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Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916 (2026)

Apportionment of estate taxes

✓ current as of July 2026
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(1) For purposes of this section:

(a) "Estate" means the gross estate of a decedent as determined for the purpose of federal estate tax and the estate tax payable to this state.

(b) "Fiduciary" means personal representative or trustee.

(c) "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, corporation, government, political subdivision, governmental agency, or local governmental agency.

(d) "Person interested in the estate" means any person entitled to receive, or who has received, from a decedent or by reason of the death of a decedent any property or interest therein included in the decedent's estate. It includes a personal representative, conservator, and trustee.

(e) "State" means any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(f) "Tax" means the federal estate tax, the additional inheritance tax imposed by section 26-2-113, C.R.S., the Colorado estate tax imposed by article 23.5 of title 39, C.R.S., and interest and penalties imposed in addition to the tax.

(2) Unless otherwise provided in the will or other dispositive instrument, the tax shall be apportioned among all persons interested in the estate, subject to the exceptions specified in this section. The apportionment is to be made in the proportion that the value of the interest of each person interested in the estate bears to the total value of the interests of all persons interested in the estate. The values used in determining the tax are to be used for tax apportionment purposes. In all instances not involving a spouse unprovided for in a will as provided in section 15-11-301 or an election by a surviving spouse as provided in section 15-11-202, if the decedent's will or other dispositive instrument directs a method of apportionment of tax different from the method described in this code, the method described in the will or other dispositive instrument controls. In instances involving such a spouse unprovided for in a will or election, if the decedent's will or other dispositive instrument directs a method of apportionment of tax different from the method described in this code, the apportionment of tax to the spouse unprovided for in the will or to the surviving spouse shall be in accordance with the method described in this code, and the apportionment of tax to the remaining persons interested in the estate shall be in accordance with the method described in the will or other dispositive instrument.

(3) (a) The court in which venue lies for the administration of the estate of a decedent, on petition for the purpose, may determine the apportionment of the tax.

(b) If the court finds that it is inequitable to apportion interest and penalties in the manner provided in subsection (2) of this section, because of special circumstances, it may direct apportionment thereof in the manner it finds equitable.

(c) If the court finds that the assessment of penalties and interest assessed in relation to the tax is due to delay caused by the negligence of the fiduciary, the court may charge him with the amount of the assessed penalties and interest.

(d) In any action to recover from any person interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the person in accordance with this code, the determination of the court in respect thereto shall be prima facie correct.

(4) (a) The personal representative or other person in possession of the property of the decedent required to pay the tax may withhold from any property distributable to any person interested in the estate, upon its distribution to him, the amount of tax attributable to his interest. If the property in possession of the personal representative or other person required to pay the tax and distributable to any person interested in the estate is insufficient to satisfy the proportionate amount of the tax determined to be due from the person, the personal representative or other person required to pay the tax may recover the deficiency from the person interested in the estate. If the property is not in the possession of the personal representative or the other person required to pay the tax, the personal representative or the other person required to pay the tax may recover from any person interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the person in accordance with this section.

(b) If property held by the personal representative is distributed prior to final apportionment of the tax, the distributee shall provide a bond or other security for the apportionment liability in the form and amount prescribed by the personal representative.

(5) (a) In making an apportionment, allowances shall be made for any exemptions granted, any classification made of persons interested in the estate, and for any deductions and credits allowed by the law imposing the tax.

(b) Any exemption or deduction allowed by reason of the relationship of any person to the decedent or by reason of the purposes of the gift inures to the benefit of the person bearing such relationship or receiving the gift; but, if an interest is subject to a prior present interest which is not allowable as a deduction, the tax apportionable against the present interest shall be paid from principal.

(c) Any deduction for property previously taxed and any credit for gift taxes or death taxes of a foreign country paid by the decedent or his estate inures to the proportionate benefit of all persons liable to apportionment.

(d) Any credit for inheritance, succession, or estate taxes or taxes in the nature thereof applicable to property or interests includable in the estate inures to the benefit of the persons or interests chargeable with the payment thereof to the extent proportionately that the credit reduces the tax. (e) To the extent that property passing to or in trust for a surviving spouse or any charitable, public, or similar gift or devise is not an allowable deduction for purposes of the tax solely by reason of an inheritance tax or other death tax imposed upon and deductible from the property, the property is not included in the computation provided for in subsection (2) of this section, and to that extent no apportionment is made against the property. The provisions of this paragraph (e) do not apply to any case if the result would be to deprive the estate of a deduction otherwise allowable under section 2053(d) of the federal "Internal Revenue Code of 1986", as amended, of the United States, relating to deduction for state death taxes on transfers for public, charitable, or religious uses.

(6) No interest in income and no estate for years or for life or other temporary interest in any property or fund is subject to apportionment as between the temporary interest and the remainder. The tax on the temporary interest and the tax, if any, on the remainder is chargeable against the corpus of the property or funds subject to the temporary interest and remainder.

(7) Neither the personal representative nor other person required to pay the tax is under any duty to institute any action to recover from any person interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the person until the expiration of the three months next following final determination of the tax. A personal representative or other person required to pay the tax who institutes the action within a reasonable time after the three months' period is not subject to any liability or surcharge because any portion of the tax apportioned to any person interested in the estate was collectible at a time following the death of the decedent but thereafter became uncollectible. If the personal representative or other person required to pay the tax cannot collect from any person interested in the estate the amount of the tax apportioned to the person, the amount not recoverable shall be equitably apportioned among the other persons interested in the estate who are subject to apportionment.

(8) A personal representative acting in another state or a person required to pay the tax domiciled in another state may institute an action in the courts of this state and may recover a proportionate amount of the federal estate tax, of an estate tax payable to another state, or of a death duty due by a decedent's estate to another state, from a person interested in the estate who is either domiciled in this state or who owns property in this state subject to attachment or execution. For the purposes of the action the determination of apportionment by the court having jurisdiction of the administration of the decedent's estate in the other state is prima facie correct.

(9) If the liabilities of persons interested in the estate as prescribed by this code differ from those which result under the federal estate tax law, the liabilities imposed by the federal law shall control, and all other provisions of this code shall apply as if the amounts and liabilities prescribed by the federal law had been prescribed by subsection (2) of this section.

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1602, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 153-3-916. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 600, § 39, effective July 1. L. 79: (1)(f) amended, p. 1436, § 18, effective July 3. L. 81: (2) amended, p. 915, § 10, effective July 1. L. 83: (9) added, p. 660, § 1, effective April 21. L. 85:

(2) amended, p. 605, § 1, effective April 30. L. 94: (2) amended, p. 1038, § 12, effective July 1, 1995. L. 2000: (5)(e) amended, p. 1846, § 29, effective August 2. L. 2002: (1)(f) amended, p. 1360, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2014: (2) amended, (HB 14-1322), ch. 296, p. 1240, § 13, effective August 6.

PART 10 CLOSING ESTATES 15-12-1001. Formal proceedings terminating administration - testate or intestate - order of general protection. (1) A personal representative or any interested person may petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate. The personal representative may petition at any time, and any other interested person may petition after one year from the appointment of the original personal representative; except that no petition under this section may be entertained until the time for presenting claims which arose prior to the death of the decedent has expired. The petition may request the court to determine testacy, if not previously determined, to consider the final account or compel or approve an accounting and distribution, to construe any will or determine heirs, and to adjudicate the final settlement and distribution of the estate. After notice to all interested persons and hearing, the court may enter an order or orders, on appropriate conditions, determining the persons entitled to distribution of the estate, and, as circumstances require, approving settlement and directing or approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative from further claim or demand of any interested person.

(2) If one or more heirs or devisees were omitted as parties in, or were not given notice of, a previous formal testacy proceeding, the court, on proper petition for an order of complete settlement of the estate under this section, and after notice to the omitted or unnotified persons and other interested parties determined to be interested on the assumption that the previous order concerning testacy is conclusive as to those given notice of the earlier proceeding, may determine testacy as it affects the omitted persons and confirm or alter the previous order of testacy as it affects all interested persons as appropriate in the light of the new proofs. In the absence of objection by an omitted or unnotified person, evidence received in the original testacy proceeding shall constitute prima facie proof of due execution of any will previously admitted to probate, or of the fact that the decedent left no valid will if the prior proceedings determined this fact.

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1604, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 153-3-1001.

Cross references: For the termination of a conservatorship, see § 15-14-431.

15-12-1002. Formal proceedings terminating testate administration - order construing will without adjudicating testacy. A personal representative administering an estate under an informally probated will or any devisee under an informally probated will may petition for an order of settlement of the estate which will not adjudicate the testacy status of the decedent. The personal representative may petition at any time, and a devisee may petition after one year, from the appointment of the original personal representative; except that no petition under this section may be entertained until the time for presenting claims which arose prior to the death of the decedent has expired. The petition may request the court to consider the final account or compel or approve an accounting and distribution, to construe the will and adjudicate final settlement and distribution of the estate. After notice to all devisees and the personal representative and hearing, the court may enter an order or orders, on appropriate conditions, determining the persons entitled to distribution of the estate under the will, and, as circumstances require, approving settlement and directing or approving distribution of the estate and discharging the personal representative from further claim or demand of any devisee who is a party to the proceeding and those he represents. If it appears that a part of the estate is intestate, the proceedings shall be dismissed or amendments made to meet the provisions of section 15-12- 1001.

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1604, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 153-3-1002.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1978–2016 · leading case: Katz, Look & Moison, P.C. v. Turnwall, 113 P.3d 150 (Colo. 2005).
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Katz, Look & Moison, P.C. v. Turnwall, 113 P.3d 150 (Colo. 2005). · cites it 36× “Albert’s daughters responded, asserting that the testamentary instruments were clear and unambiguous in waiving apportionment of taxes 4 ; that the Trustees had an inherent *153 conflict of interest; and that if section 15-12-916 applied, it applied to Marian’s non-probate…”
In Re Est. of Klarner, 98 P.3d 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 15× “The court allowed the Trustees to pay a contribution to Marian's estate from the QTIP Trust in proportion to its percentage of Marian's gross estate, pursuant to § 15-12-916(2), C.R.S. 2003. Albert's daughters then filed a motion for reconsideration and motion to compel…”
In Matter of Est. of Kelly, 584 P.2d 640 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 11× “In an action arising under § 15-12-916, C.R.S.1973 (1976 Cum.Supp.) of the Colorado Probate Code, petitioners appeal from the judgment of the district court ordering the apportionment of estate taxes.”
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. · cites it 58× “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Shirley v. Katz, Look & Moison, P.C., 98 P.3d 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 13× “The court allowed the Trustees to pay a contribution to Marian's estate from the QTIP Trust in proportion to its percentage of Marian's gross estate, pursuant to § 15-12-916(2), C.R.S. 2003. ‘ Albert's daughteré then filed a motion for reconsideration and motion to compel…”
Est. of Petteys ex rel. Beattie v. Farmers State Bank of Brush, 2016 COA 34, 381 P.3d 386. · cites it 52× “The court ruled that the federal statute relied on by the Trustee is not appli *390 cable to this case and therefore Colorado law governs apportionment, The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute,…”
Beren v. Goodyear (In re Est. of Beren), 412 P.3d 487 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 20× “¶ 83 Section 15-12-916, C.R.S.2012, governs the "Apportionment of estate taxes.”
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. · cites it 58× “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
In Re Est. of Eakin, 708 P.2d 476 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 7× “She contends that any estate tax on her elective share of the estate should be applied after computation of her elective share and should be apportioned according to § 15-12-916(2) C.”
In Re Est. of Barnard, 867 P.2d 47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 7× “First, § 15-12-916(1)(d), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(1)(d): 3 cases
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
In Re Est. of Barnard, 867 P.2d 47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). “First, § 15-12-916(1)(d), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol.”
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(1)(f): 1 case
In Matter of Est. of Kelly, 584 P.2d 640 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978). “In an action arising under § 15-12-916, C.R.S.1973 (1976 Cum.Supp.) of the Colorado Probate Code, petitioners appeal from the judgment of the district court ordering the apportionment of estate taxes.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(2): 10 cases
In Re Est. of Klarner, 98 P.3d 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). “The court allowed the Trustees to pay a contribution to Marian's estate from the QTIP Trust in proportion to its percentage of Marian's gross estate, pursuant to § 15-12-916(2), C.R.S. 2003. Albert's daughters then filed a motion for reconsideration and motion to compel…”
Katz, Look & Moison, P.C. v. Turnwall, 113 P.3d 150 (Colo. 2005). “Albert’s daughters responded, asserting that the testamentary instruments were clear and unambiguous in waiving apportionment of taxes 4 ; that the Trustees had an inherent *153 conflict of interest; and that if section 15-12-916 applied, it applied to Marian’s non-probate…”
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Shirley v. Katz, Look & Moison, P.C., 98 P.3d 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003). “The court allowed the Trustees to pay a contribution to Marian's estate from the QTIP Trust in proportion to its percentage of Marian's gross estate, pursuant to § 15-12-916(2), C.R.S. 2003. ‘ Albert's daughteré then filed a motion for reconsideration and motion to compel…”
In Matter of Est. of Kelly, 584 P.2d 640 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978). “In an action arising under § 15-12-916, C.R.S.1973 (1976 Cum.Supp.) of the Colorado Probate Code, petitioners appeal from the judgment of the district court ordering the apportionment of estate taxes.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(3)(a): 3 cases
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Est. of Petteys ex rel. Beattie v. Farmers State Bank of Brush, 2016 COA 34, 381 P.3d 386. “The court ruled that the federal statute relied on by the Trustee is not appli *390 cable to this case and therefore Colorado law governs apportionment, The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute,…”
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(3)(b): 3 cases
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Est. of Petteys ex rel. Beattie v. Farmers State Bank of Brush, 2016 COA 34, 381 P.3d 386. “The court ruled that the federal statute relied on by the Trustee is not appli *390 cable to this case and therefore Colorado law governs apportionment, The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute,…”
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(3)(d): 3 cases
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Est. of Petteys ex rel. Beattie v. Farmers State Bank of Brush, 2016 COA 34, 381 P.3d 386. “The court ruled that the federal statute relied on by the Trustee is not appli *390 cable to this case and therefore Colorado law governs apportionment, The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute,…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(4)(a): 1 case
In Re Est. of Barnard, 867 P.2d 47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993). “First, § 15-12-916(1)(d), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(5)(a): 1 case
Beren v. Goodyear (In re Est. of Beren), 412 P.3d 487 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012). “¶ 83 Section 15-12-916, C.R.S.2012, governs the "Apportionment of estate taxes.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(5)(b): 1 case
Beren v. Goodyear (In re Est. of Beren), 412 P.3d 487 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012). “¶ 83 Section 15-12-916, C.R.S.2012, governs the "Apportionment of estate taxes.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(9): 4 cases
Katz, Look & Moison, P.C. v. Turnwall, 113 P.3d 150 (Colo. 2005). “Albert’s daughters responded, asserting that the testamentary instruments were clear and unambiguous in waiving apportionment of taxes 4 ; that the Trustees had an inherent *153 conflict of interest; and that if section 15-12-916 applied, it applied to Marian’s non-probate…”
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Est. of Petteys ex rel. Beattie v. Farmers State Bank of Brush, 2016 COA 34, 381 P.3d 386. “The court ruled that the federal statute relied on by the Trustee is not appli *390 cable to this case and therefore Colorado law governs apportionment, The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute,…”
Est. of Robert A. Petteys v. Farmers State Bank, 2016 COA 34. “The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute, section 15-12-916, C.R.S. 2015, but it concluded that the Trustee’s equitable arguments raised factual issues to be resolved at a bench trial.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(l)(a): 1 case
Katz, Look & Moison, P.C. v. Turnwall, 113 P.3d 150 (Colo. 2005). “Albert’s daughters responded, asserting that the testamentary instruments were clear and unambiguous in waiving apportionment of taxes 4 ; that the Trustees had an inherent *153 conflict of interest; and that if section 15-12-916 applied, it applied to Marian’s non-probate…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-12-916(l)(d): 1 case
Est. of Petteys ex rel. Beattie v. Farmers State Bank of Brush, 2016 COA 34, 381 P.3d 386. “The court ruled that the federal statute relied on by the Trustee is not appli *390 cable to this case and therefore Colorado law governs apportionment, The court further ruled that the Estate is presumptively entitled to reimbursement under Colorado’s apportionment statute,…”
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