29 C.F.R. § 1604.9

Fringe benefits

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(a) “Fringe benefits,” as used herein, includes medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.

(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.

(c) Where an employer conditions benefits available to employees and their spouses and families on whether the employee is the “head of the household” or “principal wage earner” in the family unit, the benefits tend to be available only to male employees and their families. Due to the fact that such conditioning discriminatorily affects the rights of women employees, and that “head of household” or “principal wage earner” status bears no relationship to job performance, benefits which are so conditioned will be found a prima facie violation of the prohibitions against sex discrimination contained in the act.

(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make available benefits for the wives and families of male employees where the same benefits are not made available for the husbands and families of female employees; or to make available benefits for the wives of male employees which are not made available for female employees; or to make available benefits to the husbands of female employees which are not made available for male employees. An example of such an unlawful employment practice is a situation in which wives of male employees receive maternity benefits while female employees receive no such benefits.

(e) It shall not be a defense under title VIII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with respect to one sex than the other.

(f) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement plan which establishes different optional or compulsory retirement ages based on sex, or which differentiates in benefits on the basis of sex. A statement of the General Counsel of September 13, 1968, providing for a phasing out of differentials with regard to optional retirement age for certain incumbent employees is hereby withdrawn.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 35 cases, 1973–2012 · leading case: City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978). · cites it 6× “See 29 CFR §§ 1604.9 (e) and (f) (1977). Two other agencies with responsibility for equal opportunity in employment adhere to the Wage and Hour Administrator's position.”
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). · cites it 4× “See Guidelines On Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.9 (d) (1982); Commission Decision No.”
Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). · cites it 4× “See also 29 CFR § 1604.9 (f) (1982) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement plan .”
Mary Jo Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996). “…benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 .”
Hillesland v. Paccar, Inc., 722 P.2d 1239 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). · cites it 4× “29 CFR § 1604.9 (d) (1985) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to make available benefits for the wives and families of male employees where the same benefits are not made available for the husbands and families of female employees; or to make…”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988). “11 (c) (1987) (“Where an employer conditions benefits available to employees on whether the employee is the ‘head of household’ or ‘principal wage earner’ in the family unit, the overall implementation of the plan will be closely scrutinized.”
Rouse v. Berry, 680 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D.D.C. 2010). “1996) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 ). 7 . In any event, Rouse has pled sufficient facts in support of his claim of discrimination to satisfy any fair reading of pleading requirements articulated in Sparrow, Swierkiewicz, Twombly, or Iqbal .”
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 F. Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974). · cites it 3× “The plaintiffs also represented that this state law clearly violates the interpretive guidelines relating to pension fringe benefits as promulgated under 29 C.F.R. 1604.9 and 37 C.F.R. 6835 1 by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, revised April 5, 1972.”
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984). “The Court remembers a movement in the Congress that enacted Title VII directed toward conferring cease and desist remedial power on the EEOC.”
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001). “Bartell offers its employees an admittedly generous package of healthcare benefits, including both third-party healthcare plans and an in-house prescription program.”
Hutchison v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7, 374 F. Supp. 1056 (D. Or. 1974). · cites it 2× “Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary…”
Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Colby Coll., 439 F. Supp. 631 (D. Me. 1977). · cites it 3× “The relevant guideline, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (f) (1976), states in pertinent part: (f) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to have a pension or retirement plan which establishes different optional or compulsory retirement age based on sex, or which…”
— 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(c) — 1 case
Wambheim v. J. C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981).
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