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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 31 — LaborChapter 568 — Workers' Compensation Act

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-309 (2025)

Maximum weekly compensation. Determination of average weekly earnings of state workers and production and related workers in manufacturing

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1970–2025 65citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 65 opinions since 1970, 4 of them in the last five years.

(a) Except as provided in section 31-307, the weekly compensation received by an injured employee under the provisions of this chapter shall in no case be more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of all workers in the state as hereinafter defined for the year in which the injury occurred except that the weekly compensation received by an injured employee whose injury occurred before July 1, 1993, shall be computed according to the provisions of law in effect at the time of his injury. In the case of an occupational disease, the time of injury shall be the date of total or partial incapacity to work as a result of such disease.

(b) (1) The average weekly earnings of all workers in the state shall be determined by the Labor Commissioner on or before the fifteenth day of August of each year, to be effective the following October first, and shall be the average of all workers' weekly earnings for the year ending the previous June thirtieth and shall be so determined in accordance with the standards for the determination of average weekly earnings of all workers established by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

(2) Prior to July 1, 1993, the Labor Commissioner shall determine the average weekly earnings of all workers in the state to be effective during the period July 1, 1993, to October 1, 1993.

(c) The average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state shall be determined by the Labor Commissioner on or before the fifteenth day of August of each year, to be effective the following October first, and shall be the average of the manufacturing production and related workers' weekly earnings for the year ending the previous June thirtieth and shall be so determined in accordance with the standards for the determination of average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing established by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

(1959, P.A. 580, S. 19; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 32; 1967, P.A. 842, S. 16; 1969, P.A. 696, S. 10; 1971, P.A. 371; P.A. 78-354, S. 1, 8; 78-360, S. 2; P.A. 79-483, S. 12; P.A. 80-124, S. 4; P.A. 87-547; P.A. 88-2, S. 1, 2; P.A. 91-339, S. 29; P.A. 93-228, S. 21, 35.)

History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 act set maximum at 60% rather than 55% of average production wage in state for year in which injury occurred; 1969 act substituted “weekly earnings of production and related workers” for “production wage”; 1971 act raised percentage maximum to 66.66%; P.A. 78-354 raised percentage to 85% and added exception re employees injured before January 1, 1979; P.A. 78-360 added exception re Sec. 31-307; P.A. 79-483 raised percentage maximum to 100% except for those injured October 1, 1979; P.A. 80-124 specified that in cases of occupational disease, time of injury is date of total or partial inability to work as a result of disease; P.A. 87-547 increased maximum percentages to 150%; P.A. 88-2 replaced “1979” with “1987,” in provision re applicable injury date; P.A. 91-339 divided existing section into Subsecs. (a) and (b) and changed applicable date from October 1, 1987, to October 1, 1991; P.A. 93-228 amended Subsec. (a) to decrease maximum for persons injured on or after July 1, 1993, from 150% to 100% of state average weekly wage for all workers, inserted new Subsec. (b) to require labor commissioner to annually calculate average weekly earnings of all state workers as well as production and related workers, and redesignated existing Subsec. (b) as Subsec. (c), effective July 1, 1993, except that Subdiv. (2) of Subsec. (b) effective June 30, 1993.

Rate applicable to volunteer firemen under Sec. 7-314a. 159 C. 53. Cited. 187 C. 363; 217 C. 42; 220 C. 739; 239 C. 676.

Cited. 38 CA 754; 40 CA 409.

Cited. 39 CS 449.

Subsec. (a):

Claimant's weekly compensation limit under Subsec. does not encompass lump-sum payment made pursuant to commutation award. 208 CA 615.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-309 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENGil v. Courthouse One, 687 A.2d 146 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 31-309 17×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“93-228), which amended General Statutes § 31-309 (a), is relevant to our interpretation of P.”
The case’s holding
The Workers' Compensation Act is remedial in nature and requires liberal interpretation to achieve its humanitarian purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“is remedial and must be interpreted liberally to achieve its humanitarian purposes.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENVincent v. City of New Haven, 941 A.2d 932 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 31-309 8×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“"(2) To those wholly dependent upon the deceased employee at the time of his injury, a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the average weekly earnings of the deceased at the time of injury but in no case more than the maximum weekly benefit rate set…”
The case’s holding
An employer is not required to provide health insurance coverage to the surviving dependent of a deceased employee under the workers' compensation act.
Later courts cite it for
“this court repeatedly has observed that an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute is entitled to deference only when that interpretation has been subjected to judicial review or the agency interpretation is both reasonable and time-tested.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENMarandino v. Prometheus Pharmacy, 986 A.2d 1023 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 31-309 6×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“310, after such earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee's total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee's average weekly wage pursuant to…”
The case’s holding
A claimant may receive total incapacity benefits for a subsequent disability if the disability is distinct from and caused by a condition not normally incident to the original loss.
Later courts cite it for
“although legislative silence is not always indicative of legislative affirmation, we have routinely considered legislative inaction for a significant period of time to be significant” · 1 citing court
4
GREENLafayette v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 770 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 31-309 5×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“ch earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee’s total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee’s average weekly wage pursuant to said section…”
The case’s holding
Collateral estoppel bars relitigating causation in state workers' compensation if fully litigated and determined in a prior federal Longshore Act proceeding.
5
GREENGurliacci v. Mayer, 590 A.2d 914 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 31-309 2×cited by 1,137 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“In either of the above cases, such compensation shall in no case be more than the maximum weekly benefit rate set forth in section 31-309 and shall continue during the period of partial incapacity but no longer than seven hundred and eighty weeks.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must determine attorney fees on remand following a finding that a statute serves to recover costs from a culpable third party while avoiding double recovery.
Later courts cite it for
“it is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be immediately acted upon by the court.” · 17 citing courts
6
GREENBirnie v. Elec. Boat Corp., 953 A.2d 28 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 31-309 4×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“ch earnings have been reduced by any deduction for federal or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee’s total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee’s average weekly wage pursuant to said section…”
The case’s holding
The substantial factor causation standard requires that employment or incidental risks contribute to the development of an injury in more than a de minimis way.
Later courts cite it for
“the substantial factor causation standard simply requires that the employment, or the risks incidental thereto, contribute to the development of the injury in more than a de minimis way.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENDuni v. United Tech. Corp., 682 A.2d 99 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 31-309 4×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“nings have been reduced by any deduction for federal taxes or state taxes, or both, and for the federal Insurance Contributions Act made from such employee’s total wages received during the period of calculation of the employee’s average weekly wage pursuant to said section…”
The case’s holding
An employee may compromise the future rights of surviving dependents through a clear and unequivocal settlement agreement because those rights depend upon the existence of a compensable injury.
Later courts cite it for
“inextricably linked to, and wholly dependent upon, the existence of a compensable injury or illness suffered by the employee” · 1 citing court
8
GREENCappellino v. Town of Cheshire, 628 A.2d 595 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 31-309 5×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“-308 provided in relevant part: “With respect to the following-described injuries the compensation, in addition to the usual compensation for total incapacity but in lieu of all other payments for compensation, shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the average weekly…”
The case’s holding
Permanent partial disability awards survive the death of an employee and pass to his dependents, and temporary total disability benefits do not discharge the obligation to pay them.
9
GREENRayhall v. Akim Co., 819 A.2d 803 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 31-309 2×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“Compensation paid under this subsection shall not be more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production and related workers in manufacturing in the state, as determined in accordance with the provisions of section 31-309,…”
The case’s holding
An employee with multiple injuries receives temporary incapacity benefits until all injured body parts reach maximum medical improvement.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that we do not defer to the review board's construction of a statute-a question of law-when, as in the present case, the provisions at issue previously have not been subjected to judicial scrutiny or when the review board's interpretation has not been time tested.” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENHasselt v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 815 A.2d 94 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 31-309 3×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“ch totally incapacitates the employee permanently, shall be adjusted as provided in this subsection as of October 1, 1997, or the October first following the injury date, whichever is later, and annually on each subsequent October first, to provide the injured employee with a…”
Later courts cite it for
“we previously have not determined whether a commissioner's policy directive, which contains an interpretation not adopted pursuant to formal rule-making or acyudicatory procedures, is entitled to deference” · 1 citing court
11
GREENPaternostro v. Edward Coon Co., 583 A.2d 1293 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 31-309 5×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“” In their brief, the defendants argued in the alternative that even if simultaneous payment of benefits under General Statutes §§ 31-307 and 31-308 (b) is generally permissible, in the instant case it is prohibited because it would result in payment of benefits in violation of…”
Later courts cite it for
“statutes must be construed to avoid illogical, irrational results” · 1 citing court
12
GREENDiaz v. Bridgeport, 266 A.3d 909 (Conn. App. Ct. 2021).
cites § 31-309 17×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 31-309
“Because the plaintiff’s weekly compensation rate does not, in and of itself, exceed the maximum weekly compensation under General Statutes § 31-309 (a), inherent in the defendant’s argument is the notion that a lump-sum payment pursuant to a commutation order should be included…”
13
GREENMingachos v. CBS, Inc., 491 A.2d 368 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 31-309 1×cited by 1,640 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“injury for which compensation is provided under the provisions of this chapter results in total incapacity to work, there shall be paid to the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of his average weekly earnings at the time of the…”
The case’s holding
An employee may sue an employer in court for intentional injuries (allowing an employee to sue his employer in a court of law for an intentional injury).
Later courts cite it for
“admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.” · 309 citing courts
14
GREENMcCurdy v. State, 630 A.2d 64 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 31-309 6×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“injury for which compensation is provided under the provisions of this chapter results in total incapacity to work, there shall be paid to the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of his average weekly earnings at the time of the…”
15
GREENStarks v. Univ. of Connecticut, 850 A.2d 1013 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 31-309 4×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“prior to his injury and the weekly amount which such employee will probably be able to earn thereafter, to be determined by the commissioner based upon the nature and extent of the injury, the training, education and experience of the employee, the availability of work for…”
16
GREENGyadu v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 930 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1996).
cites § 31-309 6×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“A The Maximum Weekly Benefit Cap, C.G.S.A. § 31-309 As noted above, Plaintiff challenges the maximum weekly benefits cap, set forth in C.”
17
GREENStewart v. Tunxis Serv. Ctr., 676 A.2d 819 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 31-309 3×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“the injury, the training, education and experience of the employee, the availability of work for persons with such physical condition and at the employee’s age, but not more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production…”
The case’s holding
Failure to comply with a mandatory statutory time period invalidates an action unless the parties waive the noncompliance through express agreement or conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“if a statutory time period is mandatory in nature, a showing of prejudice is not necessary to a conclusion that a failure to comply with the time period will invalidate the untimely action” · 1 citing court
18
GREENRydingsword v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 615 A.2d 1032 (Conn. 1992).
cites § 31-309 2×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“General Statutes § 31-308 (d) provides in pertinent part: “[T]he commissioner may award such compensation as he deems just, equal to sixty-six and two-thirds per cent of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee, but in no case more than the maximum weekly benefit rate…”
The case’s holding
An underinsured motorist insurer may set off the value of an unrealized workers' compensation indemnity award to prevent double recovery even if the claimant bypasses the workers' compensation forum.
Later courts cite it for
“the public policy established by the underinsured motorist statute is that every insured is entitled to recover for the damages he or she would have been able to recover if the underinsured motorist had maintained an adequate policy of liability insurance.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENPizzuto v. Comm'r of Mental Retardation, 927 A.2d 811 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 31-309 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“the injury, the training, education and experience of the employee, the availability of work for persons with such physical condition and at the employee’s age, but not more than one hundred per cent, raised to the next even dollar, of the average weekly earnings of production…”
The case’s holding
A workers' compensation commissioner may award § 31-308a benefits based on a prior disability if that disability is a substantial cause of the claimant's loss of earning capacity following a subsequent injury.
20
GREENGoing v. Cromwell Fire Dist., 267 A.2d 428 (Conn. 1970).
cites § 31-309 6×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 31-309
“The latter *59 act substituted an upgrading of the benefits for volunteer firemen equated to those in the Workmen's Compensation Act and provides, inter alia, that "[f]or the purpose of this section" the wage rate shall be taken as that producing the maximum benefit rate as…”
Later courts cite it for
“the purpose of the workmen's compensation law is to provide for the workman, and it is presumed that the general assembly acted with the knowledge that the objective in enacting such legislation was to protect the employee.” · 2 citing courts

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197019972025

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Conn.47Conn. App. Ct.16Conn. Super. Ct.1D. Conn.1
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