cites § 35-24 8×cited by 55 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “pplicable competitive bidding laws, General Statutes §§ 4a-100, 4b-91, 4b-92 and 10-287, (3) the individual plaintiffs did not have standing under article first, §§ 1, 4, 5 and 20, of the Connecticut constitution to challenge the PLA requirement, and (4) ECI did not have…”
- The case’s holding
- Unsuccessful bidders have standing to challenge public contract awards if they allege conduct that undermines the integrity of the competitive bidding process.
- Later courts cite it for
- “claims are also inadequately briefed when they are raised for the first time in a reply brief” · 1 citing court
cites § 35-24 8×cited by 32 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “The defendant is conducting an ongoing investigation into certain practices in the insurance industry that may be in violation of the Connecticut Antitrust Act, General Statutes § 35-24 et seq. In furtherance of this investigation, the defendant issued interrogatories and a…”
- The case’s holding
- Denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory ruling and not a final judgment unless it conclusively determines the rights of the parties.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the right of appeal is accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are met” · 1 citing court
cites § 35-24 4×cited by 93 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “1 First, as a matter of first impression, we must determine whether the plaintiff, Andrew Vacco, 2 as an end user licensee 3 of a software product manufactured by the defendant, Mircosoft Corporation, may maintain a claim against the defendant pursuant to the Connecti *62 cut…”
- The case’s holding
- An indirect purchaser lacks standing under the Connecticut Antitrust Act and cannot recover under CUTPA if the alleged injuries are too remote from the defendant's conduct.
- Later courts cite it for
- “notwithstanding the broad language and remedial purpose of cutpa, we have applied traditional common-law principles of remoteness and proximate causation to determine whether a party has standing to bring an action under cutpa” · 3 citing courts
cites § 35-24 4×cited by 44 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “is suspicion of the respondents’ participation in a retaliatory economic boycott against Smith & Wesson, the petitioner issued to the respondents interrogatories and a subpoena duces tecum, pursuant to the petitioner’s investigatory authority under General Statutes § 35-42,…”
- The case’s holding
- The attorney-client privilege protects corporate communications to counsel regarding anticipated litigation unless the crime-fraud exception applies through proof that the communication furthered an unlawful act.
- Later courts cite it for
- “long recognized that the granting or denial of a discovery request rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and is subject to reversal only if such an order constitutes an abuse of that discretion. . . . it is only in rare instances that the trial court's decision will be disturbed.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 35-24 4×cited by 31 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “They contend that the trial court improperly: (1) applied § 35-31(b), which exempts certain activities from the Connecticut Antitrust Act, General Statutes § 35-24 et seq., when those activities are "specifically directed or required by a statute of this state, or of the United…”
- The case’s holding
- State action antitrust immunity applies only when challenged conduct is specifically directed or required by statute rather than merely approved by regulators or implied by a general mandate.
- Later courts cite it for
- “it is well settled that in construing statutes, our fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 35-24 5×cited by 19 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “5 The plaintiffs complaint alleged a violation of the Connecticut Antitrust Act (act); General Statutes § 35-24 et seq.; 6 *244 in that it was not awarded the contract due to a conspiratorial agreement between a union and the defendant, with the purpose of obtaining a union…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “a judgment that disposes of only a part of a complaint is not a final judgment.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 35-24 3×cited by 14 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “(antitrust act). The plaintiff, Tremont Public Advisors, LLC, is a public affairs firm.”
cites § 35-24 4×cited by 19 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “[3] The plaintiff's complaint alleged a violation of the Connecticut Antitrust Act (act); General Statutes § 35-24 et seq.; in that it was not awarded the contract due to a conspiratorial agreement between a [labor] union and the defendant, with the purpose of obtaining a union…”
- The case’s holding
- The Connecticut Antitrust Act's broad definition of person includes municipalities, and it confers standing on unsuccessful bidders in a municipal bidding process to sue for damages.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the legislature expressly has conferred standing on a broad range of individuals under the connecticut antitrust act (act), including unsuccessful bidders in a municipal bidding process.” · 1 citing court
cites § 35-24 2×cited by 182 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “” See General Statutes §§ 35-24 through 35-49. Because the defendant does not allege it was precluded from introducing evidence of the plaintiffs actual conduct that might have constituted an antitrust as well as a CUTPA violation, we fail to perceive any prejudice to the…”
- The case’s holding
- A defendant may file a counterclaim in any action for legal or equitable relief if the counterclaim arises out of the transaction or transactions subject to the complaint.
- Later courts cite it for
- “a practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three.” · 9 citing courts
cites § 35-24 2×cited by 148 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “In this appeal, we must decide whether the trial court properly imposed liability upon the defendant under the Connecticut Antitrust Act (act); General Statutes § 35-24 et seq.; and, if so, whether the trial court properly awarded the plaintiff treble damages, including lost…”
- The case’s holding
- State courts follow federal precedent when interpreting antitrust statutes unless the state text or other pertinent law requires a different interpretation.
- Later courts cite it for
- “we follow federal precedent when we interpret the act unless the text of our antitrust statutes, or other pertinent state law, requires us to interpret it differently.” · 7 citing courts
cites § 35-24 2×cited by 96 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “General Statutes §§ 35-24 through 35-45. This claim is wholly lacking in merit.”
- The case’s holding
- A statute existing at the time of contract execution is read into the agreement unless the parties indicate otherwise.
- Later courts cite it for
- “parties generally do not insert meaningless provisions in their agreements and therefore every provision must be given effect if reasonably possible.” · 10 citing courts
cites § 35-24 4×cited by 20 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “§§ 1-7 , the Connecticut Anti-Trust Act, Conn.Gen. Stat. §§ 35-24 to 35-45, the Connecticut Franchise Act, Conn.”
cites § 35-24 2×cited by 84 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “The Connecticut Anti-Trust Act; General Statutes §§ 35-24 through 35-45; incorporates, in modified form, and with notable exceptions, various provisions of the federal antitrust laws, especially the Sherman Act.”
- The case’s holding
- State antitrust laws are not preempted by federal regulations when both sets of laws aim to promote competition and the state law does not conflict with federal objectives.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the superior court has jurisdiction of all matters expressly committed to it and of all other judicially cognizable matters not within the exclusive jurisdiction of another court.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 35-24 2×cited by 11 cases
Reversed by Reserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC (2020): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “The plaintiffs appeal from that judgment, claiming that the trial court improperly determined that (1) the purchase and sale agreements upon which they based their claims for brokerage fees constituted part of an illegal tying arrangement in violation of the Connecticut…”
cites § 35-24 2×cited by 74 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “tiff under General Statutes § 42-133g 2 for an injunction against the termination of the franchise, and for money damages for violation of the Franchise Agreement Act; General Statutes §§ 42-133e through 42-133h; for violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act…”
- The case’s holding
- The ultimate issue in a summary process action is the right to possession.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the ultimate issue in a summary process action is the right to possession.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 35-24 4×cited by 8 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “They removed counts alleging a violation of the Connecticut Antitrust Act, General Statutes § 35-24 et seq., and civil conspiracy.”
cites § 35-24 2×cited by 26 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “The sole issue in this interlocutory public interest appeal is whether General Statutes § 35-32 (c) (2) 1 gives the plaintiff, the state of Connecticut *457 (state), standing to pursue a parens patriae claim for damages to its general economy caused by violations of the…”
- The case’s holding
- The state antitrust act authorizes the attorney general to seek parens patriae damages to the state's general economy notwithstanding federal limits, and duplication concerns are matters of proof.
- Later courts cite it for
- “defendants' arguments with respect to the potentially duplicative nature of the damages and injuries pleaded in the state's complaint implicate potential problems of proof rather than pleading” · 2 citing courts
cites § 35-24 4×cited by 52 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “General Statutes §§ 35-24 to 35-44. The complaint alleges, inter alia, that the defendant's practices in enforcing certain specified policies were "unlawful as they are for the purpose or have the effect of: (a) Fixing, controlling or maintaining prices, rates or quotations; (b)…”
- The case’s holding
- The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a rule of judicial administration used to promote proper relationships between courts and regulatory agencies.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a rule of judicial administration created by court decision in order to promote proper relationships between the courts and administrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 35-24 2×cited by 10 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “2d 719 (1995) ("we reach this issue under the plain error rule" where "for the first time, we are asked to decide whether a plaintiff may be awarded prejudgment interest under the [Connecticut Antitrust Act, General Statutes § 35-24 et seq. ]"); Madison Hills Ltd.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “it is well established that a court may summarily enforce-within the framework of existing litigation-a clear and unambiguous settlement agreement reached during that litigation” · 1 citing court
cites § 35-24 2×cited by 10 cases
- Where it cites § 35-24
- “], a plaintiff must adequately allege not only that it is a member of the class of persons that is statutorily authorized to bring such an action, but also that [1] it suffered an antitrust injury and [2] it is an acceptable plaintiff to pursue the alleged antitrust violations’’…”
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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.