

1986QUANTUM In Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979), the Supreme Court, per Tate, J., reiterated the well-established codal rule that in the assessment of general damages, “much discretion must be left to the [trial] judge or jury,” citing Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239 , 158 So.2d 149 (1963) as “the fountainhead decision of modern jurisprudence interpreting and applying this [article 1934(3) ] code provision.” 373 So.2d at 499 .

1986QUANTUM In Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979), the Supreme Court, per Tate, J., reiterated the well-established codal rule that in the assessment of general damages, “much discretion must be left to the [trial] judge or jury,” citing Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239 , 158 So.2d 149 (1963) as “the fountainhead decision of modern jurisprudence interpreting and applying this [article 1934(3) ] code provision.” 373 So.2d at 499 .

1986QUANTUM In Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979), the Supreme Court, per Tate, J., reiterated the well-established codal rule that in the assessment of general damages, “much discretion must be left to the [trial] judge or jury,” citing Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239 , 158 So.2d 149 (1963) as “the fountainhead decision of modern jurisprudence interpreting and applying this [article 1934(3) ] code provision.” 373 So.2d at 499 .

1986QUANTUM In Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979), the Supreme Court, per Tate, J., reiterated the well-established codal rule that in the assessment of general damages, “much discretion must be left to the [trial] judge or jury,” citing Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239 , 158 So.2d 149 (1963) as “the fountainhead decision of modern jurisprudence interpreting and applying this [article 1934(3) ] code provision.” 373 So.2d at 499 .

2017App. 1 Cir. 9/23/09), 28 So.3d 1057, 1060 , writ not considered, 2010-0480 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1256 ; Succession of Slay, 99-1753, p. 6-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/17/00), 764 So.2d 102 , writ denied, 00-2481 (La. 11/13/00), 774 So.2d 144 ; and Evans v. Evans, 410 So.2d 729, 733 (La. 1982) ("The fact that there is no fraud, or even suggestion or intimation of it, will not justify the courts in departing from the codal requirements, even to bring about justice in the particular instance, since any material relaxation of the codal rule will open up a fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and impos

2017App. 1 Cir. 9/23/09), 28 So.3d 1057, 1060 , writ not considered, 2010-0480 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1256 ; Succession of Slay, 99-1753, p. 6-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/17/00), 764 So.2d 102 , writ denied, 00-2481 (La. 11/13/00), 774 So.2d 144 ; and Evans v. Evans, 410 So.2d 729, 733 (La. 1982) ("The fact that there is no fraud, or even suggestion or intimation of it, will not justify the courts in departing from the codal requirements, even to bring about justice in the particular instance, since any material relaxation of the codal rule will open up a fruitful field for fraud, substitution, and impos

2003C.C.P. art. 1915(B) certification to facilitate appellate review" and to "satisfy the codal requirement for a trial court's express determination." Id.

2000According to Article 2329, this procedure, as a matter of law, was insufficient to terminate the matrimonial regime and, therefore, we find error in the trial court's failure to recognize the lack of compliance with the codal requirement. [3] See Poirier v. Poirier, 626 So.2d 868 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 634 So.2d 389 (La.1994); Lauga v. Lauga, 537 So.2d 758 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989).

2000According to Article 2329, this procedure, as a matter of law, was insufficient to terminate the matrimonial regime and, therefore, we find error in the trial court's failure to recognize the lack of compliance with the codal requirement. [3] See Poirier v. Poirier, 626 So.2d 868 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 634 So.2d 389 (La.1994); Lauga v. Lauga, 537 So.2d 758 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989).

2000According to Article 2329, this procedure, as a matter of law, was insufficient to terminate the matrimonial regime and, therefore, we find error in the trial court's failure to recognize the lack of compliance with the codal requirement. [3] See Poirier v. Poirier, 626 So.2d 868 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 634 So.2d 389 (La.1994); Lauga v. Lauga, 537 So.2d 758 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989).

1994Phillips, supra at 795 .

1987See Sabrier v. Leard, 426 So.2d 213 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982); Dietz v. Dietz, 227 La. 801 , 80 So.2d 414 (1955).

1987See Sabrier v. Leard, 426 So.2d 213 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982); Dietz v. Dietz, 227 La. 801 , 80 So.2d 414 (1955).

1985State v. McDermitt, 406 So.2d 195 (La.1981); State v. Morgan, supra. There are two underlying purposes of the codal requirement that the sentencing court articulate the specific reasons based on particular facts and considerations for imposing a sentence.

1985State v. McDermitt, 406 So.2d 195 (La.1981); State v. Morgan, supra. There are two underlying purposes of the codal requirement that the sentencing court articulate the specific reasons based on particular facts and considerations for imposing a sentence.

1984Art. 2203." 437 So.2d at 367 .

1982The evidence further establishes that the tree was owned by and in the custody of the State at the time of the accident. *608 Consequently, under the codal doctrine of strict liability for things in one's custody, LSA-C.C. art. 2317, [3] as interpreted by Loescher v. Parr, 324 So.2d 441 (La.1975), the State must be held liable.

1982In Loescher, supra, our Supreme Court concluded that the owner and custodian of a tree was liable to third persons for damages occasioned by its falling.

1980Plaintiff contends that the compromise is unenforceable because it does not meet the codal requirement of La.Civ.Code art. 3071 that "the contract must be reduced to writing." Plaintiff further contends that the Court of Appeal erred in relying on Martin v. Holzer Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 376 So.2d 500 (La.1979) in granting defendants' motion.

1980Defendants rely on Martin v. Holzer Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 376 So.2d 500 (La. 1979), like the Jasmin case, a workman's compensation suit, where this court decided that a joint stipulation in open court, recorded and transcribed, constituted a confession of judgment.