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Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101 (2026)

Alternatives in sentencing - repeal

✓ current as of July 2026
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(Repealed) Source: L. 72: R&RE, p. 239, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 39-11-101. L. 73: p. 503, § 1. L. 76: IP(1), (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), and (1)(e) amended, p. 545, § 1, effective July 1. L. 77: (1)(b) amended, p. 993, § 2, effective July 1; (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), and (1)(h) amended, p. 861, § 2, effective July 1, 1979. L. 79: (1)(d) repealed and (1)(h) amended, pp. 672, 664, §§ 24, 1, effective July 1; (1)(h) amended, p. 679, § 5, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(e) amended, p. 1253, § 2, effective January 1, 1986. L. 88: (1)(e) amended, p. 1049, § 4, effective July 1. L. 92: (1)(b.5) added, p. 262, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93, 1st Ex. Sess.: (1)(i) added, p. 13, § 4, effective September 13. L. 95: (1)(i)(I) amended, p. 1095, § 11, effective May 31; (1)(b.5) amended and

(2) added, p. 1279, § 17, effective June 5. L. 96: (1)(e) amended, p. 1842, § 5, effective July 1;

(1)(i)(I) amended, p. 1688, § 18, effective January 1, 1997. L. 98: (1)(j) added, p. 1290, § 8, effective November 1. L. 99: (1)(i)(II) amended, p. 43, § 3, effective March 15; (3) added, p. 316, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2002: (3)(a) amended, p. 1182, § 8, effective July 1; entire section repealed, p. 1463, § 3, effective October 1. L. 2002, 3rd Ex. Sess.: (1)(c) amended, p. 32, § 23, effective July 12.

Editor's note: (1) The effective date for amendments made to this section by chapter 216, L. 77, was changed from July 1, 1978, to April 1, 1979, by chapter 1, First Extraordinary Session, L. 78, and was subsequently changed to July 1, 1979, by chapter 157, § 23, L. 79. See People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).

(2) Senate Bill 02-010 amended subsection (3)(a). This section as amended by Senate Bill 02-010 was subsequently harmonized with House Bill 02-1046 and relocated to section 18- 1.3-104.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act repealing this section, see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (1)(c), see section 16 of chapter 1 of the supplement to the Session Laws of Colorado 2002, Third Extraordinary Session.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 70 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1976–2021 · leading case: People v. Kennaugh, 80 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2003).
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People v. Kennaugh, 80 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2003). · cites it 68× “Viewing the statute as a whole, we construe the introductory clause of section 16-11-101, which provides that a trial court may grant probation "[w]ithin the limitations of the penalties provided by the classification of the offense of which a person is found guilty," as capping…”
Chae v. People, 780 P.2d 481 (Colo. 1989). · cites it 22× “The court of appeals concluded that the original suspended prison term imposed by the district court was an illegal sentence because the alternative sentencing provisions of section 16-11-101, 8A C.R.S. (1986), do not authorize a district court to suspend execution of a sentence…”
People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1981). · cites it 28× “The defendant contends that he should have been sentenced under section 16-11-101(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
People v. Madonna, 651 P.2d 378 (Colo. 1982). · cites it 13× “Pursuant to section 16-11-101, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
People v. Smith, 579 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1978). · cites it 21× “Appellant, who was represented by counsel, admitted the prior felony conviction but contended that section 16-11-101 (l)(d) could not be employed by the *406 judge in imposing sentence in the absence of a specific count in the information charging the prior conviction.”
People v. Flenniken, 749 P.2d 395 (Colo. 1988). · cites it 9× “[[Image here]] § 16-11-101, 8A C.R.S. (1986). Because the new sentencing scheme did not require that offenders be sentenced to imprisonment, it was unnecessary to grant judges authority to suspend the imposition or execution of such a sentence in order to place an offender on…”
People v. Anaya, 894 P.2d 28 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “The sentencing alternatives that are within a court’s jurisdiction are defined in § 16-11-101, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A). Those alternatives do not include the authority to enter orders modifying parole eligibility dates.”
People v. Hinchman, 589 P.2d 917 (Colo. 1978). · cites it 6× “[2] The same scope of sentencing power is indicated by section 16-11-101, C.R.S.1973 (Supp. 1976): "In .”
People v. Robinson, 713 P.2d 1333 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985). · cites it 3× “Section 16-11-101, C.R.S. (1978 Repl.Vol.”
Adair v. People, 651 P.2d 389 (Colo. 1982). · cites it 2× “Turner, supra; section 16-11-101, supra. Since the court misapprehended its discretion in sentencing after the deferred sentence had been revoked, this cause must be remanded for a reconsideration of the sentencing issue, consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.”
People v. Deadmond, 683 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1984). · cites it 2× “Section 16-11-101(1), 8 C.R.S. (1973), defines the alternatives available to a trial court in imposing sentence upon a person found guilty of an offense.”
People v. Watkins, 613 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1980). · cites it 3× “10 The definite terms of six to ten years and two to five years were imposed under section 16-11-101(l)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
Show all 70 citing cases →
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(1) — 18 cases
People v. Kennaugh, 80 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2003). “Viewing the statute as a whole, we construe the introductory clause of section 16-11-101, which provides that a trial court may grant probation "[w]ithin the limitations of the penalties provided by the classification of the offense of which a person is found guilty," as capping…”
People v. Deadmond, 683 P.2d 763 (Colo. 1984). “Section 16-11-101(1), 8 C.R.S. (1973), defines the alternatives available to a trial court in imposing sentence upon a person found guilty of an offense.”
People v. Smith, 579 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1978). “Appellant, who was represented by counsel, admitted the prior felony conviction but contended that section 16-11-101 (l)(d) could not be employed by the *406 judge in imposing sentence in the absence of a specific count in the information charging the prior conviction.”
People v. Hunter, 738 P.2d 20 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
People v. Hughes, 946 P.2d 509 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(1)(a) — 7 cases
People v. Kennaugh, 80 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2003). “Viewing the statute as a whole, we construe the introductory clause of section 16-11-101, which provides that a trial court may grant probation "[w]ithin the limitations of the penalties provided by the classification of the offense of which a person is found guilty," as capping…”
People v. Graham, 678 P.2d 1043 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
People v. Jenkins, 575 P.2d 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977).
People v. Valenzuela, 98 P.3d 951 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
People v. Smith, 681 P.2d 525 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(1)(b) — 4 cases
People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1981). “The defendant contends that he should have been sentenced under section 16-11-101(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
People v. Kennaugh, 80 P.3d 315 (Colo. 2003). “Viewing the statute as a whole, we construe the introductory clause of section 16-11-101, which provides that a trial court may grant probation "[w]ithin the limitations of the penalties provided by the classification of the offense of which a person is found guilty," as capping…”
People v. Lobato, 559 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1977).
People v. Lobato, 559 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1977).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(1)(d) — 7 cases
People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146 (Colo. 1981). “The defendant contends that he should have been sentenced under section 16-11-101(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
Godbold v. Dist. Court in & for the Twenty-First Jud. Dist., 623 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1981).
People v. Smith, 579 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1978). “Appellant, who was represented by counsel, admitted the prior felony conviction but contended that section 16-11-101 (l)(d) could not be employed by the *406 judge in imposing sentence in the absence of a specific count in the information charging the prior conviction.”
People v. Steelman, 613 P.2d 334 (Colo. 1980).
People v. Lipinski, 580 P.2d 1243 (Colo. 1978).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(2) — 1 case
People v. Romero, 767 P.2d 782 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(2)(a) — 1 case
People v. Gagnon, 997 P.2d 1278 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(f) — 1 case
People v. Lewis, 564 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1977).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(l)(a) — 1 case
People v. Manley, 707 P.2d 1021 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(l)(b) — 2 cases
People v. Flenniken, 749 P.2d 395 (Colo. 1988). “[[Image here]] § 16-11-101, 8A C.R.S. (1986). Because the new sentencing scheme did not require that offenders be sentenced to imprisonment, it was unnecessary to grant judges authority to suspend the imposition or execution of such a sentence in order to place an offender on…”
People v. Turner, 644 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1982).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(l)(d) — 4 cases
People v. Watkins, 613 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1980). “10 The definite terms of six to ten years and two to five years were imposed under section 16-11-101(l)(d), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
People v. Smith, 579 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1978). “Appellant, who was represented by counsel, admitted the prior felony conviction but contended that section 16-11-101 (l)(d) could not be employed by the *406 judge in imposing sentence in the absence of a specific count in the information charging the prior conviction.”
People v. Espinosa, 614 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1980).
People v. Weber, 604 P.2d 30 (Colo. 1979).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-101(l)(e) — 1 case
People v. Turner, 644 P.2d 951 (Colo. 1982).
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