Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-503 (2026)

Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) When the commission of an offense, or some element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, that mental state is ordinarily designated by use of the terms "intentionally", "with intent", "knowingly", "willfully", "recklessly", or "criminal negligence" or by use of the terms "with intent to defraud" and "knowing it to be false" describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge.

(2) Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such a culpable mental state.

(3) If a statute provides that criminal negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, that element also is established if a person acts recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally. If recklessness suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts knowingly or intentionally. If acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.

(4) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 404, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-1-603. L. 77: (1) amended, p. 960, § 3, effective July 1.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 94 cases (14 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case: v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74 (Colo. 2020).

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v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74 (Colo. 2020). · cites it 42× “Rigsby—Mutually Exclusive Verdicts—Legally Consistent Verdicts—§ 18-1-503(3), C.R.S. (2019)—Double Jeopardy— Multiplicity and Merger.”

v. Struckmeyer, 2020 CO 76 (Colo. 2020). · cites it 12× “Struckmeyer—Mutually Exclusive Verdicts—Legally Consistent Verdicts—§ 18-1-503(3), C.R.S. (2019). A jury found the defendant guilty of both child abuse (knowingly or recklessly), a class 3 felony, and child abuse (criminal negligence), a class 4 felony, based on the same…”

People v. Coleby, 34 P.3d 422 (Colo. 2001). · cites it 35× “I understand it to be the legislature's explanation of the manner in which it intends its of use the four culpable mental states specified in section 501, see also § 18-1-503(1), to be understood. In my view, it indicates that when a statute prescribes as an element of an…”

Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo. 2000). · cites it 28× “Section 18-1-503 provides that: (4) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.”

People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12 (Colo. 2016). · cites it 3× “More specifically, section 18-1-503(4), C.R.S. (2015), provides that, “[w]hen a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its…”

People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006). · cites it 12× “In so holding, the court relied on section 18-1-503(2), C.R.S. (2006), and reasoned that because Leaving the Scene of an Accident with Serious Injury is a class 5 felony, the General Assembly must have intended a culpable mental state.”

People v. Lopez, 140 P.3d 106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 14× “The court stated: *111 Because a crime ordinarily requires the conjunction of an act and a culpable mental state, a court should not construe legislative silence on the element of intent in a criminal statute as an indication that no culpable mental state is required.”

People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006). · cites it 6× “[14] Section 18-1-503(3), C.R.S. (2005) provides that "[i]f acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.”

The People of the State of Colorado v. Adrian Elijah Salazar, 2023 COA 102 (Colo. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 3× “” § 18-1-503(4), C.R.S. 2023. Under this rule and its exception, we must carefully consider whether the legislature intended that the expressed culpable mental state of the offense applies only to certain elements.”

People v. Metcalf, 926 P.2d 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 16× “Thus, he reasons, the trial court was required by § 18-1-503(2), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B) to add the culpable mental state of "knowingly" to its instruction, thereby requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew he was violating a court order.”

v. People, 2020 CO 54 (Colo. 2020). · cites it 2× “Application ¶16 Hoggard contends that the instruction on attempt to influence a public servant was plainly erroneous because it failed to apply the intent requirement to all elements of the offense, thereby contravening section 18-1-503(4). Assuming without deciding that an…”

Montoya v. People, 394 P.3d 676 (Colo. 2017). · cites it 5× “¶16 Whether or not the same conclusion could be reached solely from the legislature’s direction in section 18-1-503(3) for understanding its intent concerning the breadth of application of a mental state included in the definition of a crime, we have at least never deviated from…”

Show all 94 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-503(1) — 3 cases

People v. Manzo, 114 P.3d 78 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).

Deshawn Lynn Randolph, Petitioner: v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent:, 2025 CO 44 (Colo. 2025).

People v. Coleby, 34 P.3d 422 (Colo. 2001). “I understand it to be the legislature's explanation of the manner in which it intends its of use the four culpable mental states specified in section 501, see also § 18-1-503(1), to be understood. In my view, it indicates that when a statute prescribes as an element of an…”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-503(2) — 21 cases

People v. Manzo, 144 P.3d 551 (Colo. 2006). “In so holding, the court relied on section 18-1-503(2), C.R.S. (2006), and reasoned that because Leaving the Scene of an Accident with Serious Injury is a class 5 felony, the General Assembly must have intended a culpable mental state.”

People v. Lopez, 140 P.3d 106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). “The court stated: *111 Because a crime ordinarily requires the conjunction of an act and a culpable mental state, a court should not construe legislative silence on the element of intent in a criminal statute as an indication that no culpable mental state is required.”

People v. Metcalf, 926 P.2d 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). “Thus, he reasons, the trial court was required by § 18-1-503(2), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B) to add the culpable mental state of "knowingly" to its instruction, thereby requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew he was violating a court order.”

Dep't of Nat. Res. v. 5 Star Feedlot, Inc, 2021 CO 27 (Colo. 2021).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-503(3) — 25 cases

v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74 (Colo. 2020). “Rigsby—Mutually Exclusive Verdicts—Legally Consistent Verdicts—§ 18-1-503(3), C.R.S. (2019)—Double Jeopardy— Multiplicity and Merger.”

v. Struckmeyer, 2020 CO 76 (Colo. 2020). “Struckmeyer—Mutually Exclusive Verdicts—Legally Consistent Verdicts—§ 18-1-503(3), C.R.S. (2019). A jury found the defendant guilty of both child abuse (knowingly or recklessly), a class 3 felony, and child abuse (criminal negligence), a class 4 felony, based on the same…”

People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006). “[14] Section 18-1-503(3), C.R.S. (2005) provides that "[i]f acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element also is established if a person acts intentionally.”

People v. Mattas, 645 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1982).

People v. Beatty, 80 P.3d 847 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-503(4) — 51 cases

Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo. 2000). “Section 18-1-503 provides that: (4) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.”

People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12 (Colo. 2016). “More specifically, section 18-1-503(4), C.R.S. (2015), provides that, “[w]hen a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its…”

The People of the State of Colorado v. Adrian Elijah Salazar, 2023 COA 102 (Colo. Ct. App. 2023). “” § 18-1-503(4), C.R.S. 2023. Under this rule and its exception, we must carefully consider whether the legislature intended that the expressed culpable mental state of the offense applies only to certain elements.”

v. People, 2020 CO 54 (Colo. 2020). “Application ¶16 Hoggard contends that the instruction on attempt to influence a public servant was plainly erroneous because it failed to apply the intent requirement to all elements of the offense, thereby contravening section 18-1-503(4). Assuming without deciding that an…”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-503(8) — 1 case

Brown v. People, 239 P.3d 764 (Colo. 2010).

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