Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-1f (2026)

“Blind”, “physically disabled”, defined

✓ current as of May 2026
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For purposes of sections 3-10e, 4a-60, subdivision (12) of section 38a-816 and sections 46a-58, 46a-60, 46a-64, 46a-70 to 46a-73, inclusive, 46a-75, 46a-76 and 52-175a:

(a) An individual is blind if his central visual acuity does not exceed 20/200 in the better eye with correcting lenses, or if his visual acuity is greater than 20/200 but is accompanied by a limitation in the fields of vision such that the widest diameter of the visual field subtends an angle no greater than twenty degrees;

(b) An individual is physically disabled if he has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to, epilepsy, deafness or hearing impairment or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device.

(P.A. 73-279, S. 1; P.A. 74-346; P.A. 75-346; P.A. 79-631, S. 41, 111; P.A. 80-259, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 74-346 added Subsec. (b) defining “physically disabled”; P.A. 75-346 clarified definition of “physically disabled”; P.A. 79-631 deleted reference to Sec. 53-34a, substituting Sec. 53-34 (later transferred to Sec. 46a-58); P.A. 80-259 added reference to Sec. 38-61(12).

Subsec. (b): The term “physical disability” has a readily ascertainable meaning as it refers to any recurring bodily condition that detrimentally affects one's ability to carry out life's activities, regardless of whether it is congenital, the result of bodily injury, organic processes, or the result of illness. 190 CA 353; judgment reversed, see 340 C. 463.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1995–2021 · leading case: State v. Dojnia, 210 A.3d 586 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
State v. Dojnia, 210 A.3d 586 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019). · cites it 25× “" As is reflected in the state's substitute information, the state's theory of the case was that the defendant engaged in conduct constituting assault in the second degree as defined by General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (3) against the victim, who is physically disabled as defined…”
State v. Brown, 668 A.2d 1288 (Conn. 1995). “ity cites as an example General Statutes § 53a-59a (a), which provides: “A person is guilty of assault of a victim sixty or older in the first degree, when he commits assault in the first degree under section 53a-59 (a) (2), 53a-59 (a) (3) or 53a-59 (a) (5) and the victim of…”
State v. Dojnia (Conn. App. Ct. 2019). · cites it 32× “’’ As is reflected in the state’s substitute information, the state’s theory of the case was that the defendant engaged in conduct constituting assault in the second degree as defined by General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (3) against the victim, who is physically disabled as defined…”
State v. Jodi D., 340 Conn. 463 (Conn. 2021). · cites it 16× “The issues before us in this appeal are (1) whether the term ‘‘physically disabled,’’ as used in General Statutes § 53a-60b (a) (1) and defined by General Statutes § 1-1f (b), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of the defendant, Jodi D.”
State v. Jodi D. (Conn. 2021). · cites it 11× “The issues before us in this appeal are (1) whether the term ‘‘physically disabled,’’ as used in General Statutes § 53a-60b (a) (1) and defined by General Statutes § 1-1f (b), is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct of the defendant, Jodi D.”
Desrosiers v. Diageo North Am., Inc. (Conn. 2014). · cites it 3× “75-346, now codified at General Statutes § 1-1f (b), ‘‘[a]n individual is physically disabled if he has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic processes or changes or from illness, including, but not…”
State v. Jodi D. (Conn. 2021). “§§ 1-1f (b) and 53a-60b (a) (1) were not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant?’’ And (2) ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the evidence the state presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was…”
State v. Jodi D. (Conn. 2021). “§§ 1-1f (b) and 53a-60b (a) (1) were not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant?’’ And (2) ‘‘[d]id the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the evidence the state presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was…”
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