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C.F.R.Title 29Chapter V—Wage and Hour Division, Department of LaborSubchapter C—Other LawsPart 825—The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993Subpart C—Employee and Employer Rights and Obligations Under the Act

29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (2026)

Employee notice requirements for foreseeable FMLA leave

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1995–2026 447citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 447 opinions since 1995, 116 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (c) (10 cases).

(a) Timing of notice. An employee must provide the employer at least 30 days advance notice before FMLA leave is to begin if the need for the leave is foreseeable based on an expected birth, placement for adoption or foster care, planned medical treatment for a serious health condition of the employee or of a family member, or the planned medical treatment for a serious injury or illness of a covered servicemember. If 30 days notice is not practicable, such as because of a lack of knowledge of approximately when leave will be required to begin, a change in circumstances, or a medical emergency, notice must be given as soon as practicable. For example, an employee's health condition may require leave to commence earlier than anticipated before the birth of a child. Similarly, little opportunity for notice may be given before placement for adoption. For foreseeable leave due to a qualifying exigency notice must be provided as soon as practicable, regardless of how far in advance such leave is foreseeable. Whether FMLA leave is to be continuous or is to be taken intermittently or on a reduced schedule basis, notice need only be given one time, but the employee shall advise the employer as soon as practicable if dates of scheduled leave change or are extended, or were initially unknown. In those cases where the employee is required to provide at least 30 days notice of foreseeable leave and does not do so, the employee shall explain the reasons why such notice was not practicable upon a request from the employer for such information.

(b) As soon as practicable means as soon as both possible and practical, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances in the individual case. When an employee becomes aware of a need for FMLA leave less than 30 days in advance, it should be practicable for the employee to provide notice of the need for leave either the same day or the next business day. In all cases, however, the determination of when an employee could practicably provide notice must take into account the individual facts and circumstances.

(c) Content of notice. An employee shall provide at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave. Depending on the situation, such information may include that a condition renders the employee unable to perform the functions of the job; that the employee is pregnant or has been hospitalized overnight; whether the employee or the employee's family member is under the continuing care of a health care provider; if the leave is due to a qualifying exigency, that a military member is on covered active duty or call to covered active duty status (or has been notified of an impending call or order to covered active duty), and that the requested leave is for one of the reasons listed in § 825.126(b); if the leave is for a family member, that the condition renders the family member unable to perform daily activities, or that the family member is a covered servicemember with a serious injury or illness; and the anticipated duration of the absence, if known. When an employee seeks leave for the first time for a FMLA-qualifying reason, the employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA. When an employee seeks leave due to a FMLA-qualifying reason, for which the employer has previously provided FMLA-protected leave, the employee must specifically reference the qualifying reason for leave or the need for FMLA leave. In all cases, the employer should inquire further of the employee if it is necessary to have more information about whether FMLA leave is being sought by the employee, and obtain the necessary details of the leave to be taken. In the case of medical conditions, the employer may find it necessary to inquire further to determine if the leave is because of a serious health condition and may request medical certification to support the need for such leave. See § 825.305. An employer may also request certification to support the need for leave for a qualifying exigency or for military caregiver leave. See §§ 825.309, 825.310). When an employee has been previously certified for leave due to more than one FMLA-qualifying reason, the employer may need to inquire further to determine for which qualifying reason the leave is needed. An employee has an obligation to respond to an employer's questions designed to determine whether an absence is potentially FMLA-qualifying. Failure to respond to reasonable employer inquiries regarding the leave request may result in denial of FMLA protection if the employer is unable to determine whether the leave is FMLA-qualifying.

(d) Complying with employer policy. An employer may require an employee to comply with the employer's usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave, absent unusual circumstances. For example, an employer may require that written notice set forth the reasons for the requested leave, the anticipated duration of the leave, and the anticipated start of the leave. An employee also may be required by an employer's policy to contact a specific individual. Unusual circumstances would include situations such as when an employee is unable to comply with the employer's policy that requests for leave should be made by contacting a specific number because on the day the employee needs to provide notice of his or her need for FMLA leave there is no one to answer the call-in number and the voice mail box is full. Where an employee does not comply with the employer's usual notice and procedural requirements, and no unusual circumstances justify the failure to comply, FMLA-protected leave may be delayed or denied. However, FMLA-protected leave may not be delayed or denied where the employer's policy requires notice to be given sooner than set forth in paragraph (a) of this section and the employee provides timely notice as set forth in paragraph (a) of this section.

(e) Scheduling planned medical treatment. When planning medical treatment, the employee must consult with the employer and make a reasonable effort to schedule the treatment so as not to disrupt unduly the employer's operations, subject to the approval of the health care provider. Employees are ordinarily expected to consult with their employers prior to the scheduling of treatment in order to work out a treatment schedule which best suits the needs of both the employer and the employee. For example, if an employee who provides notice of the need to take FMLA leave on an intermittent basis for planned medical treatment neglects to consult with the employer to make a reasonable effort to arrange the schedule of treatments so as not to unduly disrupt the employer's operations, the employer may initiate discussions with the employee and require the employee to attempt to make such arrangements, subject to the approval of the health care provider. See §§ 825.203 and 825.205.

(f) Intermittent leave or leave on a reduced leave schedule must be medically necessary due to a serious health condition or a serious injury or illness. An employee shall advise the employer, upon request, of the reasons why the intermittent/reduced leave schedule is necessary and of the schedule for treatment, if applicable. The employee and employer shall attempt to work out a schedule for such leave that meets the employee's needs without unduly disrupting the employer's operations, subject to the approval of the health care provider.

(g) An employer may waive employees' FMLA notice requirements. See § 825.304.

The 20 cases that cite 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMichael Woods v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2005).
cites § 825.302 5×cited by 363 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“1999)); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302 (c), 825.303(b). Although the employee need not name the statute, Thorson, 205 F.”
The case’s holding
An employee fails to provide adequate notice under the FMLA if medical documentation does not describe the nature of the illness or the expected duration of the absence.
Later courts cite it for
“summary judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” · 28 citing courts
2
REDSamuel J. Cavin v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2004).
cites § 825.302 6×cited by 201 cases
Superseded by regulation on other grounds (29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d)): 4 citing opinions limit it to other grounds. As recognized in Tina Wallace v. FedEx Corporation.
Where it cites § 825.302
“§ 2612 (e)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (b), and for the most part more generous than the FMLA’s requirements for unforeseeable leave, 6 see 29 C.”
The case’s holding
An employer cannot deny FMLA leave by enforcing internal procedural requirements that are more strict than those contemplated by the FMLA.
Later courts cite it for
“the fmla does not permit an employer to limit his employee's fmla rights by denying them whenever an employee fails to comply with internal procedural requirements that are more strict than those contemplated by the fmla.” · 8 citing courts
3
GREENJackie Killian v. Yorozu Auto. Tennessee, Inc., 454 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2006).
cites § 825.302 4×cited by 170 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (a). The notice may be verbal, and it “need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA 29 C.”
The case’s holding
An employer violates the FMLA by terminating an employee for failing to provide timely medical certification when regulations require allowing at least fifteen days for such documentation.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) she was engaged in an activity protected by the fmla; (2) the employer knew that she was exercising her rights under the fmla; (3) after learning of the employee's exercise of fmla rights, the employer took an employment action adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected fmla activity and the adverse employment ac tion.” · 9 citing courts
4
GREENHannah P. v. Daniel Coats, 916 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2019).
cites § 825.302 2×cited by 222 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“” 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 . Proper notice merely “makes the employer aware” that the employee needs potentially FMLA-qualifying leave.”
The case’s holding
An employee's disclosure of a medical condition and request for leave triggers an employer's duty to inquire about FMLA eligibility even without the use of specific statutory language.
Later courts cite it for
“to establish a prima facie claim of failure to accommodate under the rehabilitation act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she was a qualified person with a disability; (2) the employer had notice of the disability; (3) the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the position with a reasonable accommodation; and (4) the employer nonetheless refused to make the accommodation.” · 13 citing courts
5
GREENDighello v. Thurston Foods, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 5 (D. Conn. 2018).
cites § 825.302 6×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302 (c) ; 825.303(b). Under those regulations, if the illness is foreseeable, the employee must "provide at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of…”
6
GREENSteve Aubuchon v. Knauf Fiberglass, GmbH, 359 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2004).
cites § 825.302 5×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“But if, though the need is foreseeable, “30 days notice is not practicable, such as because of a lack of knowledge of approximately when leave will be required to begin, a change in circumstances, or a medical emergency, notice must be given as soon as practicable.”
The case’s holding
An employee satisfies the FMLA notice requirement by providing enough information to establish probable cause that they are entitled to leave.
Later courts cite it for
“the employee's duty is merely to place the employer on notice of a probable basis for fmla leave.” · 9 citing courts
7
GREENPhillips v. Mathews, 547 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2008).
cites § 825.302 4×cited by 121 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“" 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (a). "This ordinarily means at least verbal notification to the employer within one or two business days of when the need for leave becomes known to the employee.”
The case’s holding
An employer's termination of an employee based on a mistaken but honestly held belief regarding available leave time constitutes a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for discharge.
Later courts cite it for
“because phillips does not have direct evidence of retaliation, we analyze her fmla retaliation claim under the mcdonnell douglas burden-shifting framework.” · 4 citing courts
8
GREENEshbach v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 855 A.2d 943 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
cites § 825.302 6×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (c). The employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA, but may state only that leave is needed for an expected birth or adoption, for example.”
The case’s holding
Willful misconduct requires an employer to prove the employee deliberately violated a work rule with a conscious wrongdoing or disregard for the employer's interests.
Later courts cite it for
“all include an element 4 indicating a consciousness of wrongdoing on the part of the employee.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENVillegas v. Albertsons, LLC, 96 F. Supp. 3d 624 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
cites § 825.302 12×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“See generally 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (setting out -notice requirements).”
Later courts cite it for
“what circumstances qualify as 'unusual' is not well defined in the regulations or in case law ....” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENWilson v. Lemington Home for the Aged, 159 F. Supp. 2d 186 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
cites § 825.302 8×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“29 C.F.R. § 825.302 . If the leave is foreseeable, the employee must provide at least 30 days notice.”
The case’s holding
A leave of absence for medical treatment may constitute a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, so an employee need not explicitly invoke the ADA to trigger accommodation.
Later courts cite it for
“a leave of absence for medical treatment may constitute a reasonable accommodation under the ada.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENHayduk v. City of Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
cites § 825.302 7×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“During the leave, the employer “must maintain [the employee’s] coverage under any ‘group health plan’” under the same terms as if the employee had been continuously employed throughout his leave.”
Later courts cite it for
“that the fmla provides the exclusive means of recovery for violation of rights created by the fmla” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENRodriguez v. Smithfield Packing Co., 545 F. Supp. 2d 508 (D. Md. 2008).
cites § 825.302 6×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“§ 2612 (a)(1)(D), (e); 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302 -.303. When timely and adequate communication is not given, the protections of the Act do not apply, even if the employee in fact has a serious health condition.”
The case’s holding
An employee who says only that she is sick, without details of the illness or likely absence duration, gives notice insufficient to trigger the employer's FMLA inquiry duty.
Later courts cite it for
“an eligible employee is entitled to a total of twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve-month period and, upon return to work, restoration to the position held when the leave commenced or to an equivalent position.” · 5 citing courts
13
GREENRochelle Garrison v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 939 F.3d 937 (8th Cir. 2019).
cites § 825.302 3×cited by 37 cases
The case’s holding
An employee's conduct or workplace treatment must be severe enough to be actionable; upsetting incidents such as spreading rumors may be insufficient to support a retaliation claim.
Later courts cite it for
“lost any right that she had to fmla leave.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENKeith Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215 (7th Cir. 2015).
cites § 825.302 2×cited by 339 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“2004) (citations omitted); see also, 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (a). In the event 30-days’ notice cannot be given due to extenuating circumstances, “notice must be given as soon as practicable.”
The case’s holding
A responding party's failure to dispute material facts in the manner prescribed by local rules results in those facts being deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment.
Later courts cite it for
“district courts are not required to 'wade through improper denials and legal argument in search of a genuinely disputed fact.” · 16 citing courts
15
GREENMora v. Chem-Tronics, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
cites § 825.302 4×cited by 150 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302 , 825.303. The interim regulations provided that with foreseeable leave the employee must give, “at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave.”
The case’s holding
The standards and procedures for granting partial summary judgment are the same as those for summary judgment.
Later courts cite it for
“the standards and procedures for granting partial summary judgment, also known as summary adjudication, are the same as those for summary judgment.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENBruce v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 2 A.3d 667 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010).
cites § 825.302 4×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“Consequently, under 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (c), [c]laimant provided sufficient information to make [e]mployer aware that [c]laimant needed leave which would qualify as leave under the FMLA.”
The case’s holding
Pre-trial incarceration resulting from an illegal act precludes a finding of good cause if the claimant fails to notify the employer of their absence in violation of established rules.
Later courts cite it for
“made aware of the existence of the work rule.” · 10 citing courts
17
GREENRynders v. Williams, 650 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 2011).
cites § 825.302 4×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“"); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (a). Even then, though, the employer is to be informed as early as possible, and almost always in a day or two.”
The case’s holding
A single incident of unconstitutional activity by a high-ranking official with final policy-making authority can establish municipal liability.
Later courts cite it for
“although rare, a public official's single incident of unconstitutional activity can establish the requisite policy if the decision is 'taken by the highest officials responsible for setting policy in that area of the government's business.” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENMaria Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2014).
cites § 825.302 2×cited by 226 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“The “employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even men *1244 tion the FMLA,” 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (c), but the employer “should inquire further of the employee if it is necessary to have more information about whether FMLA leave is being sought by the employee,…”
The case’s holding
An employee may affirmatively decline to exercise FMLA rights to preserve them for future use.
Later courts cite it for
“appropriate reasons for denying costs include: (1) the substantial public importance of the case, (2) the closeness and difficulty of the issues in the case, (3) the chilling effect on future similar actions, (4) the plaintiff's limited financial resources, and (5) the economic disparity between the parties.” · 49 citing courts
19
GREENTheresa Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847 (8th Cir. 2002).
cites § 825.302 3×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“” 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (a). Notice is required “as soon as practicable,” meaning “as soon as both possible and practical, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances in the individual case.”
The case’s holding
An employee provides sufficient notice under the FMLA when they inform an employer of a specific medical condition that necessitates leave.
Later courts cite it for
“summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” · 5 citing courts
20
GREENDavid Burnett v. LFW Inc., 472 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2006).
cites § 825.302 2×cited by 204 cases
Where it cites § 825.302
“”) (citing 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302 (c), 825.303(b), 825.”
The case’s holding
An employee satisfies the FMLA notice requirement by providing information sufficient to show that he likely has an FMLA-qualifying condition.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) he was eligible for the fmla's protections, (2) his employer was covered by the fmla, (3) he was entitled to leave under the fmla, (4) he provided sufficient notice of his intent to take leave, and (5) his employer denied him fmla benefits to which he was entitled.” · 13 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199520102026

One bar per year. Tallest: 25 cases in 2021. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
6th Cir.327th Cir.218th Cir.19S.D. Ohio17E.D. Mich.16W.D. Pa.1511th Cir.145th Cir.13

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 96 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)4 cases
Woodman v. Miesel Sysco Food Co., 657 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
Barbara Horelica v. Fiserv Solutions, Inc., 123 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003).
Cain v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., No. 3:24-cv-00244 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 22, 2025).
(b)2 cases
Randolph v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 925 N.E.2d 149 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 2009).
Barbara Horelica v. Fiserv Solutions, Inc., 123 S.W.3d 492 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003).
(c)10 cases
Tate v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 268 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2001).
Brenda Joyce Lowery v. Ronald Strength, 356 F. App'x 332 (11th Cir. 2009).
Lynn Yuk Chun Wai v. Fed. Express Corp., 461 F. App'x 876 (11th Cir. 2012).
Paasch v. City of Saf. Harbor, 915 F. Supp. 315 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
Mullin v. Rochester Manpower, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 556 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(d)3 cases
Harville v. Texas A & M Univ., 833 F. Supp. 2d 645 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
Basso v. Potter, 596 F. Supp. 2d 324 (D. Conn. 2009).
Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Kan. 2002).
(f)2 cases
Nadine Ranade v. BT Americas, Inc., 581 F. App'x 182 (4th Cir. 2014).
(g)1 case
Woodman v. Miesel Sysco Food Co., 657 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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