(1) A person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if:
(a) With intent to cause serious bodily injury to another person, he causes serious bodily injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon; or
(b) With intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate, or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such an injury to any person; or
(c) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, he knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious bodily injury to any person; or
(d) Repealed.
(e) With intent to cause serious bodily injury upon the person of a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider, he or she threatens with a deadly weapon a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and the offender knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider acting in the performance of his or her duties; or (e.5) With intent to cause serious bodily injury upon the person of a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction or an officer of said court, he threatens with a deadly weapon a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction or an officer of said court, and the offender knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction or an officer of said court; or
(f) While lawfully confined or in custody as a result of being charged with or convicted of a crime or as a result of being charged as a delinquent child or adjudicated as a delinquent child and with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a person employed by or under contract with a detention facility, as defined in section 18-8-203 (3), or to a person employed by the division in the department of human services responsible for youth services and who is a youth services counselor or is in the youth services worker classification series, he or she threatens with a deadly weapon such a person engaged in the performance of his or her duties and the offender knows or reasonably should know that the victim is such a person engaged in the performance of his or her duties while employed by or under contract with a detention facility or while employed by the division in the department of human services responsible for youth services. A sentence imposed pursuant to this paragraph (f) shall be served in the department of corrections and shall run consecutively with any sentences being served by the offender. A person who participates in a work release program, a furlough, or any other similar authorized supervised or unsupervised absence from a detention facility, as defined in section 18-8-203 (3), and who is required to report back to the detention facility at a specified time shall be deemed to be in custody.
(g) With the intent to cause serious bodily injury, he or she applies sufficient pressure to impede or restrict the breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by applying such pressure to the neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of the other person and thereby causes serious bodily injury.
(2) (a) If assault in the first degree is committed under circumstances where the act causing the injury is performed upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a serious and highly provoking act of the intended victim, affecting the person causing the injury sufficiently to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, and without an interval between the provocation and the injury sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, it is a class 5 felony.
(b) If assault in the first degree is committed without the circumstances provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), it is a class 3 felony.
(c) If a defendant is convicted of assault in the first degree pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-406.
(d) Repealed.
(e) For purposes of determining sudden heat of passion pursuant to subsection (2)(a) of this section, a defendant's act does not constitute an act performed upon a sudden heat of passion if it results solely from the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including but not limited to under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant.
(3) Repealed.
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 420, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-3-202. L. 75: (1)(d) amended, p. 632, § 6, effective July 1; (1)(a) amended, p. 618, § 7, effective July 21. L. 76, Ex. Sess.: (1)(f) added, p. 8, § 1, effective September 18. L. 77: (1)(c) amended, p. 961, § 9, effective July 1. L. 79: (2) R&RE, p. 732, § 1, effective May 18. L. 81: (1)(d) R&RE, p. 973, § 6, effective July 1. L. 86: (1)(d) amended, p. 770, § 5, effective July 1; (1)(f) amended, p. 789, § 1, effective July 1; (2)(c) and (2)(d) added, p. 776, § 2, effective July 1. L. 90: (1)(f) amended, p. 991, § 1, effective April 5; (1)(e.5) added and (2)(c) amended, p. 986, §§ 7, 8, effective April 24. L. 94: (1)(f) amended, p. 2655, § 137, effective July 1. L. 95: (1)(d) and (2)(d) repealed, p. 1250, § 6, effective July 1. L. 97: (2)(a) amended, p. 1544, § 13, effective July 1; (1)(e) amended, p. 1011, § 15, effective August 6. L. 98: (2)(c) amended, p. 1441, § 25, effective July 1. L. 2002: (2)(c) amended, p. 1512, § 186, effective October 1. L. 2003: (1)(f) amended, p. 1430, § 16, effective April 29. L. 2014: (1)(e) amended, (HB 14-1214), ch. 336, p. 1496, § 5, effective August 6. L. 2015: (3) added, (SB 15-005), ch. 108, p. 314, § 1, effective July 1; (3)(d) repealed, (SB 15-126), ch. 109, p. 318, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2016: (1)(g) added, (HB 16-1080), ch. 327, p. 1327, § 1, effective July 1; (3) repealed, (HB 16-1393), ch. 304, p. 1226, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2020:
(2)(e) added, (SB 20-221), ch. 279, p. 1369, § 8, effective July 13.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsection (1)(f), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (2)(c), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-221, see section 1 of chapter 279, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
263
cases (
44 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case:
Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1993).
Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1993).
· cites it 53× “On February 28, 1989, Rowe was charged with one count of first-degree assault in violation of section 18-3-202, 8B C.R.S. (1986), [1] and one count of committing a violent crime in violation of section 16-11-309(2), *488 8A C.”
People v. Moore, 877 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1994).
· cites it 42× “Section 18-3-202, 8B C.R.S. (1986), states: *843 Assault in the first degree.”
v. Denhartog, 2019 COA 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 6× “§ 18-3-202(1)(e), C.R.S. 2018. ¶ 10 Denhartog does not dispute that a car can be used as a deadly weapon, see People v.”
People v. Baker, 178 P.3d 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 8× “Because of the distinctions between the current extreme indifference first degree murder and assault statutes, we conclude that a finding of “universal malice” was not required for the jury to convict defendant of extreme indifference first degree assault under section 18-3-202.…”
People v. Muckle, 107 P.3d 380 (Colo. 2005).
· cites it 6× “(1995), and *382 first degree assault after provocation under section 18-3-202(2)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1995).”
Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896 (Colo. 2007).
· cites it 6× “(2007), a class four felony; section 18-3-202(1)(c), C.R.S. (2007), a class three felony; section 18-3-205, C.”
People v. Halstead, 881 P.2d 401 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 28× “1988), and we agree with the People that this result could not have been intended by the General Assembly when it enacted § 18-3-202(1)-(d). This is evident when considering the manner in which included offenses are usually treated under Colorado law.”
People v. Duran, 2025 COA 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
· cites it 10× “Next, the division conducts an abbreviated proportionality review of the defendant’s sentence and addresses an issue of first impression: whether extreme indifference first degree assault in violation of section 18-3-202(1)(c), C.”
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 18× “§ 18-3-202, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.) (emphasis added).”
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
· cites it 4× “[4] § 18-3-202(1)(b), (2)(b) (intent to disfigure another seriously and permanently).”
People v. Moore, 860 P.2d 549 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 28× “8B), is a lesser included offense and therefore merges into his conviction for first degree assault committed under provocation, a class five felony in violation of § 18-3-202, C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 8B). Defendant cites to no authority in any jurisdiction that has upheld the…”
People v. Trujillo, 83 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2004).
· cites it 5× “The police arrested Trujillo and the State charged him with four counts of first-degree assault on a police officer under section 18-3-202(l)(e), 6 C.R.S. (2001) and four crimes of violence counts under section 16-11-309(2) and (8), 6 C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(1) — 13 cases
Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1993).
“On February 28, 1989, Rowe was charged with one count of first-degree assault in violation of section 18-3-202, 8B C.R.S. (1986), [1] and one count of committing a violent crime in violation of section 16-11-309(2), *488 8A C.”
People v. Moore, 860 P.2d 549 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
“8B), is a lesser included offense and therefore merges into his conviction for first degree assault committed under provocation, a class five felony in violation of § 18-3-202, C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 8B). Defendant cites to no authority in any jurisdiction that has upheld the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(1)(a) — 66 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(1)(b) — 5 cases
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
“[4] § 18-3-202(1)(b), (2)(b) (intent to disfigure another seriously and permanently).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(1)(c) — 21 cases
Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896 (Colo. 2007).
“(2007), a class four felony; section 18-3-202(1)(c), C.R.S. (2007), a class three felony; section 18-3-205, C.”
People v. Duran, 2025 COA 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
“Next, the division conducts an abbreviated proportionality review of the defendant’s sentence and addresses an issue of first impression: whether extreme indifference first degree assault in violation of section 18-3-202(1)(c), C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(1)(d) — 6 cases
People v. Halstead, 881 P.2d 401 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
“1988), and we agree with the People that this result could not have been intended by the General Assembly when it enacted § 18-3-202(1)-(d). This is evident when considering the manner in which included offenses are usually treated under Colorado law.”
People v. Moore, 860 P.2d 549 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
“8B), is a lesser included offense and therefore merges into his conviction for first degree assault committed under provocation, a class five felony in violation of § 18-3-202, C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 8B). Defendant cites to no authority in any jurisdiction that has upheld the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(1)(e) — 15 cases
v. Denhartog, 2019 COA 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“§ 18-3-202(1)(e), C.R.S. 2018. ¶ 10 Denhartog does not dispute that a car can be used as a deadly weapon, see People v.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(1)(f) — 3 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(1)(g) — 7 cases
v. Lee, 2019 COA 130 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(2) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(2)(a) — 17 cases
Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1993).
“On February 28, 1989, Rowe was charged with one count of first-degree assault in violation of section 18-3-202, 8B C.R.S. (1986), [1] and one count of committing a violent crime in violation of section 16-11-309(2), *488 8A C.”
People v. Muckle, 107 P.3d 380 (Colo. 2005).
“(1995), and *382 first degree assault after provocation under section 18-3-202(2)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1995).”
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
“[4] § 18-3-202(1)(b), (2)(b) (intent to disfigure another seriously and permanently).”
People v. Moore, 860 P.2d 549 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
“8B), is a lesser included offense and therefore merges into his conviction for first degree assault committed under provocation, a class five felony in violation of § 18-3-202, C.R.S. (1988 Repl. Vol. 8B). Defendant cites to no authority in any jurisdiction that has upheld the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(2)(b) — 11 cases
Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1993).
“On February 28, 1989, Rowe was charged with one count of first-degree assault in violation of section 18-3-202, 8B C.R.S. (1986), [1] and one count of committing a violent crime in violation of section 16-11-309(2), *488 8A C.”
People v. Duran, 2025 COA 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
“Next, the division conducts an abbreviated proportionality review of the defendant’s sentence and addresses an issue of first impression: whether extreme indifference first degree assault in violation of section 18-3-202(1)(c), C.”
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995).
“§ 18-3-202, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.) (emphasis added).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(2)(c) — 14 cases
People v. Duran, 2025 COA 34 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
“Next, the division conducts an abbreviated proportionality review of the defendant’s sentence and addresses an issue of first impression: whether extreme indifference first degree assault in violation of section 18-3-202(1)(c), C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(2)(d) — 2 cases
People v. Halstead, 881 P.2d 401 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
“1988), and we agree with the People that this result could not have been intended by the General Assembly when it enacted § 18-3-202(1)-(d). This is evident when considering the manner in which included offenses are usually treated under Colorado law.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(2)(e) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(e) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(l) — 1 case
People v. Halstead, 881 P.2d 401 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
“1988), and we agree with the People that this result could not have been intended by the General Assembly when it enacted § 18-3-202(1)-(d). This is evident when considering the manner in which included offenses are usually treated under Colorado law.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(l)(a) — 46 cases
People v. Muckle, 107 P.3d 380 (Colo. 2005).
“(1995), and *382 first degree assault after provocation under section 18-3-202(2)(a), 8B C.R.S. (1995).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(l)(b) — 4 cases
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
“[4] § 18-3-202(1)(b), (2)(b) (intent to disfigure another seriously and permanently).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(l)(c) — 8 cases
People v. Baker, 178 P.3d 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Because of the distinctions between the current extreme indifference first degree murder and assault statutes, we conclude that a finding of “universal malice” was not required for the jury to convict defendant of extreme indifference first degree assault under section 18-3-202.…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(l)(d) — 12 cases
People v. Moore, 877 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1994).
“Section 18-3-202, 8B C.R.S. (1986), states: *843 Assault in the first degree.”
People v. Halstead, 881 P.2d 401 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
“1988), and we agree with the People that this result could not have been intended by the General Assembly when it enacted § 18-3-202(1)-(d). This is evident when considering the manner in which included offenses are usually treated under Colorado law.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(l)(e) — 19 cases
People v. Trujillo, 83 P.3d 642 (Colo. 2004).
“The police arrested Trujillo and the State charged him with four counts of first-degree assault on a police officer under section 18-3-202(l)(e), 6 C.R.S. (2001) and four crimes of violence counts under section 16-11-309(2) and (8), 6 C.”
People v. Baker, 178 P.3d 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Because of the distinctions between the current extreme indifference first degree murder and assault statutes, we conclude that a finding of “universal malice” was not required for the jury to convict defendant of extreme indifference first degree assault under section 18-3-202.…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-202(l)(f) — 1 case
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