(a) Spouse. “Spouse” means a person of the opposite sex whose marriage to the veteran meets the requirements of § 3.1(j).
(b) Surviving spouse. Except as provided in § 3.52, “surviving spouse” means a person of the opposite sex whose marriage to the veteran meets the requirements of § 3.1(j) and who was the spouse of the veteran at the time of the veteran's death and:
(1) Who lived with the veteran continuously from the date of marriage to the date of the veteran's death except where there was a separation which was due to the misconduct of, or procured by, the veteran without the fault of the spouse; and
(2) Except as provided in § 3.55, has not remarried or has not since the death of the veteran and after September 19, 1962, lived with another person of the opposite sex and held himself or herself out openly to the public to be the spouse of such other person.
[62 FR 5529, Feb. 6, 1997]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
39
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1993–2024 · leading case:
Stillwell v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 291 (Vet. App. 1994).
Stillwell v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 291 (Vet. App. 1994).
· cites it 2× “Pursuant to this statutory authority, the VA promulgated 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 , which, as relevant here, is identical to the language of the statute.”
Gregory v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 108 (Vet. App. 1993).
· cites it 3× “Pursuant to this statutory authority, the VA promulgated 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 , which, as relevant here, is identical to the language of the statute.”
Trilles v. West, 13 Vet. App. 314 (Vet. App. 2000).
· cites it 2× “here there was a separation which was due to the misconduct of, or procured by, the veteran without the fault of the spouse) and who has not remarried or (in cases not involving remarriage) has not since the death of the veteran, and after September 19, 1962, lived with another…”
Nancy C. Gazaille v. Robert A. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 205 (Vet. App. 2014).
· cites it 4× “§ 101 (3); 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 (b) (2014). Under § 3.1(j), "[m]arriage means a marriage valid under the law of the place where the parties resided at the time of marriage, or the law of the place where the parties resided when the right to benefits accrued.”
Berger v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 166 (Vet. App. 1997).
· cites it 2× “38 C.F.R. § 3.50 (b) (1969). The requirement of continuous cohabitation was addressed in 38 C.”
Colon v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 104 (Vet. App. 1996).
· cites it 3× “§ 101 (3) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 (1992) because the record showed that she did “not consider herself to be legally married to the veteran following their divorce” and a person “who does not believe that she is married cannot be said to have formed a common-law marriage”.”
Brewer v. West, 11 Vet. App. 228 (Vet. App. 1998).
“108 (1993) (interpreting 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 (b)(1) in manner more favorable to VA claimant seeking to come under that regulation than VA had interpreted the regulation)).”
Flores v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 516 (Vet. App. 2005).
“§ 101 (3); see 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 (b) (2005). If “surviving spouse” status is discontinued because a surviving spouse remarries, or lives with another person and holds himself or herself out openly to the public as the spouse of that person, section 103(d)(3) provides that his or…”
Haynes v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 614 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
“Haynes states that her claim to DIC benefits is not based on her status as a surviving spouse, but “on the alternative theory of entitlement under 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 (b)(1) exception for abused spouses.”
Westberry v. West, 12 Vet. App. 510 (Vet. App. 1999).
“§§ 101 (3), 1541(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 (b)(1). VA did not have any information, at the time that the appellant reported the veteran’s death, that her separation from him “was due to the misconduct of, or procured by, the veteran without the fault of the [appellant],” a statutory…”
Camphor v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 272 (Vet. App. 1995).
“§ 101 (3); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.50 (1994). We begin with a brief summation of the facts leading up to the filing of the application for fees.”
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