The committee may receive and disburse for the purposes of the study moneys from any source, including bequests, gifts or contributions, made by any individual, corporation or association. Each participating town shall pay a share of the expenses of the committee in an amount which is in the same proportion to the total expenses as the number of pupils in average daily membership of such town as defined in section
10-261 for the school year next prior to that in which the committee is established bears to the total number of such pupils in participating towns. The expenses of the committee in the initial two-year period shall not exceed ten dollars times the total number of pupils used in the above computation. An affirmative vote by the legislative body to join a temporary regional school study committee shall obligate the town or regional school district to pay its share of the expenses of the committee. The treasurer of the district shall pay to the committee upon demand of its treasurer any portion of such share. Subject to the approval of the State Board of Education, for the purpose of computing any state grant for school building purposes under chapter 173, any part of such moneys paid to an architect for professional services shall be applied to the total cost of any school building which may be constructed. An affirmative vote by the legislative body to extend the life of the committee pursuant to section
10-39 shall obligate the town or regional school district to pay its share of the additional expenses. The total expenses of the committee for each additional year shall not exceed one-half the limit set for the initial two-year period. Any unencumbered balance remaining in the treasury of the committee at the time such committee is dissolved shall be returned by the treasurer to the participating districts in the same proportion as their respective shares were paid to finance the expenses of the committee.
(1951, 1955, S. 897d; 1969, P.A. 698, S. 4; P.A. 79-128, S. 31, 36; P.A. 95-259, S. 4, 32.)
History: 1969 act simplified the wording of the section, obligated towns voting to join temporary study committee to pay their share of expenses and additional expenses resulting from extension of committee's term of operation and limited total expenses for each additional year to one-half of limit set for initial two-year term; P.A. 79-128 replaced “number of pupils used to compute the grant to such town pursuant to section 10-262” with “number of pupils in average daily membership of such town as defined in section 10-261”; P.A. 95-259 increased the limit on expenses of the committee from $5 to $10 times total number of pupils, effective July 6, 1995.
Cited. 187 C. 187; 195 C. 24.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases, 2002–2017 · leading case:
Fennelly v. Norton, 931 A.2d 269 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
Fennelly v. Norton, 931 A.2d 269 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
· cites it 4× “Although some sections of our rules of practice previously mandated such a memorandum of law to be submitted, neither Practice Book §§ 10-31(b) nor § 25-13(b) contain such a requirement.”
Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 819 A.2d 289 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
· cites it 3× “As the court noted in its memorandum of decision, Practice Book § 155, now § 10-42, previously provided that a party who failed to file such a memorandum “shall be deemed by the court to have consented to the granting of the motion.”
Heim v. California Fed. Bank, 828 A.2d 129 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
· cites it 2× “11 On February 26, 2001, the defendant filed a motion to strike pursuant to Practice Book § 10-42. 12 In its motion, the defendant set forth as to each count the reasons for seeking to have those counts stricken.”
Izzo v. Quinn, 155 A.3d 315 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
“The defendant filed an objection in which he argued that the plaintiff's motion was improper because (1) it was not accompanied by a memorandum of law, in violation of Practice Book § 10-42, and (2) all four counts of his counterclaim are against the plaintiff individually and…”
Santorso v. Bristol Hosp., 15 A.3d 1131 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
“” Practice Book § 10-42 (a). “A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading .”
Pantelopoulos v. Pantelopoulos, 869 A.2d 280 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005).
“Practice Book [§ 10-42], which requires a motion to strike to be accompanied by an appropriate memorandum of law citing the legal authorities upon which the motion relies, does not dispense with the requirement of [§ 10-41] that the reasons for the claimed pleading deficiency be…”
Bakker v. Brave Indus., Inc., 829 A.2d 928 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002).
“On August 16, 2002, Home Depot filed a memorandum of law in opposition of the motion to strike pursuant to Practice Book § 10-42. On September 19, 2002, Brave Industries filed a reply memorandum to Home Depot’s memorandum in opposition to the motion to strike.”
Izzo v. Quinn (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
“The defendant filed an objection in which he argued that the plaintiff’s motion was improper because (1) it was not accompanied by a memorandum of law, in violation of Practice Book § 10-42, and (2) all four counts of his counterclaim are against the plaintiff individually and…”
Washburn v. Potter, No. Cv02-0515312s (Jan. 6, 2003), 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 932 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003).
“The plaintiff has filed an objection to the motion to strike contending that General Statutes 52-183 does not authorize punitive or exemplary damages against a principal for the reckless acts of its agent.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.