(1) An instrument conveying an interest in real property, in which the grantee is described as trustee, agent, conservator, executor, administrator, attorney-in-fact, personal representative, nominee, custodian, or a person acting in any other representative capacity, shall also describe the representative capacity of such grantee by one or more of the following means:
(a) Naming the person so represented;
(b) Identifying the statute, the trust or other agreement, or the court appointment under which the grantee is acting; or
(c) Referring, by proper description to book, page, document number, or file to an instrument, order, decree, or other writing containing any such description of the representative capacity of the grantee that is recorded with the county clerk and recorder in the county where the real property is located.
(2) If the representative capacity of the grantee is not described as provided in subsection (1) of this section, the description of a grantee in any such representative capacity in such instrument of conveyance shall be presumed to be a description of the person only and shall not be notice of the representative capacity of such grantee.
(3) After the recording of an instrument conveying an interest in real property in which the grantee is described as acting in a representative capacity, but in which the description of the grantee does not comply with subsection (1) of this section, and regardless of whether such instrument of conveyance was recorded prior to or after August 8, 2001, an affidavit that has been executed by or on behalf of such grantee, which refers by proper description by book, page, document number, or file to the recording information of such instrument of conveyance and that contains one of the descriptions of the representative capacity of such grantee described in subsection (1) of this section, may be recorded with the county clerk and recorder of the county where the real property is located. Upon the recording of such affidavit, all persons shall thereafter have notice of the representative capacity of such grantee with respect to the interest in real property so conveyed.
Source: L. 21: p. 187, § 1. C.L. § 4877. CSA: C. 40, § 9. CRS 53: § 118-1-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 118-1-8. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 398, § 1, effective August 8. Cross references: For succession of title to property held in trust for church or religious society, see § 7-52-105.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
6
cases, 1997–2012 · leading case:
Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 2000).
Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281 (Colo. 2000).
· cites it 43× “Judgment creditors sought satisfaction of their judgments based on a personal representative’s deed to the co-trustee “as trustee” that did not identify the beneficiaries of the trust or reference a document of record containing such information, as provided by section…”
In Re Est. of Kiser, 72 P.3d 425 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 25× “The trial court, relying on § 38-30-108, C.R.S.2002, concluded that the deed did not *428 convey the property to the trust; rather, it conveyed the property to decedent and her husband as tenants in common.”
Lackner v. King, 972 P.2d 690 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 9× “The basis for the trial court’s conclusion that King did not possess an ownership interest in the property was that the affidavit of trust provided notice of King’s fiduciary capacity, thereby satisfying the requirements of §38-30-108, C.R.S.1997. We disagree with this…”
In Re Est. of Kiser v. Campbell, 72 P.3d 425 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 12× “The trial court, relying on § 38-30-108, C.R.8.2002, concluded that the deed did not *428 convey the property to the trust; rather, it conveyed the property to decedent and her husband as tenants in common.”
Bolen v. Kathleen v. Ferry Trust, 949 P.2d 82 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 2× “The General Assembly first responded to this issue in 1921 by adopting § 38-30-108, C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol. 16A).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-30-108(1) — 2 cases
In Re Est. of Kiser, 72 P.3d 425 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
“The trial court, relying on § 38-30-108, C.R.S.2002, concluded that the deed did not *428 convey the property to the trust; rather, it conveyed the property to decedent and her husband as tenants in common.”
In Re Est. of Kiser v. Campbell, 72 P.3d 425 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
“The trial court, relying on § 38-30-108, C.R.8.2002, concluded that the deed did not *428 convey the property to the trust; rather, it conveyed the property to decedent and her husband as tenants in common.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-30-108(2) — 1 case
In Re Est. of Kiser, 72 P.3d 425 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
“The trial court, relying on § 38-30-108, C.R.S.2002, concluded that the deed did not *428 convey the property to the trust; rather, it conveyed the property to decedent and her husband as tenants in common.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-30-108(3) — 1 case
In Re Est. of Kiser, 72 P.3d 425 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
“The trial court, relying on § 38-30-108, C.R.S.2002, concluded that the deed did not *428 convey the property to the trust; rather, it conveyed the property to decedent and her husband as tenants in common.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-30-108(8) — 1 case
In Re Est. of Kiser v. Campbell, 72 P.3d 425 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
“The trial court, relying on § 38-30-108, C.R.8.2002, concluded that the deed did not *428 convey the property to the trust; rather, it conveyed the property to decedent and her husband as tenants in common.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.