(1) If the allegation of previous convictions of other felony offenses is included in an indictment or information and if a verdict of guilty of the substantive offense with which the defendant is charged is returned, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether or not the defendant has suffered such previous felony convictions. As soon as practicable, the hearing shall be conducted by the judge who presided at trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered or a replacement for said judge in the event he or she dies, resigns, is incapacitated, or is otherwise disqualified as provided in section 16-6-201, C.R.S.
(2) An information or indictment seeking the increased penalties authorized by section 18-1.3-801 shall identify by separate counts each alleged former conviction and shall allege that the defendant on a date and at a place specified was convicted of a specific felony. If any such conviction was had outside this state, the information or indictment shall allege that the offense, if committed in this state, would be a felony.
(3) Upon arraignment of the defendant, such defendant shall be required to admit or deny that such defendant has been previously convicted of the crimes identified in the information or indictment. If the defendant refuses to admit or deny the previous convictions, such refusal shall be treated as a denial by such defendant that the defendant has been convicted as alleged. If the defendant admits to having been convicted as alleged in any count charging a previous conviction, no proof of such previous conviction is required. Such admission shall constitute conclusive proof in determining whether the defendant has been previously convicted of an alleged felony and the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with section 18- 1.3-801.
(4) If the defendant denies that he or she has been previously convicted as alleged in any count of an information or indictment, the trial judge, or a replacement judge as provided in subsection (1) of this section, shall determine by separate hearing and verdict whether the defendant has been convicted as alleged. The procedure in any case in which the defendant does not become a witness in his or her own behalf upon the trial of the substantive offense shall be as follows:
(a) The jury shall render a verdict upon the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence of the substantive offense charged;
(b) If the verdict is that the defendant is guilty of the substantive offense charged, the trial judge, or a replacement judge as provided in subsection (1) of this section, shall proceed to try the issues of whether the defendant has been previously convicted as alleged. The prosecuting attorney has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has been previously convicted as alleged.
(5) (a) If, upon the trial of the issues upon the substantive offense charged, the defendant testifies in his or her own defense and denies that he or she has been previously convicted as alleged, the prosecuting attorney on rebuttal may present all evidence relevant to the issues of previous convictions for the sole purpose of impeachment of the defendant's credibility, subject to the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials.
(b) If, upon the trial of the issues upon the substantive offense charged, the defendant testifies in his or her own defense and, after having denied the previous conviction under subsection (3) of this section, admits that he or she has been previously convicted as alleged, the trial judge, or a replacement judge as provided in subsection (1) of this section, shall, in any sentencing hearing, consider any admissions of prior convictions elicited from the defendant in connection with his or her testimony on the substantive offense only as they affect the defendant's credibility. In any sentencing hearing, the prosecution shall be required to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's prior convictions by evidence independent of the defendant's testimony.
(6) If the prosecuting attorney does not have any information indicating that the defendant has been previously convicted of a felony prior to the time a verdict of guilty is rendered on a felony charge and if thereafter the prosecuting attorney learns of the felony conviction prior to the time that sentence is pronounced by the court, he or she may file a new information in which it shall be alleged in separate counts that the defendant has been convicted of the particular offense upon which judgment has not been entered and that prior thereto at a specified date and place the defendant has been convicted of a felony warranting application of increased penalties authorized in this section and sections 18-1.3-801 and 18-1.3-802. The defendant shall be arraigned upon the new information, and, if the defendant denies the previous conviction, the trial judge, or a replacement judge as provided in subsection (1) of this section, shall try the issue prior to imposition of sentence.
Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1428, § 2, effective October 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 16-13-103 as it existed prior to 2002.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
24
cases (
9 in the last 5 years), 2002–2026 · leading case:
v. People, 2020 CO 49 (Colo. 2020).
v. People, 2020 CO 49 (Colo. 2020).
· cites it 20× “Section 18-1.3-803, C.R.S. (2019), establishes 22 the procedures for habitual offender proceedings.”
People v. Wilson, 318 P.3d 538 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 2× “{45 We reject defendant's argument that the sentence enhancer here is akin (1) to a finding that he was a habitual criminal, which requires the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant has been previously convicted of a designated number of felonies,…”
People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34 (Colo. 2015).
· cites it 2× “" § 18-1.3-803(4), CRS. (2014). We have not addressed the applicability of double jeopardy principles to the habitual phase of a bifurcated trial since this amendment.”
People v. Johnson, 74 P.3d 349 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 2× “Section 18-1.3-803(1) provides in clear and unambiguous language that the habitual criminal hearing shall be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial, subject to four stated exceptions.”
People v. Gregg, 298 P.3d 983 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 3× “Section 18-1.3-803(5)(b), C.R.S.2010; People v.”
People v. Nunn, 148 P.3d 222 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 2× “See § 18-1.3-803, C.E.S.2005; Colo. Sess. Laws 1995, ch.”
People v. LePage, 397 P.3d 1074 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 3× “Under section 18-1.3-803, C.R.S.2010, a court shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant has previous felony convictions, and the hearing shall be conducted by the judge who presided at trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered.”
People v. Green, 296 P.3d 260 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 3× “1984) ("habitual criminal charges are not substantive offenses"); see also § 18-1.3-803(1), (2), C.R.S. 2011 (referring to a "substantive offense" as a charge for which there has been a conviction before the habitual criminal hearing is conducted and to an "offense" as an…”
People v. King, 121 P.3d 234 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 3× “That statute, now codified at § 18-1.3-803, C.R.S.2004, was amended such that it applied to all informations filed on or after July 1, 1995.”
People v. Parks, 2015 COA 158 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 3× “Parks argues that Colorado's habitual criminal procedures are unconstitutional, Specifically, and in reliance on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 580 U.”
People v. Silva, 131 P.3d 1082 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 4× “In December 2003, defendant filed the present postconviction motion, in which he argued that: (1) his postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance and suffered from a conflict of interest; (2) on direct appeal his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (3)…”
People v. Garcia, 176 P.3d 872 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 2× “§ 18-1.3-803(1), C.R.S.2007 (after a guilty verdict on the substantive offense, the court must conduct a separate sentencing hearing for the purposes of adjudicating the defendant a habitual criminal).”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-803(1): 9 cases
People v. Johnson, 74 P.3d 349 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
“Section 18-1.3-803(1) provides in clear and unambiguous language that the habitual criminal hearing shall be conducted by the judge who presided at the trial, subject to four stated exceptions.”
People v. Green, 296 P.3d 260 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).
“1984) ("habitual criminal charges are not substantive offenses"); see also § 18-1.3-803(1), (2), C.R.S. 2011 (referring to a "substantive offense" as a charge for which there has been a conviction before the habitual criminal hearing is conducted and to an "offense" as an…”
People v. Garcia, 176 P.3d 872 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“§ 18-1.3-803(1), C.R.S.2007 (after a guilty verdict on the substantive offense, the court must conduct a separate sentencing hearing for the purposes of adjudicating the defendant a habitual criminal).”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-803(2): 2 cases
v. People, 2020 CO 49 (Colo. 2020).
“Section 18-1.3-803, C.R.S. (2019), establishes 22 the procedures for habitual offender proceedings.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-803(3): 1 case
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-803(4): 2 cases
v. People, 2020 CO 49 (Colo. 2020).
“Section 18-1.3-803, C.R.S. (2019), establishes 22 the procedures for habitual offender proceedings.”
People v. Porter, 2015 CO 34 (Colo. 2015).
“" § 18-1.3-803(4), CRS. (2014). We have not addressed the applicability of double jeopardy principles to the habitual phase of a bifurcated trial since this amendment.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-803(4)(b): 4 cases
People v. Wilson, 318 P.3d 538 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
“{45 We reject defendant's argument that the sentence enhancer here is akin (1) to a finding that he was a habitual criminal, which requires the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant has been previously convicted of a designated number of felonies,…”
v. People, 2020 CO 49 (Colo. 2020).
“Section 18-1.3-803, C.R.S. (2019), establishes 22 the procedures for habitual offender proceedings.”
People v. Silva, 131 P.3d 1082 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
“In December 2003, defendant filed the present postconviction motion, in which he argued that: (1) his postconviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance and suffered from a conflict of interest; (2) on direct appeal his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (3)…”
People v. Nunn, 148 P.3d 222 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
“See § 18-1.3-803, C.E.S.2005; Colo. Sess. Laws 1995, ch.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-803(5)(b): 1 case
People v. Gregg, 298 P.3d 983 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
“Section 18-1.3-803(5)(b), C.R.S.2010; People v.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-803(6): 2 cases
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