Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-22-101 (2026)

Liens in favor of whom - when filed - definition of person

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) Every person who furnishes or supplies laborers, machinery, tools, or equipment in the prosecution of the work, and mechanics, materialmen, contractors, subcontractors, builders, and all persons of every class performing labor upon or furnishing directly to the owner or persons furnishing labor, laborers, or materials to be used in construction, alteration, improvement, addition to, or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building, mill, bridge, ditch, flume, aqueduct, reservoir, tunnel, fence, railroad, wagon road, tramway, or any other structure or improvement upon land, including adjacent curb, gutter, and sidewalk, and also architects, engineers, draftsmen, and artisans who have furnished designs, plans, plats, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys, or superintendence, or who have rendered other professional or skilled service, or bestowed labor in whole or in part, describing or illustrating, or superintending such structure, or work done or to be done, or any part connected therewith, shall have a lien upon the property upon which they have furnished laborers or supplied machinery, tools, or equipment or rendered service or bestowed labor or for which they have furnished materials or mining or milling machinery or other fixtures, for the value of such laborers, machinery, tools, or equipment supplied, or services rendered or labor done or laborers or materials furnished, whether at the instance of the owner, or of any other person acting by the owner's authority or under the owner, as agent, contractor, or otherwise for the laborers, machinery, tools, or equipment supplied, or work or labor done or services rendered or laborers or materials furnished by each, respectively, whether supplied or done or furnished or rendered at the instance of the owner of the building or other improvement, or the owner's agent; and every contractor, architect, engineer, subcontractor, builder, agent, or other person having charge of the construction, alteration, addition to, or repair, either in whole or in part, of said building or other improvement shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the purposes of this article.

(2) In case of a contract for the work, between the reputed owner and a contractor, the lien shall extend to the entire contract price, and such contract shall operate as a lien in favor of all persons performing labor or services or furnishing laborers or materials under contract, express or implied, with said contractor, to the extent of the whole contract price; and after all such liens are satisfied, then as a lien for any balance of such contract price in favor of the contractor.

(3) All such contracts shall be in writing when the amount to be paid thereunder exceeds five hundred dollars, and shall be subscribed by the parties thereto. The contract, or a memorandum thereof, setting forth the names of all the parties to the contract, a description of the property to be affected thereby, together with a statement of the general character of the work to be done, the estimated total amount to be paid thereunder, together with the times or stages of the work for making payments, shall be filed by the owner or reputed owner, in the office of the county clerk and recorder of the county where the property, or the principal portion thereof, is situated before the work is commenced under and in accordance with the terms of the contract. In case such contract, or a memorandum thereof, is not so filed, the labor done and materials furnished by all persons shall be deemed to have been done and furnished at the personal instance of the owner, and such persons shall have a lien for the value thereof.

(4) For the purposes of this article, the value of labor done shall include, but not be limited to, the payments required under any labor contract to any trust established for the provision of any pension, profit-sharing, vacation, health and welfare, prepaid legal services, or apprentice training benefits for the use of the employees of any contractors, and the trustee of any such trust shall have a lien therefor.

(5) All claimants who establish the right to a lien or claim under any of the provisions of this article shall be entitled to receive interest on any such lien or claim at the rate provided for under the terms of any contract or agreement under which the laborers were furnished or the labor or material was supplied or, in the absence of an agreed rate, at the rate of twelve percent per annum.

(6) For purposes of this article, "person" means a natural person, firm, association, corporation, or other legal entity; except that it shall not include a labor organization as defined in section 24-34-401 (6), C.R.S.

Source: L. 1899: p. 261, § 1. R.S. 08: § 4025. C.L. § 6442. CSA: C. 101, § 15. CRS 53: § 86-3-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 86-3-1. L. 65: p. 849, § 1. L. 69: p. 692, § 1. L. 75: (4) and (5) added, p. 1422, § 1, effective October 1. L. 2000: (1), (2), and (5) amended and (6) added, p. 204, § 1, effective August 2.

Cross references: For liens for surveyors and civil and mining engineers, see § 38-22- 121.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 68 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case: Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan, 151 P.3d 1281 (Colo. 2007).

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Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan, 151 P.3d 1281 (Colo. 2007). · cites it 66× “Section 38-22-101 is titled in part: "liens in favor of whom.”

Ridge Erection Co. v. Mountain States T. & T. Co., 549 P.2d 408 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976). · cites it 14× “While the trustees attack all of the arguments urged by Mountain Bell as a basis for the entry of summary judgment, we need consider but one of them since it is dispositive of the case.”

Tuscany, LLC v. W. States Excavating Pipe & Boring, LLC, 128 P.3d 274 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 4× “2004, excludes from the definition of "spurious lien" any lien provided for by a specific Colorado statute, and mechanies' liens are governed by the General Mechanics' Lien statute, § 38-22-101, et seq., C.R.S$.2004. According to Western States, because such liens cannot be…”

Thirteenth Street Corp. v. A-1 Plumbing & Heating Co., 640 P.2d 1130 (Colo. 1982). · cites it 16× “In Stewart the court noted that when there was a joint undertaking between a landlord and tenant for the purpose of constructing a building on the landlord’s property, a lien could be imposed upon the property pursuant to the predecessor of section 38-22-101, C.R.S.1973. This…”

Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stan Miller, Inc., 796 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1990). · cites it 15× “See §§ 38-22-101 to -133, 16A C.R.S. (1982 & 1989 Supp.”

Weather Eng'g & Mfg., Inc. v. Pinon Springs Condos., Inc., 563 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1977). · cites it 14× “No problem of retroactivity arises in applying section 38-22-101 (5) in this manner, since the judgment was entered October 22, 1975, after the statute’s effective date.”

Elm Distributors, Inc. v. Tri-Centennial Corp., 768 P.2d 215 (Colo. 1989). · cites it 16× “Elm filed a mechanic's lien statement in El Paso County on February 9, 1983, pursuant to section 38-22-101, 16A C.R.S. (1982), after mailing notice of intent to file such lien to CMD and Tri-Centennial.”

In Re the Marriage of Mitchell, 55 P.3d 183 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 2× “2001 (covering various types of liens on personal property); see also § 38-22-101, et seq., C.R.8.2001 (covering mechanies' liens).”

Weize Co. v. Colorado Reg'l Constr., Inc., 251 P.3d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 2× “The twelve percent interest rate found in C.R.S. 38-22-101(5) only applies to me-chanie's lien claims, not trust fund claims.”

Schneider v. J.W. Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1986). · cites it 13× “See §§ 38-22-101, -103, -105, 16A C.R.S. (1982).”

Bob Blake Builders, Inc. v. Gramling, 18 P.3d 859 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 6× “As such, it qualifies as a "person" entitled to file a lien under § 38-22-101. IL. Defendants next assert that the lien was void because the amount claimed was excessive.”

Climax Molybdenum v. Specialized Installers, Inc. (In Re Specialized Installers, Inc.), 12 B.R. 546 (Bankr.D. Colo. 1981). · cites it 8× “The subcontractor is protected by the mechanic’s lien statute itself, §§ 38-22-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973. Thus, it is the property owner who is the principal beneficiary of the statutory trust.”

Show all 68 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-22-101(1) — 28 cases

Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan, 151 P.3d 1281 (Colo. 2007). “Section 38-22-101 is titled in part: "liens in favor of whom.”

Ridge Erection Co. v. Mountain States T. & T. Co., 549 P.2d 408 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976). “While the trustees attack all of the arguments urged by Mountain Bell as a basis for the entry of summary judgment, we need consider but one of them since it is dispositive of the case.”

Tuscany, LLC v. W. States Excavating Pipe & Boring, LLC, 128 P.3d 274 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). “2004, excludes from the definition of "spurious lien" any lien provided for by a specific Colorado statute, and mechanies' liens are governed by the General Mechanics' Lien statute, § 38-22-101, et seq., C.R.S$.2004. According to Western States, because such liens cannot be…”

Elm Distributors, Inc. v. Tri-Centennial Corp., 768 P.2d 215 (Colo. 1989). “Elm filed a mechanic's lien statement in El Paso County on February 9, 1983, pursuant to section 38-22-101, 16A C.R.S. (1982), after mailing notice of intent to file such lien to CMD and Tri-Centennial.”

Schneider v. J.W. Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1986). “See §§ 38-22-101, -103, -105, 16A C.R.S. (1982).”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-22-101(2) — 5 cases

Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stan Miller, Inc., 796 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1990). “See §§ 38-22-101 to -133, 16A C.R.S. (1982 & 1989 Supp.”

Heating & Plumbing Engineers, Inc. v. H.J. Wilson Co., 698 P.2d 1364 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).

Byerly v. Bank of Colo., 411 P.3d 732 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).

Wholesale Specialties, Inc. v. Vill. Homes, Ltd., 820 P.2d 1170 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).

Stan Miller, Inc. v. Breckenridge Resort Assocs., Inc., 779 P.2d 1365 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-22-101(3) — 8 cases

Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan, 151 P.3d 1281 (Colo. 2007). “Section 38-22-101 is titled in part: "liens in favor of whom.”

Weather Eng'g & Mfg., Inc. v. Pinon Springs Condos., Inc., 563 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1977). “No problem of retroactivity arises in applying section 38-22-101 (5) in this manner, since the judgment was entered October 22, 1975, after the statute’s effective date.”

Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stan Miller, Inc., 796 P.2d 483 (Colo. 1990). “See §§ 38-22-101 to -133, 16A C.R.S. (1982 & 1989 Supp.”

Byerly v. Bank of Colo., 411 P.3d 732 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).

Daniel v. MJ Dev., Inc., 603 P.2d 947 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-22-101(4) — 1 case

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-22-101(5) — 13 cases

Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan, 151 P.3d 1281 (Colo. 2007). “Section 38-22-101 is titled in part: "liens in favor of whom.”

Weize Co. v. Colorado Reg'l Constr., Inc., 251 P.3d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). “The twelve percent interest rate found in C.R.S. 38-22-101(5) only applies to me-chanie's lien claims, not trust fund claims.”

Thirteenth Street Corp. v. A-1 Plumbing & Heating Co., 640 P.2d 1130 (Colo. 1982). “In Stewart the court noted that when there was a joint undertaking between a landlord and tenant for the purpose of constructing a building on the landlord’s property, a lien could be imposed upon the property pursuant to the predecessor of section 38-22-101, C.R.S.1973. This…”

Pritchard Concrete, Inc. v. Barnes (In Re Barnes), 377 B.R. 289 (Bankr.D. Colo. 2007).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-22-101(6) — 1 case

Bob Blake Builders, Inc. v. Gramling, 18 P.3d 859 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). “As such, it qualifies as a "person" entitled to file a lien under § 38-22-101. IL. Defendants next assert that the lien was void because the amount claimed was excessive.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-22-101(l) — 1 case

Schneider v. J.W. Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1986). “See §§ 38-22-101, -103, -105, 16A C.R.S. (1982).”

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