(1) If death occurs to an injured employee, other than as a proximate result of any injury, before disability indemnity ceases and the deceased leaves persons wholly dependent upon the deceased for support, death benefits shall be as follows:
(a) Where the injury proximately caused permanent total disability, the death benefit shall consist of the unpaid and unaccrued portion of the permanent total disability benefit which the employee would have received had the employee lived until receiving compensation at the employee's regular rate for a period of six years.
(b) Where the injury proximately caused permanent partial disability, the death benefit shall consist of the unpaid and unaccrued portion of the permanent partial disability benefit which the employee would have received had he lived.
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 496, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-50-112 as it existed prior to 1990.
Notes of Decisions
Singleton v. Kenya Corp., 961 P.2d 571 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 12× “Although we find these decisions instructive, we are here concerned with the claimant’s right to recover “unaccrued” benefits under § 8-42-116. We, therefore, find it necessary to resort to the standard rules of statutory construction.”
Cooper v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 109 P.3d 1056 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 8× “We recognize that, in both McBride and Schenfeld , the decedents had dependents, a fact which could have brought them under the provisions of § 8-42-116, discussed in part I of this opinion.”
Metro Glass & Glazing, Inc. v. Orona, 868 P.2d 1178 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 7× “At issue in this workers’ compensation ease is whether death benefits payable to a dependent spouse under § 8-42-116(1), C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) are subject to an offset for social security disability (SSDI) insurance benefits.”
Winters v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 819 P.2d 542 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 7× “The previous inclusion of such language in contrast to its past and current omission from § 8-42-116 persuades us that its omission was intentional.”
Subsequent Injury Fund v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 131 P.3d 1224 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
“1998), a division of this court interpreted the phrase “proximately caused,” as used in §§ 8-42-116 and 8412-117, C.R.S. 2005, which describe death benefits when death is not “a proximate result” of an injury.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-116(1): 4 cases
Cooper v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 109 P.3d 1056 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
“We recognize that, in both McBride and Schenfeld , the decedents had dependents, a fact which could have brought them under the provisions of § 8-42-116, discussed in part I of this opinion.”
Singleton v. Kenya Corp., 961 P.2d 571 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
“Although we find these decisions instructive, we are here concerned with the claimant’s right to recover “unaccrued” benefits under § 8-42-116. We, therefore, find it necessary to resort to the standard rules of statutory construction.”
Metro Glass & Glazing, Inc. v. Orona, 868 P.2d 1178 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
“At issue in this workers’ compensation ease is whether death benefits payable to a dependent spouse under § 8-42-116(1), C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) are subject to an offset for social security disability (SSDI) insurance benefits.”
Winters v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 819 P.2d 542 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
“The previous inclusion of such language in contrast to its past and current omission from § 8-42-116 persuades us that its omission was intentional.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-116(l)(a): 2 cases
Metro Glass & Glazing, Inc. v. Orona, 868 P.2d 1178 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
“At issue in this workers’ compensation ease is whether death benefits payable to a dependent spouse under § 8-42-116(1), C.R.S. (1993 Cum.Supp.) are subject to an offset for social security disability (SSDI) insurance benefits.”
Singleton v. Kenya Corp., 961 P.2d 571 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
“Although we find these decisions instructive, we are here concerned with the claimant’s right to recover “unaccrued” benefits under § 8-42-116. We, therefore, find it necessary to resort to the standard rules of statutory construction.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.