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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 16 — Public Service CompaniesChapter 283 — Telephone, Gas, Power and Water Companies

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-262f (2025)

Action for receivership of rents and common expenses by electric distribution, gas and telephone companies; petition; hearing; appointment; duties; termination

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1978–2024 19citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 19 opinions since 1978, 3 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a)(1) Upon default of the owner, agent, lessor or manager of a residential dwelling who is billed directly by an electric distribution, gas or telephone company or by a municipal utility for electric or gas utility service furnished to such building, such company or municipal utility or electric supplier providing electric generation services may petition the Superior Court or a judge thereof, for appointment of a receiver of the rents or payments for use and occupancy or common expenses, as defined in section 47-202, for any dwelling for which the owner, agent, lessor or manager is in default. The court or judge shall forthwith issue an order to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed, which shall be served upon the owner, agent, lessor or manager or his agent in a manner most reasonably calculated to give notice to such owner, agent, lessor or manager as determined by such court or judge, including, but not limited to, a posting of such order on the premises in question.

(2) A hearing shall be had on such order no later than seventy-two hours after its issuance or the first court day thereafter. The sole purpose of such a hearing shall be to determine whether there is an amount due and owing between the owner, agent, lessor or manager and the company, electric supplier or municipal utility. The court shall make a determination of any amount due and owing and any amount so determined shall constitute a lien upon the real property of such owner. A certificate of such amount may be recorded in the land records of the town in which such property is located describing the amount of the lien and the name of the party in default. When the amount due and owing has been paid the company, electric supplier or municipality shall issue a certificate discharging the lien and shall file the certificate in the land records of the town in which such lien was recorded.

(3) The receiver appointed by the court shall collect all rents or payments for use and occupancy or common expenses forthcoming from or paid on behalf of the occupants or residents of the building or facility in question in place of the owner, agent, lessor, manager or administrator. The receiver may also petition the court to obtain any remedy available under chapter 906 against such owner, agent, lessor or manager in order to recover amounts due as determined under subdivision (2) of this subsection and continuing charges for such utility service until all such charges and other costs have been paid.

(4) The receiver shall pay the petitioner or other supplier, from such rents or payments for use and occupancy or common expenses for electric, gas, telephone, water or heating oil supplied on and after the date of his appointment. The owner, agent, lessor or manager shall be liable for such reasonable fees and costs determined by the court to be due the receiver, which fees and costs may be recovered from the rents or payments for use and occupancy under the control of the receiver, provided no such fees or costs shall be recovered until after payment for current electric, gas, telephone and water service and heating oil deliveries has been made. The owner, agent, lessor or manager shall be liable to the petitioner for reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred by the petitioner, provided no such fees or costs shall be recovered until after payment for current electric, gas, telephone and water service and heating oil deliveries has been made and after payments of reasonable fees and costs to the receiver. Any moneys from rental payments or payments for use and occupancy or common expenses remaining after payment for current electric, gas, telephone and water service or heating oil deliveries, and after payment for reasonable costs and fees to the receiver, and after payment to the petitioner for reasonable attorney's fees and costs, shall be applied to any arrearage found by the court to be due and owing the company, electric supplier or municipal utility from the owner, agent, lessor or manager for service provided such building. Any moneys remaining thereafter shall be turned over to the owner, agent, lessor or manager. The court may order an accounting to be made at such times as it determines to be just, reasonable, and necessary.

(b) Any receivership established pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall be terminated by the court upon its finding that the arrearage which was the subject of the original petition has been satisfied, or that all occupants have agreed to assume liability in their own names for prospective service supplied by the petitioner, or that the building has been sold and the new owner has assumed liability for prospective service supplied by the petitioner.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the petitioner from pursuing any other action or remedy at law or equity that it may have against the owner, agent, lessor or manager.

(d) Any owner, agent, lessor or manager who collects or attempts to collect any rent or payment for use and occupancy from any occupant of a building subject to an order appointing a receiver shall be found, after due notice and hearing, to be in contempt of court.

(e) If a proceeding is initiated pursuant to sections 47a-14a to 47a-14h, inclusive, or sections 47a-56 to 47a-56i, inclusive, or if a receiver of rents is appointed pursuant to chapter 735a or pursuant to any other action involving the making of repairs to residential rental property under court supervision, rent or use and occupancy payments shall be made pursuant to such proceeding or action without regard to whether such proceeding or action is initiated before or after a receivership is established under this section, and such proceeding or action shall take priority over a receivership established under this section in regard to expenditure of such rent or use and occupancy payments.

(P.A. 75-625, S. 4, 8; P.A. 77-452, S. 51, 72; P.A. 84-394, S. 1; P.A. 89-254, S. 15; P.A. 91-310, S. 2; P.A. 98-28, S. 41, 117; 98-102, S. 1; P.A. 07-217, S. 62; 07-228, S. 2; P.A. 13-78, S. 10; P.A. 14-134, S. 103.)

History: P.A. 77-452 replaced court of common pleas with superior court and deleted phrase which had limited judge's power to act to time when court not in session; P.A. 84-394 inserted references to payment for heating oil in Subsec. (a); P.A. 89-254 added Subsec. (e) re the payment and expenditure of rent or use and occupancy payments made pursuant to certain proceedings or actions in relation to receiverships established under this section; P.A. 91-310 added provision allowing companies or municipal utilities to obtain a lien against parties in default; P.A. 98-28 amended Subsec. (a) by adding electric suppliers and electric distribution companies, effective July 1, 1998; P.A. 98-102 amended Subsec. (a) by inserting Subdiv. indicators, deleting water companies and inserting “common expenses”; P.A. 07-217 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective July 12, 2007; P.A. 07-228 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to include payments paid on behalf of occupants or residents of building or facility, and in place of the administrator, effective July 1, 2007; P.A. 13-78 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to add provision re court petition to obtain remedy for amounts due and continuing charges for utility service, effective June 5, 2013; P.A. 14-134 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting reference to electric company, effective June 6, 2014.

Cited. 183 C. 85. Provisions of statute which do not provide exemption for public housing authorities had to prevail over those earlier enacted in Sec. 8-65. 191 C. 514. Cited. 196 C. 172; 231 C. 441; 239 C. 313.

Cited. 7 CA 802; 12 CA 499; 25 CA 226.

Remedy provided by statute is not an unconstitutional taking of private property for a public purpose; legislative intent was that receivership proceeding should be a summary proceeding, not a “civil action”; personal service by sheriff not required. 35 CS 609.

The 19 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 16-262f most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENConnecticut Nat. Gas Corp. v. Miller, 684 A.2d 1173 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 16-262f 39×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“The sole issue in this appeal is whether, at a summary proceeding brought under General Statutes § 16-262f 1 for the appointment of a receiver of rents, *314 the defendants have a constitutional right, as a matter of procedural due process, to litigate fully their counter *315…”
The case’s holding
A summary proceeding to appoint a receiver does not violate procedural due process if the defendant retains the right to litigate counterclaims in a subsequent action.
Later courts cite it for
“it is axiomatic that 'due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENS. Connecticut Gas Co. v. Hous. Auth., 468 A.2d 574 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 16-262f 12×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“It claims error in the trial court's: (1) denial of its motion to dismiss the petition for receivership; (2) failure to uphold its alleged exemption under General Statutes § 8-65; (3) failure to hold the rent receivership statute, General Statutes § 16-262f, unconstitutional;…”
The case’s holding
A litigant may not assert the constitutional claims of third parties who are not in a direct adversarial posture before the court.
Later courts cite it for
“we have uniformly resisted the efforts of litigants to assert constitutional claims of others not in a direct adversarial posture before the court.' southern connecticut gas co. v. housing authority, 191 conn. 514, 522 , 468 a.2d 574 (1983).” · 3 citing courts
3
GREENHartford Elec. Light Co. v. Tucker, 438 A.2d 828 (Conn. 1981).
cites § 16-262f 10×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“The plaintiff initiated a statutory action pursuant to General Statutes § 16-262f 1 for the appointment of a receiver of rents for a number of apartment buildings owned by the defendant.”
The case’s holding
A statutory award of attorney's fees is not unconstitutionally standardless where reasonableness must be proven by an appropriate evidentiary showing, with notice and opportunity to be heard.
Later courts cite it for
“undisputed requirement that the reasonableness of attorney's fees and costs must be proven by an appropriate evidentiary showing.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENCanton v. Cadle Props. of Connecticut, Inc., 204 A.3d 62 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
cites § 16-262f 12×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“2d 551 (1994) (in light of language, purpose and sui generis nature of General Statutes § 16-262f, trial court mistaken in assumption that appointment of rent receiver for protection of utility governed by wide-ranging equitable and discretionary principles of ordinary mortgage…”
5
GREENHartford Elec. Light Co. v. Tucker, 401 A.2d 454 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
cites § 16-262f 12×cited by 10 cases
Summary
No passage or summary on file for this case yet.
6
GREENConnecticut Light & Power Co. v. DaSilva, 650 A.2d 551 (Conn. 1994).
cites § 16-262f 8×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“General Statutes § 16-262f provides in relevant part: “petition for RECEIVER OF RENTS; HEARING; APPOINTMENT; DUTIES.”
Later courts cite it for
“the summary rent receivership proceedings authorized by 16-262f constitute, as we have previously recognized, a statutory trade-off for the requirement of continued service imposed by 16-262e (a).” · 1 citing court
7
GREENPowell v. Infinity Ins., 922 A.2d 1073 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 16-262f 2×cited by 80 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“2d 1173 (1996) (doctrine of res judicata *603 cannot be invoked to preclude relitigation of determination made in summary proceeding for appointment of receiver of rents brought pursuant to General Statutes § 16-262f); Delahunty v.”
The case’s holding
Res judicata bars subsequent bad faith claims arising from the same transaction, and a prior judgment for breach of contract is not a necessary predicate to bringing such claims.
Later courts cite it for
“the applicability of the doctrines of collateral estoppel or res judicata presents a question of law that we review de novo.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENCumberland Farms, Inc. v. Town of Groton, 808 A.2d 1107 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 16-262f 2×cited by 80 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“2d 1173 (1996) (doctrine of res judicata cannot be invoked to preclude relitigation of determination made in summary proceeding for appointment of receiver of rents brought pursuant to General Statutes § 16-262f); Delahunty v.”
The case’s holding
Collateral estoppel does not bar a property owner from litigating factual issues in an inverse condemnation action previously decided by a zoning board.
Later courts cite it for
“cjollat-eral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 16-262f 4×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“10 General Statutes § 16-262f provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) Upon default of the owner, agent, lessor or manager of a residential dwelling who is billed directly by an electric distribution, gas or telephone company or by a municipal utility for electric or gas utility…”
10
GREENAdams v. Hartconn Assocs., Inc. (In re Adams), 212 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
cites § 16-262f 3×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“Accordingly, the receivership was not terminated and Monty’s post-discharge actions pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 16-262f were perfectly legitimate.”
The case’s holding
Laches bars a debtor's claim for damages from a willful automatic stay violation where she delays asserting her rights for an unreasonable period while the violation continues.
Later courts cite it for
“nothing would be achieved by recovering payment to a secured creditor who in any event is entitled to the payment ahead of other creditors.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENConnecticut Light & Power Co. v. Westview Carlton Grp., LLC, 950 A.2d 522 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 16-262f 5×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“The only statutory remedy available to the plaintiff in the event of nonpayment for electrical service by an owner of an apartment building is to apply to the Superior Court for the appointment of a receiver of rents pursuant to General Statutes § 16-262f. The court noted that…”
12
GREENMetro. Dist. v. Hous. Auth., 531 A.2d 194 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987).
cites § 16-262f 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“The respondent contends that a utility receivership authorized by General Statutes § 16-262Í is limited to the four utility services stated in the statute: water, gas, electric and telephone.”
13
REDTown of Canton v. Cadle Props. of Connecticut, Inc., 77 A.3d 144 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013).
cites § 16-262f 9×cited by 2 cases
Reversed in part by Canton v. Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc. (2015): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case ("The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed only as to the reversal of the trial court’…
Where it cites § 16-262f
“We agree with the tenant, however, that the court improperly granted the motion to modify, and therefore the court should have granted the motion to remove to the extent that it sought to reverse the granting of the motion to modify.”
14
cites § 16-262f 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 16-262f
“If, for whatever reason, the building is so constructed, or the metering system is so arranged, you can’t divide that, then that becomes a landlord responsibility.’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, supra, p.”
15
NO FLAGCanton v. Cadle Props. of Connecticut, Inc., No. SC19225 Concurrence (Conn. May 19, 2015).
cites § 16-262f 8×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“The threat of eviction would serve as an incentive for the tenant to pay the rents that are due, and, should an eviction occur, the municipality would be in a slightly better position because of the reduced demand for public services such as fire, police and traffic control in…”
cites § 16-262f 4×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“See General Statutes § 16-262f (a) (4); see also General Statutes § 12-262t (a) (5).”
17
NEUTRALYankee Gas Servs. Co. v. DaSilva, 593 A.2d 158 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
cites § 16-262f 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 16-262f
“We conclude that the conditions of General Statutes § 16-262e are not applicable to § 16-262f and, therefore, that the respondents’ first claim is without merit.”
18
NO FLAGCanton v. Cadle Props. of Connecticut, Inc., No. SC19225 (Conn. May 19, 2015).
cites § 16-262f 4×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“2d 574 (1983) (cit- ing similar language in General Statutes § 16-262f as setting ‘‘statutory priority which allocates collected rentals to arrearages only after current charges, receiv- ership fees, and attorney’s fees have first been paid’’).”
19
NO FLAGBoardwalk Realty Assocs., LLC v. Crespo (In re Crespo), 561 B.R. 25 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2016).
cites § 16-262f 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 16-262f
“Section 16-262f specifically provides that owners are not to pay the utility directly.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197820012024

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 2015. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.11Conn. App. Ct.5Conn. Super. Ct.1Bankr. D. Conn.1Bankr. D. Mass.1
By subsection
(a)1 case
Adams v. Hartconn Assocs., Inc. (In re Adams), 212 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).“Accordingly, the receivership was not terminated and Monty’s post-discharge actions pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 16-262f were perfectly legitimate.”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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