(a) A national bank may make real estate loans under 12 U.S.C. 371 and § 34.3, without regard to state law limitations concerning:
(1) Licensing, registration (except for purposes of service of process), filings, or reports by creditors;
(2) The ability of a creditor to require or obtain private mortgage insurance, insurance for other collateral, or other credit enhancements or risk mitigants, in furtherance of safe and sound banking practices;
(3) Loan-to-value ratios;
(4) The terms of credit, including schedule for repayment of principal and interest, amortization of loans, balance, payments due, minimum payments, or term to maturity of the loan, including the circumstances under which a loan may be called due and payable upon the passage of time or a specified event external to the loan;
(5) The aggregate amount of funds that may be loaned upon the security of real estate;
(6) Escrow accounts, impound accounts, and similar accounts;
(7) Security property, including leaseholds;
(8) Access to, and use of, credit reports;
(9) Disclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specific statements, information, or other content to be included in credit application forms, credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related documents;
(10) Processing, origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages;
(11) Disbursements and repayments;
(12) Rates of interest on loans;
1
1 The limitations on charges that comprise rates of interest on loans by national banks are determined under Federal law. See 12 U.S.C. 85 and 1735f-7a; 12 CFR 7.4001. State laws purporting to regulate national bank fees and charges that do not constitute interest are addressed in 12 CFR 7.4002.
(13) Due-on-sale clauses except to the extent provided in 12 U.S.C. 1701j-3 and 12 CFR part 591; and
(14) Covenants and restrictions that must be contained in a lease to qualify the leasehold as acceptable security for a real estate loan.
(b) State laws on the following subjects are not inconsistent with the real estate lending powers of national banks and apply to national banks to the extent consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al., 517 U.S. 25 (1996):
(1) Contracts;
(2) Torts;
(3) Criminal law;
2
2 But see the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 238 (1903), where the Court stated that “[u]ndoubtedly a state has the legitimate power to define and punish crimes by general laws applicable to all persons within its jurisdiction * * *. But it is without lawful power to make such special laws applicable to banks organized and operating under the laws of the United States.” Id. at 239 (holding that Federal law governing the operations of national banks preempted a state criminal law prohibiting insolvent banks from accepting deposits).
(4) Homestead laws specified in 12 U.S.C. 1462a(f);
(5) Rights to collect debts;
(6) Acquisition and transfer of real property;
(7) Taxation;
(8) Zoning; and
(9) Any other law that the OCC determines to be applicable to national banks in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, Florida Insurance Commissioner, et al., 517 U.S. 25 (1996), or that is made applicable by Federal law.
[69 FR 1917, Jan. 13, 2004, as amended at 76 FR 43569, July 21, 2011]
Notes of Decisions
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N. A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
· cites it 4× “§ 484 (a) ("No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law.”
Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 908 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
· cites it 10× “The OCC defined the preemptive scope of a bank’s real estate lending power in 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 , the applicable version 6 of which provides in relevant part: (a) Except where made applicable by Federal law, state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability…”
Lomax v. Bank of Am., N.A., 435 B.R. 362 (N.D.W. Va. 2010).
· cites it 8× “See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). II. National Bank Act Preemption Standards The National Bank Act (“NBA”) empowers the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) to regulate real estate loans made by national banks.”
Leghorn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
· cites it 5× “Plaintiffs contend that their claims are not preempted because they assert contract or tort claims of general applicability not targeted at banking activity that, in addition, fall within the exemption for laws that “the OCC determines to be applicable to national banks.”
Tamburri v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
· cites it 6× “That provision states: Except where made applicable by Federal law, state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers do not apply to national banks.”
Watkins v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 631 F. Supp. 2d 776 (S.D.W. Va 2008).
· cites it 8× “” Apparently, Plaintiff continues to rely, in part, on 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (b): “State laws on' the following subjects are not inconsistent with the real estate lending powers of national banks and apply to national banks to the extent that they only incidentally affect the…”
Young v. Wells Fargo & Co., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (S.D. Iowa 2009).
· cites it 4× “The OCC regulation at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 sets forth the extent of preemption regarding real estate lending.”
Zink v. First Niagara Bank, N.A., 18 F. Supp. 3d 363 (W.D.N.Y. 2014).
· cites it 8× “, and a regulation promulgated thereunder by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (a)(10) (First Niagara’s Memorandum of Law [37-1], Point I); that Zink lacks standing to pursue his claims because his satisfaction of mortgage has already been…”
— 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) — 1 case
— 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(1) — 1 case
— 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(2) — 2 cases
— 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(4) — 2 cases
Watkins v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 631 F. Supp. 2d 776 (S.D.W. Va 2008).
“” Apparently, Plaintiff continues to rely, in part, on 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (b): “State laws on' the following subjects are not inconsistent with the real estate lending powers of national banks and apply to national banks to the extent that they only incidentally affect the…”
— 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) — 4 cases
Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 908 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
“The OCC defined the preemptive scope of a bank’s real estate lending power in 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 , the applicable version 6 of which provides in relevant part: (a) Except where made applicable by Federal law, state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability…”
— 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b)(1) — 1 case
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