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C.F.R.Title 34Chapter I—Office for Civil Rights, Department of EducationPart 106—Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial AssistanceSubpart D—Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Prohibited

34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2026)

Athletics

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1981–2026 146citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 146 opinions since 1981, 43 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (b) (5 cases).

(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.

(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport. For the purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves bodily contact.

(c) Equal opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities are available the Director will consider, among other factors:

(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;

(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;

(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;

(4) Travel and per diem allowance;

(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;

(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;

(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;

(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;

(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;

(10) Publicity.

Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex. [45 FR 30955, May 9, 1980, as amended at 85 FR 30579, May 19, 2020; 89 FR 33888, Apr. 29, 2024]
The 20 cases that cite 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
REDNat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ., 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
cites § 106.41 6×cited by 253 cases
Abrogated by Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin on other grounds: 5 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 106.41
“41 (a) (2003) (subsequently codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (a) (2003)) (“1975 Regulations”).”
The case’s holding
A district court possesses the discretion to deny a motion to amend a pleading on the grounds of futility if the proposed amendment would not survive a motion to dismiss.
Later courts cite it for
“where the record presents substantial evidence of a causal relationship between the government policy and the third-party conduct, leaving little doubt as to causation and the likelihood of redress.” · 27 citing courts
2
GREENBostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644 (2020).
cites § 106.41 2×cited by 1,200 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“49 —————— 48 A regulation allows single-sex teams, 34 CFR §106.41 (b) (2019), but the statute itself would of course take precedence.”
The case’s holding
Title VII prohibits an employer from firing an individual for being homosexual or transgender because such discrimination is based on sex.
Later courts cite it for
“it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.” · 61 citing courts
3
GREENAmy Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
cites § 106.41 10×cited by 126 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“In so doing, we upheld the district court’s analysis and ruled that an institution violates Title IX if it ineffectively accommodates its students’ interests and abilities in athletics under 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c)(1) (1995), regardless of its performance with respect to other…”
The case’s holding
An institution violates Title IX if it fails to provide athletic participation opportunities in numbers substantially proportionate to enrollment or fails to effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of female students.
Later courts cite it for
“title ix, like other anti-discrimination schemes, permits an inference that a significant gender-based statistical disparity may indicate the existence of discrimination.” · 7 citing courts
cites § 106.41 4×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (a). Plaintiffs have filed this case as a class action on behalf of SCSU's current, prospective, and future female students, alleging that SCSU has violated Title IX by (1) providing male students with a greater opportunity to participate in varsity…”
The case’s holding
A Title IX damages claim requires proof that university officials had actual knowledge of specific discrimination and acted with deliberate indifference to the violation.
Later courts cite it for
“no specific rules govern the required size of a class, and what constitutes impracticability depends upon the facts of each case.” · 5 citing courts
5
cites § 106.41 4×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“The plaintiffs allege that the CIAC Policy failed to provide “equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes,” 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c), because it afforded “students who are born female … materially fewer opportunities” for athletic achievement “than students who are born…”
The case’s holding
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendants and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Later courts cite it for
“to satisfy the redressability element of article iii standing, a plaintiff must show that it is 'likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the alleged injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” · 10 citing courts
6
GREENWilliam M. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
cites § 106.41 9×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“” 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c). Section 106.41(c) sets out the factors to be examined in determining whether a school provides equal athletic opportunity.”
The case’s holding
Policy guidelines are entitled to deference if they are not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute (Title IX).
Later courts cite it for
“congress itself recognized that addressing discrimination in athletics presented a unique set of problems not raised in areas such as employment and academics.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENAmy Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
cites § 106.41 6×cited by 150 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (b). Finally, whether teams are segregated by sex or not, the school must provide gender-blind equality of opportunity to its student body.”
The case’s holding
An institution complies with Title IX by providing athletic opportunities proportionate to enrollment, demonstrating a continuing practice of program expansion, or fully accommodating the interests and abilities of underrepresented students.
Later courts cite it for
“thus, a university which does not wish to engage in extensive compliance analysis may stay on the sunny side of title ix simply by maintaining gender parity between its student body and its athletic lineup.” · 6 citing courts
cites § 106.41 8×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“§ 1681 (1988), and its implementing regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (1990); the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the federal Constitution, under 42 U.”
The case’s holding
Title IX and its athletic regulations are motivated by the historical exclusion of girls from sports programs and apply equally to both boys and girls.
Later courts cite it for
“it would require blinders to ignore that the motivation for promulgation of the regulation on athletics was the historic emphasis on boys' athletic programs to the exclusion of girls' athletic programs in high schools as well as colleges” · 5 citing courts
9
GREENCohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995).
cites § 106.41 13×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (a). The regulations go on to clarify, however, that institutions are permitted to “operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each sex” under certain circumstances detailed therein.”
The case’s holding
An institution satisfies the substantial proportionality requirement of Title IX if its intercollegiate athletic program participation numbers mirror the gender balance of its student enrollment.
Later courts cite it for
“although the number of varsity sports offered to men and women are equal, the selection of sports offered to each gender generates far more individual positions for male athletes than for female athletes,” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENMansourian v. Regents of Univ. of California, 602 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010).
cites § 106.41 5×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“” 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c). 6 The regulations establish two components of Title IX’s equal athletic opportunity requirement: “effective accommodation” and “equal treatment.”
The case’s holding
Title IX notice and opportunity to cure requirements apply to sexual harassment claims involving deliberate indifference but not to official institutional policies regarding athletic program allocation.
Later courts cite it for
“equal treatment claims allege sex-based differences in the schedules, equipment, coaching, and other factors affecting participants in athletics.” · 8 citing courts
11
GREENParker v. Franklin Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 667 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2012).
cites § 106.41 4×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 . HEW followed notice and comment rulemaking procedures, and President Ford approved the final regulations, as required by Title IX, 20 U.”
The case’s holding
Local school corporations are persons subject to suit under Section 1983, making the defense of state sovereign immunity inapplicable to them.
Later courts cite it for
“we don't need to address state sovereign immunity where we can resolve the issue by examining whether the defendants are 'persons' under 1983.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENBiediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2012).
cites § 106.41 4×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“” 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c). Section 106.41(c) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to determining whether equal athletic opportunities are available: (1)Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of…”
The case’s holding
Providing athletic opportunities through separate sports programs for each sex raises a disparate treatment claim, and substantial proportionality is determined based on the institution's specific circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“a decision on a preliminary injunction is, in effect, only a prediction about the merits of the case.” · 2 citing courts
13
REDRoberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993).
cites § 106.41 11×cited by 12 cases
Reversed in part by Jennifer Roberts Julie Osborne Janet Brumbelow Laura Bielak Sara Stout Amy Recouper Jennifer Jacobs Malia Kuenzli Stacie Stafford Heather Nakasone Kim Johnson Aimee Rice Lisa Mize v. Colorado State Board of Ag…
Where it cites § 106.41
“” 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c). In determining whether equal opportunities' are available, the Director of the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education (OCR) must consider, among other factors, “whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively…”
Later courts cite it for
“may be shown by proof of a substantial violation in any one of the three major areas of investigation set out in the policy interpretation.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENVeronica Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch., 768 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2014).
cites § 106.41 2×cited by 182 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“” 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c). Among the factors we consider to determine whether equal opportunities are available to male and female athletes is “[wjhether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes.”
The case’s holding
A mere passing reference to a witness in a deposition does not satisfy disclosure obligations because an adverse party should not have to guess which undisclosed witnesses may testify.
Later courts cite it for
“an adverse party should not have to guess which undisclosed witnesses may be called to testify.” · 6 citing courts
15
GREENA. B. v. Hawaii State Dept of Educ., 30 F.4th 828 (9th Cir. 2022).
cites § 106.41 2×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c)(2)– (10)); see also 20 U.”
The case’s holding
A class of over 300 prospective members satisfies numerosity when membership changes continually over time and joinder is impracticable.
Later courts cite it for
“the commonality 23 requirement of rule 23(a)(2) requires plaintiffs seeking class certification to show that their claims 24 depend upon a common contention that is capable of classwide resolution-which means that 25 determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of 26 the claims in one stroke.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 106.41 13×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“070(2), the see also 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c)(1) (“[w]hether the selection of Association amended its Bylaw 40, to state: sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes” is to be If a member school sponsors or intends…”
Later courts cite it for
“school officials are aware of the misconduct but do nothing to stop it, despite the school district's ability to exercise control over the situation.” · 5 citing courts
17
REDCook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
cites § 106.41 7×cited by 17 cases
Vacated by Jennifer Baldwin Cook, Melissa Ehlers, Christine Price, Thayer Jaques, Julie Wolff v. Colgate University (1993): the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 106.41
“Colgate maintains that the plaintiffs’ allegation that its 1988 decision to retain women’s ice hockey as a club sport resulted from gender discrimination does not constitute an indictment of the entire athletic program at Colgate, and therefore, Colgate is not in violation of…”
18
GREENBenjamin Feld v. Luke Borkowski, 790 N.W.2d 72 (Iowa 2010).
cites § 106.41 2×cited by 88 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (b) (2009) (defining contact sports for purposes of gender discrimination on school sports teams and excluding softball as a contact sport).”
The case’s holding
The contact-sports exception applies to softball, but a jury may find recklessness if a participant's actions produce a radically different result than expected.
Later courts cite it for
“our obligation on appeal is to decide the case within the framework of the issues raised by the parties.” · 13 citing courts
19
GREENBoucher v. Syracuse Univ., 164 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 1999).
cites § 106.41 3×cited by 92 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“On June 12, 1996, the district court granted summary judgment to the University on plaintiffs’ equal treatment claims — those that challenged the alleged unequal allocation of benefits and scholarships between varsity men’s and women’s teams (brought under 34 C.F.R. § 106.41…”
The case’s holding
District judges possess broad discretion regarding class definition but must reassess class certification rulings as the litigation develops.
Later courts cite it for
“district judges have broad discretion over class definition, ... courts are required to reassess their class rulings as the case develops.” · 8 citing courts
20
GREENArthur West v. Loretta E. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
cites § 106.41 1×cited by 128 cases
Where it cites § 106.41
“3d at 934 -35 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) and 45 C.F.R. § 86.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each individual claim by showing a concrete injury traceable to the defendant that is likely to be redressed by judicial relief.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no justiciable case or controversy unless the plaintiff has standing.” · 18 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198120032026

One bar per year. Tallest: 12 cases in 2021. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
6th Cir.81st Cir.79th Cir.7E.D. Cal.7D. Minn.78th Cir.6D.D.C.64th Cir.5

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 53 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)3 cases
Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pennsylvania, 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-2483 (1st Cir. Apr. 16, 1993).
Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-2483 (1st Cir. Apr. 16, 1993).
(b)5 cases
Lantz by Lantz v. Ambach, 620 F. Supp. 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 95-2205 (1st Cir. Nov. 21, 1996).
Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-2483 (1st Cir. Apr. 16, 1993).
Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-2483 (1st Cir. Apr. 16, 1993).
Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 95-2205 (1st Cir. Nov. 21, 1996).
(c)5 cases
Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
S.A. v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, No. 4:23-cv-04139 (D.S.D. Oct. 13, 2023).
Keshia Clemons v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 818 F. App'x 453 (6th Cir. 2020).
Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-2483 (1st Cir. Apr. 16, 1993).
Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 92-2483 (1st Cir. Apr. 16, 1993).
(c)(1)3 cases
Anders v. California State Univ., Fresno, No. 1:21-cv-00179 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2021).
Anders v. California State Univ., Fresno, No. 1:21-cv-00179 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2021).
State of Louisiana v. U S Dept of Educ., 737 F. Supp. 3d 377 (W.D. La. 2024).
(c)(2)2 cases
Thomas v. Regents of the Univ. of California, No. 3:19-cv-06463 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2020).
Portz v. St. Cloud State Univ., No. 0:16-cv-01115 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2022).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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