Colo. Rev. Stat. » Title 16
Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309 (2026)

Mandatory sentences for violent crimes

✓ current as of July 2026
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(Repealed) Source: L. 76: Entire section added, p. 547, § 5, effective July 1. L. 77: (1) amended, p. 902, § 4, effective July 13; (1) amended and (3) repealed, pp. 865, 888, §§ 11, 78, effective July 1, 1979. L. 79: (1) amended, p. 666, § 9, effective August 1. L. 81: (1) and (2) amended, p. 944, § 1, effective July 1; (1) amended, p. 971, § 2, effective July 1. L. 82: (2)(a), (4), and (5) amended and (6) and (7) added, pp. 314, 315, §§ 3, 4, effective July 1. L. 83: (2)(a)(I) amended, p. 682, § 1, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(a) amended, p. 647, § 1, effective July 1. L. 88: (1) amended, p. 679, § 1, effective July 1. L. 89: (8) added, p. 875, § 9, effective June 5. L. 91: (1)(b), (2)(a)(I), and (2)(b) amended, p. 1781, § 3, effective July 1. L. 93: (1)(b), (2)(a)(I), and

(2)(b) amended, p. 1633, § 15, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(b) amended and (2) R&RE, pp. 1714, 1715, §§ 2, 3, effective July 1. L. 95: (2)(c) amended, p. 1096, § 13, effective May 31; (1)(b) repealed, p. 1250, §3, effective July 1. L. 98: (1)(c) added, p. 1291, § 9, effective November 1, 1998. L. 2002: Entire section repealed, p. 1463, § 3, effective October 1.

Editor's note: In 2002, this section was relocated to section 18-1.3-406. Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act repealing this section, see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 297 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1977–2023 · leading case: People v. Terry.
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People v. Terry (Colo. 1990). · cites it 111× “The district court ruled that the defendant was not subject to section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), requiring mandatory sentencing for violent crimes, because the court had dismissed the People’s mandatory sentencing count prior to the sentencing hearing.”
People v. Fuller (Colo. 1990). · cites it 48× “The defendant, Douglas Burt Fuller, was convicted of aggravated robbery, [1] second degree kidnapping, [2] and also, pursuant to section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), of two violent crime sentence enhancement counts.”
Terry v. People (Colo. 1999). · cites it 83× “In 1995, the General Assembly amended Colorado’s criminal conspiracy statute to provide that “[c]onspiracy to commit any crime for which a court is required to sentence a defendant for a crime of violence in accordance with section 16-11-309, C.R.S., is itself a crime of…”
People v. Banks (Colo. 2000). · cites it 47× “The issue on certiorari is: "Whether a crime that statutorily requires sentencing under the provisions of the crime of violence statute, § 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1998), must be treated as 'any crime of violence as defined in § 16-11-309,' for purposes of 'extraordinary risk'…”
Robles v. People (Colo. 1991). · cites it 42× “This conclusion is contrary to the legislative intent underlying the enactment of the 1985 amendment to section 16-11-309(1)(a). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.”
People v. White (Colo. 1994). · cites it 36× “(] 1986[) ], and that factor states that, "The defendant was previously convicted in this state of a Class 1 or 2 felony involving violations as specified in Section 16-11-309." ... [T]here were two convictions.”
People v. Rodriguez (Colo. 1996). · cites it 10× “By information, the prosecution charged Rodriguez with a violation of section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), which requires a mandatory sentence for one convicted of a crime of violence.”
Cassels v. People (Colo. 2004). · cites it 8× “(2000), and two counts of crime of violence pursuant to section 16-11-309, 6 C.R.S. (2000). [2] At trial, the court instructed the jury to consider whether Cassels acted in self-defense.”
People v. Russo (Colo. 1986). · cites it 21× “9, § 16-11-309(1), 1979 Sess.Laws 664, 666. The crime of violence statute is clearly a sentencing provision.”
People v. Haymaker (Colo. 1986). · cites it 20× “" One of the circumstances included in subsection (9)(a) is the defendant's conviction of a crime of violence under section 16-11-309, 8 C.R.S. § 18-1-105(9)(a)(I).”
People v. Nguyen (Colo. 1995). · cites it 29× “(c) If a defendant is convicted of assault in the second degree pursuant to paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), or (g) of subsection (1) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 16-11-309, C.R.S. § 18-3-203, 8B C.”
People v. Darbe (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 6× “Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred in concluding that second degree murder committed in the heat of passion is subject to crime of violence sentencing under § 16-11-309, C.R.S.2001, and is an extraordinary risk offense under § 18-1-105(9.”
Show all 297 citing cases →
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(1) — 10 cases
People v. Russo (Colo. 1986). “9, § 16-11-309(1), 1979 Sess.Laws 664, 666. The crime of violence statute is clearly a sentencing provision.”
People v. Terry (Colo. 1990). “The district court ruled that the defendant was not subject to section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), requiring mandatory sentencing for violent crimes, because the court had dismissed the People’s mandatory sentencing count prior to the sentencing hearing.”
People v. Fuller (Colo. 1990). “The defendant, Douglas Burt Fuller, was convicted of aggravated robbery, [1] second degree kidnapping, [2] and also, pursuant to section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), of two violent crime sentence enhancement counts.”
People v. Banks (Colo. 2000). “The issue on certiorari is: "Whether a crime that statutorily requires sentencing under the provisions of the crime of violence statute, § 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1998), must be treated as 'any crime of violence as defined in § 16-11-309,' for purposes of 'extraordinary risk'…”
Close v. People (Colo. 2008).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(1)(2) — 1 case
People v. Clifton (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(1)(a) — 29 cases
Robles v. People (Colo. 1991). “This conclusion is contrary to the legislative intent underlying the enactment of the 1985 amendment to section 16-11-309(1)(a). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.”
People v. Fuller (Colo. 1990). “The defendant, Douglas Burt Fuller, was convicted of aggravated robbery, [1] second degree kidnapping, [2] and also, pursuant to section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), of two violent crime sentence enhancement counts.”
People v. Clifton (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
People v. Haymaker (Colo. 1986). “" One of the circumstances included in subsection (9)(a) is the defendant's conviction of a crime of violence under section 16-11-309, 8 C.R.S. § 18-1-105(9)(a)(I).”
People v. Ellis (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(1)(c) — 2 cases
People v. Corson (Colo. 2016).
People v. Becker (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(2) — 30 cases
McKinney v. Kautzky (Colo. 1990).
People v. Haymaker (Colo. 1986). “" One of the circumstances included in subsection (9)(a) is the defendant's conviction of a crime of violence under section 16-11-309, 8 C.R.S. § 18-1-105(9)(a)(I).”
Terry v. People (Colo. 1999). “In 1995, the General Assembly amended Colorado’s criminal conspiracy statute to provide that “[c]onspiracy to commit any crime for which a court is required to sentence a defendant for a crime of violence in accordance with section 16-11-309, C.R.S., is itself a crime of…”
S.G.W. v. People (Colo. 1988).
People v. Swanson (Colo. 1981).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(2)(a) — 4 cases
People v. Banks (Colo. 2000). “The issue on certiorari is: "Whether a crime that statutorily requires sentencing under the provisions of the crime of violence statute, § 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1998), must be treated as 'any crime of violence as defined in § 16-11-309,' for purposes of 'extraordinary risk'…”
People v. Ellis (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
People v. Anderson (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. Zamora (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(2)(a)(1) — 1 case
People v. Zamora (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(2)(a)(I) — 15 cases
People v. Haymaker (Colo. 1986). “" One of the circumstances included in subsection (9)(a) is the defendant's conviction of a crime of violence under section 16-11-309, 8 C.R.S. § 18-1-105(9)(a)(I).”
People v. Mozee (Colo. 1986).
People v. Chavez (Colo. 1986).
People v. Rodriguez (Colo. 1996). “By information, the prosecution charged Rodriguez with a violation of section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), which requires a mandatory sentence for one convicted of a crime of violence.”
People v. Banks (Colo. 2000). “The issue on certiorari is: "Whether a crime that statutorily requires sentencing under the provisions of the crime of violence statute, § 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1998), must be treated as 'any crime of violence as defined in § 16-11-309,' for purposes of 'extraordinary risk'…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(2)(a)(I)(A) — 2 cases
People v. Clifton (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
People v. Casias (Colo. 2002).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(2)(a)(I)(B) — 1 case
People v. Casias (Colo. 2002).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(2)(a)(ID)(A) — 1 case
People v. Banks (Colo. 2000). “The issue on certiorari is: "Whether a crime that statutorily requires sentencing under the provisions of the crime of violence statute, § 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1998), must be treated as 'any crime of violence as defined in § 16-11-309,' for purposes of 'extraordinary risk'…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(2)(b) — 1 case
People v. Banks (Colo. 2000). “The issue on certiorari is: "Whether a crime that statutorily requires sentencing under the provisions of the crime of violence statute, § 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1998), must be treated as 'any crime of violence as defined in § 16-11-309,' for purposes of 'extraordinary risk'…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(4) — 26 cases
People v. Terry (Colo. 1990). “The district court ruled that the defendant was not subject to section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), requiring mandatory sentencing for violent crimes, because the court had dismissed the People’s mandatory sentencing count prior to the sentencing hearing.”
People v. Banks (Colo. 2000). “The issue on certiorari is: "Whether a crime that statutorily requires sentencing under the provisions of the crime of violence statute, § 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1998), must be treated as 'any crime of violence as defined in § 16-11-309,' for purposes of 'extraordinary risk'…”
People v. Russo (Colo. 1986). “9, § 16-11-309(1), 1979 Sess.Laws 664, 666. The crime of violence statute is clearly a sentencing provision.”
People v. Wadley (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
Terry v. People (Colo. 1999). “In 1995, the General Assembly amended Colorado’s criminal conspiracy statute to provide that “[c]onspiracy to commit any crime for which a court is required to sentence a defendant for a crime of violence in accordance with section 16-11-309, C.R.S., is itself a crime of…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(5) — 18 cases
People v. Russo (Colo. 1986). “9, § 16-11-309(1), 1979 Sess.Laws 664, 666. The crime of violence statute is clearly a sentencing provision.”
People v. Terry (Colo. 1990). “The district court ruled that the defendant was not subject to section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), requiring mandatory sentencing for violent crimes, because the court had dismissed the People’s mandatory sentencing count prior to the sentencing hearing.”
People v. Swanson (Colo. 1981).
People v. McMullen (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
People v. Banks (Colo. 2000). “The issue on certiorari is: "Whether a crime that statutorily requires sentencing under the provisions of the crime of violence statute, § 16-11-309, C.R.S. (1998), must be treated as 'any crime of violence as defined in § 16-11-309,' for purposes of 'extraordinary risk'…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(7) — 1 case
Terry v. People (Colo. 1999). “In 1995, the General Assembly amended Colorado’s criminal conspiracy statute to provide that “[c]onspiracy to commit any crime for which a court is required to sentence a defendant for a crime of violence in accordance with section 16-11-309, C.R.S., is itself a crime of…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(8) — 1 case
Robertson v. City & Cnty. of Denver (Colo. 1994).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-309(l)(a) — 11 cases
Robles v. People (Colo. 1991). “This conclusion is contrary to the legislative intent underlying the enactment of the 1985 amendment to section 16-11-309(1)(a). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.”
People v. Fuller (Colo. 1990). “The defendant, Douglas Burt Fuller, was convicted of aggravated robbery, [1] second degree kidnapping, [2] and also, pursuant to section 16-11-309, 8A C.R.S. (1986), of two violent crime sentence enhancement counts.”
People v. Mozee (Colo. 1986).
People v. McGregor (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
People v. Page (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
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