(1) No inmate shall be discharged from the department until he has remained the full term for which he was sentenced, to be computed on and after the date upon which the sentence becomes effective and excluding any time the inmate may have been at large by reason of escape therefrom, unless he is pardoned or otherwise released by legal authority.
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the full term for which an inmate is sentenced shall be reduced by any earned release time and earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, except as provided in section 17-22.5-403 (3) and (3.5).
(3) This part 4 shall not apply to any offender to whom section 17-22.5-104 (2)(a), (2)(b), (2)(c), (2)(d)(I), (2)(d)(II), or (2)(d)(III) applies.
(4) A person discharged from a correctional facility without supervision is eligible to receive reentry support services from the department or community-based organizations that receive funding from the department to provide reentry services for up to one year after the person's date of discharge.
Source: L. 90: Entire part added, p. 947, § 19, effective June 7. L. 2004: (2) amended, p. 1741, § 2, effective June 4. L. 2006: (3) amended, p. 1053, § 4, effective May 25. L. 2009: (2) amended, (HB 09-1351), ch. 359, p. 1867, § 2, effective June 1. L. 2019: (4) added, (SB 19- 143), ch. 286, p. 2659, § 5, effective May 28.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2006 act amending subsection (3), see section 1 of chapter 228, Session Laws of Colorado 2006.
Notes of Decisions
Ankeney v. Raemisch, Exec. Dir., Colorado Dep't of Corr., 2015 CO 14, 344 P.3d 847.
· cites it 4× “13 § 17-22.5-402. Section 405 specifies not only the amount of earned time that may be deducted from an inmate's sentence but also the allowable reasons for which earned time may be granted, expressly including making positive progress in the statutorily established literacy…”
People v. Valadez, 2016 COA 62.
· cites it 3× “3-501(1)(c) would contravene section 17-22.5-402(1), C.R.S. 2015, which provides, "[n]o inmate shall be discharged from the department until he has remained the full term for which he was sentenced.”
Meyers v. Price, 842 P.2d 229 (Colo. 1992).
· cites it 2× “Section 17-22.5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1992 Supp.”
Mulberry v. Neal, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (D. Colo. 2000).
· cites it 2× “The state board of parole may set the length of the period of parole for any time period up to the date of final discharge as determined in accordance with section 17-22.5-402. If an application for parole is refused by the state board of parole, the state board of parole shall…”
People v. Valadez, 2016 COA 62.
· cites it 3× “3-501(1)(c) would contravene section 17-22.5-402(1), C.R.S. 2015, which provides, "[n]o inmate shall be discharged from the department until he has remained the full term for which he was sentenced.”
People v. Valadez, 2016 COA 62, 374 P.3d 529.
· cites it 2× “‘ $29 First, we do not construe the term "discharge" in section 17-22.5-402(1) to include the statutory requirement presented here, where a defendant is transported to court on a writ, the court imposes a consecutive county jail sentence and remands the defendant to county jail…”
Lanari v. CDOC, No. 24CA0341 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2025).
· cites it 3× “¶ 18 On the other hand, Lanari must serve “at least forty calendar years” of his life sentence for first degree murder before he can become eligible for parole.”
Martinez v. CDOC, No. 25CA1124 (Colo. Ct. App. May 21, 2026).
· cites it 3× “5)(a) (“Section 17-22.5-402(2)[, C.R.S. 2025,] shall not apply to any such offender.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-402(1): 3 cases
People v. Valadez, 2016 COA 62.
“3-501(1)(c) would contravene section 17-22.5-402(1), C.R.S. 2015, which provides, "[n]o inmate shall be discharged from the department until he has remained the full term for which he was sentenced.”
People v. Valadez, 2016 COA 62.
“3-501(1)(c) would contravene section 17-22.5-402(1), C.R.S. 2015, which provides, "[n]o inmate shall be discharged from the department until he has remained the full term for which he was sentenced.”
People v. Valadez, 2016 COA 62, 374 P.3d 529.
“‘ $29 First, we do not construe the term "discharge" in section 17-22.5-402(1) to include the statutory requirement presented here, where a defendant is transported to court on a writ, the court imposes a consecutive county jail sentence and remands the defendant to county jail…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-402(2): 2 cases
Ankeney v. Raemisch, Exec. Dir., Colorado Dep't of Corr., 2015 CO 14, 344 P.3d 847.
“13 § 17-22.5-402. Section 405 specifies not only the amount of earned time that may be deducted from an inmate's sentence but also the allowable reasons for which earned time may be granted, expressly including making positive progress in the statutorily established literacy…”
Martinez v. CDOC, No. 25CA1124 (Colo. Ct. App. May 21, 2026).
“5)(a) (“Section 17-22.5-402(2)[, C.R.S. 2025,] shall not apply to any such offender.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-22.5-402(3): 1 case
Lanari v. CDOC, No. 24CA0341 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2025).
“¶ 18 On the other hand, Lanari must serve “at least forty calendar years” of his life sentence for first degree murder before he can become eligible for parole.”
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