Colo. Rev. Stat. » Title 2
Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-204 (2026)

Severability of statutory provisions

✓ current as of July 2026
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If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid, unless it appears to the court that the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court determines that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1424, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-204.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 38 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1977–2022 · leading case: People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015).
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People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). · cites it 20× “Relying on Colorado’s general severability clause in section 2-4-204, C.R.S. (2014), the panel “restrict[ed] the applicability” of the offending portions of the statutes “to adult offenders.”
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). · cites it 4× “, severing the mandatory aspects of the federal sentencing guidelines), and our own statutory mandate, see § 2-4-204, C.R.S. (2004), and preserve, by severance, as much of the scheme as would be consistent with legislative intent.”
People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628 (Colo. 1999). · cites it 6× “See § 2-4-204, 1 C.R.S. (1999). [13] Therefore, we hold that section 18-8-706 is invalid only insofar as it prohibits an "act of harassment" against persons protected by the statute, and we strike this phrase from the statute.”
High Gear & Toke Shop v. Beacom, 689 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1984). · cites it 6× “Our power to sever these words is based upon section 2-4-204, IB C.R.S. (1973), which provides: Severability of statutory provisions.”
People v. Powell, 716 P.2d 1096 (Colo. 1986). · cites it 4× “(1980), which provides: If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid, unless it appears to the court that the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and…”
Gallegos v. Phipps, 779 P.2d 856 (Colo. 1989). · cites it 4× “Therefore, the general sever-ability statute, section 2-4-204, IB C.R.S. (1980), applies.”
Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921 (Colo. 1996). · cites it 3× “We also conclude that the General Assembly’s imposition of a market-determined rate of postjudgment interest is rationally related to these purposes.”
People v. Nguyen, 900 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1995). · cites it 4× “When a statutory provision is found to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid, unless it appears to the court that the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision…”
Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846 (Colo. 2001). “§§ 2-4-204 to -207. The legislative direction most relevant to the matter before us states that if a general provision conflicts with a specific provision, then "the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the…”
In Re Adoption of Ca, 137 P.3d 318 (Colo. 2006). · cites it 2× “I find it particularly problematic for the majority to rewrite the entire statutory scheme in this case, where the statute at issue is extremely circumspect in limiting nonparent visitation orders and where the particular visitation order at issue was imposed as a condition of…”
People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2001). “§§ 2-4-204 to -207. Those rules state that if a general provision conflicts with a specific provision, then "the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the…”
People v. Moyer., 670 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1983). · cites it 3× “nother person or organization without the consent of such person or organization; “(c) Solicits contributions for a charitable purpose and in aid of such solicitation uses a name, symbol, or statement so closely related or similar to that used by another organization or…”
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