Colorado Revised Statutes
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-116 (2026)
Action against joint debtors or obligors
✓ current as of July 2026
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If, in an action against joint debtors or obligors, the plaintiff is barred by the provisions of this article as to one or more of the debtors or obligors, but is entitled to recover against any other of them by virtue of a new acknowledgment, promise, or payment, the plaintiff shall be entitled to proceed as against that defendant.
Source: L. 86: Entire article R&RE, p. 701, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-80-121 as it existed prior to 1986.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 12
cases, 1975–1993 · leading case: McKinney v. Armco Recreational Prods., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1976).
McKinney v. Armco Recreational Prods., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1976). “Colo. Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-80-116 (1973) as written in 1972 provided: If any person entitled to bring any action mentioned in this article is under the age of twenty-one years, insane, imprisoned, or absent from the United States at the time the cause of action accrues, such…”
Broyles v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 695 P.2d 1136 (Colo. 1985). “Section 13-81-103, relevant here, is a separate, general tolling provision for "person[s] under disability,” i.”
Whisler v. Kuckler, 538 P.2d 477 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). “Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in determining that § 13-80-116, C.R.S. 1973, was the controlling statute for persons under disability.”
Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Dist. Court, 611 P.2d 963 (Colo. 1980). “1 At the time of Mary Jo Trujillo’s injury, section 13-80-116, C.R.S. 1973 provided: “Persons under disability.”
Southard ex rel. Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891 (Colo. 1986). “Section 13-80-116, 6 C.R.S. (1985 Supp.), also operates to toll the statute of limitations for certain persons.”
Southard by & Through Southard v. Miles, 714 P.2d 891 (Colo. 1986). “[10] Section 13-80-116, 6 C.R.S. (1985 Supp.), also operates to toll the statute of limitations for certain persons.”
Deason v. Lewis, 706 P.2d 1283 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). “Plaintiff admits that notice was not filed within 180 days of discovery of his cause of action, but argues that the notification period was extended under § 13-80-116, C.R.S. (1984 Cum.Supp.). See Antonopoulos v.”
Tenney v. Flaxer, 727 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1986). “See § 13-80-116, 6 C.R.S. (1973). Since Steven was only fifteen years of age in 1977, his claim was still viable under the pre-1977 statutory scheme.”
Com. Equity Corp. v. Majestic Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 620 P.2d 56 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980). “A receivership, however, is not one of the disabilities enumerated in § 13-80-116, C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Cum.Supp.).”
Hepp v. United Airlines, Inc., 540 P.2d 1141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). “Statutes tolling periods of limitations, such as § 13-80-116, C.R.S. 1973, *1144 have no application here, since they apply only to limitations which are created by statute.”
McKay v. Hammock, 542 F. Supp. 972 (D. Colo. 1982). “Compare C.R.S. § 13-80-116 with Bireline v. Seagondollar, 567 F.”
DiAndrea v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 847 P.2d 249 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). “We therefore hold that, for the purposes of § 15-12-1009(1), a claim “arises after” closure of an estate when the facts giving rise to the claim occur after entry of the order closing the estate. The date when the claim is filed is not dispositive.”
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