Colo. Rev. Stat. » Title 33
Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-41-102 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of July 2026
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As used in this article 41, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Charge" means a consideration paid for entry upon or use of the land or any facilities thereon or adjacent thereto; except that, in a case of land leased to a public entity or in which a public entity has been granted an easement or other rights to use land for recreational purposes, any consideration received by the owner for such lease, easement, or other right shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this article nor shall any consideration received by an owner from any federal governmental agency for the purposes of admitting any person constitute such a charge.

(2) "Land" also means roads, water, watercourses, private ways, and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment thereon, when attached to real property.

(3) "Owner" includes:

(a) The possessor of a fee interest;

(b) A tenant, lessee, or occupant;

(c) The possessor of any other interest in land, including a possessor or holder of a conservation easement, or any person having a right to grant permission to use the land; or

(d) Any public entity, as defined in the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", article 10 of title 24, that has an interest in land.

(4) "Person" includes any individual, regardless of age, maturity, or experience, or any corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, or association, or any other legal entity.

(4.2) "Primary access point" means a location at a trailhead or along a trail, route, area, or roadway upon an owner's land where the owner allows individuals to legally enter the land for recreational purposes.

(4.5) "Public entity" means the same as defined in section 24-10-103 (5), C.R.S.

(5) "Recreational purpose" means any hobby, diversion, sport, or other recreational activity undertaken by a person while using the land, including ponds, lakes, reservoirs, streams, paths, and trails appurtenant to the land. The term includes but is not limited to hunting, fishing, camping, picnicking, hiking, trail running, horseback riding, snowshoeing, cross country skiing, backcountry skiing and snowboarding, bicycling, riding or driving motorized recreational vehicles, swimming, tubing, paddleboarding, kayaking, rafting, diving, spelunking, sight-seeing, exploring, hang gliding, paragliding, rock climbing, ice climbing, kite flying, roller skating, bird watching, gold panning, target shooting, ice skating, ice fishing, and photography.

Source: L. 69: R&RE, p. 411, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 62-4-2. L. 73: p. 661, § 1. L. 83: (3) and (4) amended and (5) R&RE, p. 1302, §§ 1, 2, effective March 17. L. 88: (4.5) added, p. 1181, § 1, effective May 29. L. 97: (1) amended, p. 53, § 2, effective March 21. L. 2024: IP(1), (3), and (5) amended and (4.2) added, (SB 24-058), ch. 27, p. 83, § 1, effective August 7.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1979–2025 · leading case: Kritzer v. Qwest Corp., 2025 COA 54 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
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Kritzer v. Qwest Corp., 2025 COA 54 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 14× “§§ 33-41-102, -103. Therefore, we must attempt to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of “invites or permits,” as those words 12 are used in section 33-41-103(1).”
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). · cites it 3× “*144 Likewise, Article 41 of Title 33 limits the liability of an owner of “land” (which by statutory definition includes watercourses, section 33-41-102(2), C.R.S. 1973) who allows use of his streams by the public.”
Conway v. Town of Wilton, 680 A.2d 242 (Conn. 1996). “1995); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-41-102 through 33-41-105 (1995); Idaho Code § 36-1604 (1994); Ill.”
Scrapchansky v. Town of Plainfield, 627 A.2d 1329 (Conn. 1993). “any federal, State, or local political subdivision or any agency”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-41-102 (3) *461 (1984) (owner includes “any public entity as defined in the ‘Colorado Governmental Immunity Act’ .”
Kirkland v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Colo. 1996). · cites it 3× “” §§ 33-41-102(1), 33-11-104(b). The definition suggests a quid pro quo arrangement whereby the owner conditions entry on the land upon payment of a fee.”
Frances Howard v. United States of Am. Us Sailing Ass'n, Inc. Waikiki Yacht Club, a Hawaii Corp. Guy S. Fleming, 181 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). “68, § 477-2(4) (same); see also Colo.Rev.Stat. § 33-41-102(1) (“ ‘Charge’ means a consideration paid for entry upon or use of the land or any facilities thereon or adjacent thereto.”
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). · cites it 3× “*144 Likewise, Article 41 of Title 33 limits the liability of an owner of “land” (which by statutory definition includes watercourses, section 33-41-102(2), C.R.S. 1973) who allows use of his streams by the public.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-41-102(1): 2 cases
Frances Howard v. United States of Am. Us Sailing Ass'n, Inc. Waikiki Yacht Club, a Hawaii Corp. Guy S. Fleming, 181 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 1999). “68, § 477-2(4) (same); see also Colo.Rev.Stat. § 33-41-102(1) (“ ‘Charge’ means a consideration paid for entry upon or use of the land or any facilities thereon or adjacent thereto.”
Kirkland v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Colo. 1996). “” §§ 33-41-102(1), 33-11-104(b). The definition suggests a quid pro quo arrangement whereby the owner conditions entry on the land upon payment of a fee.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-41-102(2): 3 cases
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). “*144 Likewise, Article 41 of Title 33 limits the liability of an owner of “land” (which by statutory definition includes watercourses, section 33-41-102(2), C.R.S. 1973) who allows use of his streams by the public.”
Kirkland v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Colo. 1996). “” §§ 33-41-102(1), 33-11-104(b). The definition suggests a quid pro quo arrangement whereby the owner conditions entry on the land upon payment of a fee.”
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979). “*144 Likewise, Article 41 of Title 33 limits the liability of an owner of “land” (which by statutory definition includes watercourses, section 33-41-102(2), C.R.S. 1973) who allows use of his streams by the public.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-41-102(3): 1 case
Kritzer v. Qwest Corp., 2025 COA 54 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025). “§§ 33-41-102, -103. Therefore, we must attempt to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of “invites or permits,” as those words 12 are used in section 33-41-103(1).”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-41-102(3)(a): 1 case
Kritzer v. Qwest Corp., 2025 COA 54 (Colo. Ct. App. 2025). “§§ 33-41-102, -103. Therefore, we must attempt to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of “invites or permits,” as those words 12 are used in section 33-41-103(1).”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 33-41-102(5): 1 case
Kirkland v. United States, 930 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Colo. 1996). “” §§ 33-41-102(1), 33-11-104(b). The definition suggests a quid pro quo arrangement whereby the owner conditions entry on the land upon payment of a fee.”
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