12 U.S.C. § 1701j
Repealed. Aug. 2, 1954, ch. 649, title VIII, § 813, 68 Stat. 647
[repealed]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 25
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: Wilson ex rel. Wilson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 48 F. Supp. 3d 787 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
Wilson ex rel. Wilson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 48 F. Supp. 3d 787 (E.D. Pa. 2014). “Germain Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j — 3(d)(5)—which prohibits a federal savings and loan institution’s exercise of a “due-on-sale” clause upon “transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower.”
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Garcia (In Re Garcia), 276 B.R. 627 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002). “12 U.S.C. § 1701j — 3(b)(3). 58 . Snow v.”
Perry v. Island Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 684 P.2d 1281 (Wash. 1984). “12 U.S.C. § 1701j — 3(b) (1). Though Congress intended to preempt state efforts to regulate the enforcement of due-on-sale provisions in real estate loans, a total federal preemption would have had an unfair impact on those home buyers who, despite the contractual terms of their…”
Brush v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 911 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D. Tex. 2012). “law, Wells Fargo was prohibited from exercising the “due on sale clause” in Struble’s note, see 12 U.S.C. § 1701j — 3(d) & (d)(5) (“[A] lender may not exercise its option pursuant to a due-on-sale clause upon .”
Adebanjo v. Dime Sav. Bank of New York, FSB (In Re Adebanjo), 165 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994). “12 U.S.C.A. § 1701j — 3(d) (West 1989) (prohibiting lenders from exercising due-on-sale clauses as to certain transfers where the loan is “secured by a lien on residential real property containing less than five dwelling units”); 12 U.”
In Re Allen, 300 B.R. 105 (D.D.C. 2003). “The mortgagee in each case was barred by 12 U.S.C. § 1701j — 3(d)(5) or (6) from accelerating the mortgage debt based on the transfer as the transfer was to a relative resulting from the death of the mortgagor or was to the mortgagor’s child.”
Morris v. Woodside, 682 P.2d 905 (Wash. 1984). “" The trial court also found that Morris negotiated with Woodside in bad faith concerning the due-on-sale clause; that Morris failed to tell Slichter and Wallace of the clause and of his intention to not comply with it; and Morris failed to inform Woodside of the sale and his…”
United States v. Anaconda Co., 445 F. Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1977). “See 12 U.S.C. § 1701j. Federal standards were in fact contemplated for mobile homes under the Mobile Home Act.”
Citicorp Mortg., Inc. v. Lumpkin (In Re Lumpkin), 144 B.R. 240 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992). “Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 provides in 12 U.S.C. § 1701j — 3(d)(6) that due-on-sale clauses which may be otherwise valid under state law, are unenforceable as to a mortgage “lien on residential real property containing less than five dwelling units .”
Viereck v. Peoples Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 343 N.W.2d 30 (Minn. 1984). “4 Therefore, they contend, since Minnesota’s “window period” only applied to loans originating on or after June 1, 1979 and before May 9, 1981, the preemption rule of the Garn Act applies to these loans.”
Dupuis v. Yorkville Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 589 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). “§ 2201-02 , alleges that Yorkville’s “action in accelerating plaintiffs’ first mortgage” violated 12 U.S.C. § 1701j — 3, part of the Garn-St.”
In Re Smith, 469 B.R. 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). “1992) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1701j—3(d)(6)). See also In re Cady, 440 *202 B.”
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