42 C.F.R. § 435.930
Furnishing Medicaid
The agency must—
(a) Furnish Medicaid promptly to beneficiaries without any delay caused by the agency's administrative procedures;
(b) Continue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible individuals until they are found to be ineligible; and
(c) Make arrangements to assist applicants and beneficiaries to get emergency medical care whenever needed, 24 hours a day and 7 days a week.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 77
cases (8 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case: B.K. v. Thomas Betlach, 922 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2019).
B.K. v. Thomas Betlach, 922 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2019). “See 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 (a); see also Kessler v.”
Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2007). “33 The district court need not, however, revisit the Medicaid beneficiaries’ claims under § 1396a(a)(8), the Medicaid Act’s “reasonable promptness” provision, or 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 (b), a Medicaid Act regulation mandating that Medicaid, and emergency care, be furnished…”
Guggenberger ex rel. Guggenberger v. State, 198 F. Supp. 3d 973 (D. Minnesota 2016). “The court declined to credit defendants’ numerous explanations for the delays in providing services, noting that many of their reasons were based on the state’s own administrative procedures.”
Doe v. Kidd, 501 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2007). “See 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 (b) ("The agency must .”
Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Cal. 1994). “42 C.F.R. § 435.930 . Because § 1396a(a)(8) establishes requirements for providing services and is “phrased in terms of benefitting” individuals seeking Medicaid services, Medi-Cal recipients are the intended beneficiaries.”
Ollie Smith v. Jeffrey C. Miller, Dir., Illinois Dep't of Pub. Aid, 665 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1981). “§ 1396a(a)(8) (1976) and HEW regulation 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 (a). In negotiation over the length of the time limits, the parties then arrived at a compromise draft of the permanent injunction.”
Odi v. Alexander, 378 F. Supp. 3d 365 (E.D. Pa. 2019). “§ 1396a(a)(8) and 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 (b) (Count IV). All four counts were asserted against all Defendants, in both their individual and official capacities.”
K.B. v. Michigan Dept. Of Health & Human Servs., 367 F. Supp. 3d 647 (E.D. Mich. 2019). “Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs' claims under 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 fail to state a claim because they do not provide a cause of action.”
Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 428 F. Supp. 2d 585 (W.D. Tex. 2006). “§ 1396a(a)(8) and 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 . Id. at 24, ¶ 57 . Plaintiffs’ sixth count alleges that HHSC has failed to establish capitation rates on an actuarially sound basis and concludes that HHSC’s contracts with managed care organizations therefore violate 42 U.”
Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998). “" 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 (a)-(b) (1996). Another regulation states that "[t]he agency must establish time standards for determining eligibility and inform the applicant of what they are.”
Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004). “provide that all individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”
Stenson v. Blum, 476 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). “” 22 Another example is 42 C.F.R. § 435.930 (b) (1979), which mandates that the appropriate state agency “[c]ontinue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible individuals until they are found to be ineligible.”
— 42 C.F.R. § 435.930(a) — 1 case
Brown v. Luna, 735 F. Supp. 762 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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