29 C.F.R. § 1630.5
Limiting, segregating, and classifying
It is unlawful for a covered entity to limit, segregate, or classify a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects his or her employment opportunities or status on the basis of disability.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11
cases, 1994–2004 · leading case: Rizzo v. Child.'s World Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1996).
Rizzo v. Child.'s World Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1996). “29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 (“[I]t is unlawful for a covered entity to limit, segregate, or classify a[n] .”
Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998). “Similarly, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 forbids employers from limiting, segregating, or classifying an employee “in a way that adversely affects his or her employment opportunities,” yet does not specify what constitutes an adverse effect.”
Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996). “” 29 C.F.R. 1630.5, App. (1995). 7 Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the ADA plaintiff to assert not only a disability, but also any limitation resulting therefrom.”
Dan J. Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2000). “’s interpretive guide: employers “are prohibited from restricting the employment opportunities of qualified individuals with disabilities on the basis of stereo types and myths about the individual’s disability.”
Iwata v. Intel Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D. Mass. 2004). “1630, entitled “Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act,” notés with respect to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 that “it would be permissible for an employer to offer an insurance policy that limits coverage for certain procedures or treatments,” so long as…”
Victoria Rizzo v. Child.'s World Learning Centers, Inc., Doing Bus. as Cwlc, Inc., 173 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 1999). “' ”) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 , App. (1995)); Teahan v.”
Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Wis. 1994). “” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 . Defendants chose to modify the kitchenette and ask plaintiff to use already existing, comparable facilities rather than to expend $1000 to $2000 to re-build the entire kitchenette.”
Mullins v. Crowell, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (N.D. Ala. 1999). “The statutory provision is violated, the Plaintiffs allege, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 , because the requirement of an affirmative action program creates a duty that TVA not discriminate by segregating its employees in a way that adversely affects their employment status.”
Mack W. Taylor, Jr., Plaintiff-Counter v. The Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellee, Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., Mack W. Taylor, Jr., Cross-Appellee v. The Principal Fin. Grp., Inc. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996). “" 29 C.F.R. 1630.5, App. (1995). 7 Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the ADA plaintiff to assert not only a disability, but also any limitation resulting therefrom.”
Tenbrink v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 920 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Kan. 1996). “§ 12112 (a) and (b)(1) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 . 1 Tenbrink seeks total damages in the amount of $23,857.”
Doe v. DeKalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998). “Similarly, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.5 forbids employers from limiting, segregating, or classifying an employee “in a way that adversely affects his or her employment opportunities,” yet does not specify what constitutes an adverse effect.”
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