38 C.F.R. § 4.3
Resolution of reasonable doubt
It is the defined and consistently applied policy of the Department of Veterans Affairs to administer the law under a broad interpretation, consistent, however, with the facts shown in every case. When after careful consideration of all procurable and assembled data, a reasonable doubt arises regarding the degree of disability such doubt will be resolved in favor of the claimant. See § 3.102 of this chapter.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 655
cases (63 in the last 5 years), 1995–2024 · leading case: Durden v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 429 (M.D. Penn. 2016).
Durden v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 429 (M.D. Penn. 2016). “” 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 . For VA disability determinations, an adjudicator will consider “competent medical evidence".”
Birdeye Middleton v. Shinseki, 727 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “See 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (quoted in full below). Then, because even using their best efforts they could not anticipate the many ways that illnesses present, nor could they anticipate changes in treatment that new drugs might support, they added a second caveat to the “General Policy…”
Samuel L. Mayhue v. Eric K. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 273 (Vet. App. 2011). “However, because the Board’s failure to apply 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 was not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” and because the Board provided an adequate statement of reasons or bases for denying *275 Mr.”
Dwayne A. Moore v. R. James Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 211 (Vet. App. 2007). “1 (2006), and further require that the weight to be given the evidence is to be "thoroughly and conscientiously studied," 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2006), the majority, on de novo review, find that the hospitalization records are not relevant and that therefore the Board did 12 not err…”
Billy D. McCarroll v. Robert A. McDonald, 28 Vet. App. 267 (Vet. App. 2016). “at 8-11 (citing 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.3 (2016), 4.7 (2016)). He further asserts that the issue of what his blood pressure would be without medication is a question requiring medical expertise and that the Board therefore violated Colvin v.”
Blair Coleman v. Frank Kendall, 74 F.4th 610 (4th Cir. 2023). “129, noting that although its applicability was questionable, any reasonable doubt had to be resolved in favor of Coleman pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 . 6 Then, in determining Coleman’s permanent rating at the time of his discharge in April 2006, the Board considered the Medical…”
Adams v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 628 (Fed. Cl. 2014). “The 2011 PDBR majority decision in plaintiffs case referenced 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 , titled “Resolution of reasonable doubt,” and 38 C.”
Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 517 (Vet. App. 1995). “He maintains that VA’s decision to combine the two conditions into a single condition without any supporting medical evidence, and its failure to properly consider 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.3 and 4.7 (1992), justifies a remand.”
Hatmaker v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 560 (Fed. Cl. 2014). “Second, he asserts that the Board did not properly consider the evidence or appropriately apply the VASRD reasonable doubt rale, 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2007). The court considers each argument in turn.”
Douglas Bird v. Nancy A. Berryhill, 847 F.3d 911 (7th Cir. 2017). “” 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 ; Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed.”
Bruce W. Pierce v. Anthony J. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 440 (Vet. App. 2004). “In addition, we note that the Board failed to address specifically the application of and interplay between the following regulatory provisions: 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2002) (reasonable doubt resolved in favor of claimant), § 4.”
Nathan T. Meidl v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 570 (Fed. Cl. 2013). “A § 1216a(b) (2012) (medical conditions considered in disability determinations); Army Regulation 636-40 (physical evaluation for separation); 38 C.F.R. § 4.3 (resolving reasonable doubt in disability ratings); 38 C.”
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