Every
common carrier in this state must transport livestock from the initial point of shipment in this
state to the point of destination in this state at an average rate of speed of not less than ten miles
an hour and within such time, from the hour of loading at the initial point to the hour of arrival at
the destination, that the point of destination shall be reached in not more than one-tenth as many
hours as there were miles required to be traveled in the transportation of such shipment; except
only that necessary stops of reasonable duration for feeding purposes, when required by the
length of the journey, or necessary and imperative delays caused only by an act of God or
inevitable accident shall not be computed in determining such minimum requirements as to
speed.
Source: L. 21: p. 163, § 1. C.L. § 2997. CSA: C. 29, § 20. CRS 53: § 115-12-6. C.R.S.
1963: § 115-12-6.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
2
cases, 1993–1994 · leading case:
People v. Smith, 862 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1993).
People v. Smith, 862 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1993).
· cites it 2× “, C.R.S. § 40-9-106(l)(a). 6 The harassment statute at issue in this case, on the other hand, requires both repeated conduct and the actor’s specific intent to harass, annoy, or alarm.”
Aguilar v. People, 886 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1994).
· cites it 2× “1, § 40-9-106,1971 Colo.Sess.Laws 388, 467. 9 In 1976, however, we held that subsection (l)(a) of the statute was facially overbroad and refused to apply a “fighting words” limitation to the statute because the General Assembly had omitted the “fighting words” language.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-9-106(1) — 1 case
Aguilar v. People, 886 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1994).
“1, § 40-9-106,1971 Colo.Sess.Laws 388, 467. 9 In 1976, however, we held that subsection (l)(a) of the statute was facially overbroad and refused to apply a “fighting words” limitation to the statute because the General Assembly had omitted the “fighting words” language.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-9-106(l)(a) — 1 case
People v. Smith, 862 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1993).
“, C.R.S. § 40-9-106(l)(a). 6 The harassment statute at issue in this case, on the other hand, requires both repeated conduct and the actor’s specific intent to harass, annoy, or alarm.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.