If an employee suffers an injury or disease for which compensation is found by the administrative law judge to be payable according to the provisions of this chapter, the employer who last employed the claimant prior to the filing of the claim, or the employer's insurer, shall be initially liable for the payment of such compensation. The administrative law judge shall, within a reasonable period of time after issuing an award, on the basis of the record of the hearing, determine whether prior employers, or their insurers, are liable for a portion of such compensation and the extent of their liability. If prior employers are found to be so liable, the administrative law judge shall order such employers or their insurers to reimburse the initially liable employer or insurer according to the proportion of their liability. Reimbursement shall be made within ten days of the administrative law judge's order with interest, from the date of the initial payment, at twelve per cent per annum. If no appeal from the administrative law judge's order is taken by any employer or insurer within twenty days, the order shall be final and may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the Superior Court. For purposes of this section, the Second Injury Fund shall not be deemed an employer or an insurer and shall be exempt from any liability. The amount of any compensation for which the Second Injury Fund would be liable except for the exemption provided under this section shall be reallocated among any other employers, or their insurers, who are liable for such compensation according to a ratio, the numerator of which is the percentage of the total compensation for which an employer, or its insurer, is liable and the denominator of which is the total percentage of liability of all employers, or their insurers, excluding the percentage that would have been attributable to the Second Injury Fund, for such compensation.
(P.A. 81-155, S. 1; P.A. 01-22, S. 2; P.A. 05-199, S. 1; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 01-22 increased time for taking an appeal from order of commissioner from 10 to 20 days; P.A. 05-199 provided that Second Injury Fund not be deemed an employer or insurer and be exempt from liability under section, and that compensation otherwise attributable to fund be reallocated among any other liable employers or insurers according to ratio, effective July 1, 2006; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioners” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judge's” respectively, effective October 1, 2021.
Cited. 231 C. 469; 232 C. 758; 241 C. 282. Application is limited to cases of ongoing repetitive trauma or occupational disease. 263 C. 279. Connecticut Insurance Guarantee Association can be held liable for the obligations of an insolvent workers' compensation insurer that would have been the last insurer on a risk and that result does not conflict with Sec. 38a-845. 302 C. 219. Plain and unambiguous language of section permits an award of interest against a prior insurer if apportionment claim has been submitted to a commissioner after conclusion of formal hearings; existence of an agreement did not deprive commissioner of authority to make a determination as to apportionment liability and to award interest. 313 C. 735.
Cited. 33 CA 695; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 469. Once commissioner concluded that claimant had not suffered a new injury but had suffered complications from first injury, commissioner had authority to order former employer-insurer to reimburse present employer-insurer. 121 CA 400.
Notes of Decisions
Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 819 A.2d 260 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 34× “to 1999) § 31-299b 2 permits apportionment only in cases of repetitive *283 trauma or occupational disease and, therefore, does not provide a basis for apportionment of liability among insurers when the claimant has suffered two separate and distinct injuries; and (3) denied the…”
Franklin v. Superior Casting, 24 A.3d 1233 (Conn. 2011).
· cites it 23× “See General Statutes § 31-299b. 1 The sole issue in this appeal is whether § 31-299b applies to the Connecticut Insurance Guarantee Association (association) 2 when it assumes liability for the obligations of an insolvent workers’ compensation insurer that would have been the…”
Marroquin v. F. Monarca Masonry, 994 A.2d 727 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 26× “Travelers for medical and indemnity benefits arising from the October 15, 2004 and June 10, 2005 surgeries under General Statutes § 31-299b.” In her written decision, the commissioner found that “the claimant did not sustain a new inguinal hernia as *405 a result of the…”
Hall v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 695 A.2d 1051 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 7× “In support of this claim, the fund argued that, because the commissioner had not entered an award, had not issued a decision on a motion, and had not issued an order pursuant to General Statutes § 31-299b, 8 the board lacked jurisdiction.”
Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 705 A.2d 1012 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 9× “Fireman’s Fund, as the last insurer on the risk, became initially liable for the plaintiffs award pursuant to General Statutes § 31-299b and paid benefits to him for a period of 104 weeks totaling $54,457.”
Stec v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 10 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 8× “23 The fund asserts as its first alternative ground that The Hartford lacks standing to challenge the fund’s appeal because The Hartford’s liability is limited and predicated on its potential role as a future derivative *373 obligor under General Statutes § 31-299b, 24 and, the…”
Esposito v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 943 A.2d 456 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 17× “The principal issue on appeal is whether, under the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association Act (guaranty act), General Statutes §§ 38a-836 through 38a-853, a self-insured employer that initially is liable for a workers’ compensation claim as the last insurer on the risk is…”
Muldoon v. Homestead Insulation Co., 650 A.2d 1240 (Conn. 1994).
· cites it 7× “e Appellate Court 1 properly concluded that the com *471 pensation review board 2 of the workers’ compensation commission had improperly affirmed the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner for the fourth district ordering the defendant CNA Insurance Company to pay…”
Graham v. Olson Wood Assocs., Inc., 150 A.3d 1123 (Conn. 2016).
· cites it 27× “8 We conclude that the commissioner properly reinstated the association as a party to the underlying proceedings because the commissioner's broad case management authority under General Statutes § 31-298, 9 which extends to cases on the asbestos docket involving the…”
Dechio v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 10 A.3d 20 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 6× “Modena, supra, 216-17, the board concluded, inter alia, that both the fund and a beauty salon were precluded from challenging the commissioner’s determination that the salon was the claimant’s last employer for purposes of administering the claim and making initial payments…”
Levarge v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., Elec. Boat, 920 A.2d 996 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 7× “On remand, the commissioner must apportion liability among Electric Boat, ACE and Travelers pursuant to General Statutes § 31-299b. See, e.g., Hatt v.”
Deschenes v. Transco, Inc., 953 A.2d 13 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 3× “6 Delaney concluded that Transco was the employer at the time of the plaintiffs last exposure and its insurer, Zurich, was required to administer the plaintiffs claim pursuant to General Statutes § 31-299b. Following a subsequent motion to correct by the defendants D & N…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.