Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-1 (2026)

Appointed officers; term; compensation and expenses

✓ current as of May 2026
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Unless otherwise specifically provided by law, each person appointed or nominated for appointment by the Governor, with or without the advice and consent of the General Assembly or either house thereof, and each person appointed or elected by the General Assembly or either house thereof, shall be sworn and shall hold office for the term prescribed by law and until his successor is appointed and has qualified. Such persons shall receive no compensation for services unless the same is prescribed by law, but shall receive their actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties.

(1949 Rev., S. 260.)

See Sec. 4-16 re payment of expenses by state.

See Sec. 4-40 re determination of salaries not prescribed by law.

Section is effective amendment of statutes not specifically providing for extension of term in case of failure of appointment of successor, and incumbent will hold over de jure. 133 C. 40. See 133 C. 50. Can be interpreted only as effective to fix a term of office ab initio. 135 C. 639. Is a remedial statute which should receive as liberal a construction as can reasonably be given to effectuate its beneficial purpose. 136 C. 312. The term of office of a municipal court judge is “otherwise specifically provided by law” by the twentieth amendment; doubtful that statute was intended to apply to judicial offices. 138 C. 153. Cited. 200 C. 91.

Declaratory judgment not appropriate to try title to office. 13 CS 430. Where General Assembly did not appoint a county commissioner, the incumbent held over and an interim appointment was invalid. 14 CS 225.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 220 cases (41 in the last 5 years), 1962–2026 · leading case: State v. Rankin, 821 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 2018).
State v. Rankin, 821 S.E.2d 787 (N.C. 2018). · cites it 3× “C.G.S. § 4-1. Whether a particular statute supplants a common law remedy is a question of statutory interpretation.”
Dickson v. Rucho, 366 NC 332, 737 S.E.2d 362 (N.C. 2013). · cites it 6× “and which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full force within this State.”
State v. Vance, 403 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1991). · cites it 6× “On 27 July 1990, this Court allowed the defendant's petition for discretionary review, limited to the issue of the applicability of the year and a day rule.”
State v. Colon, 864 A.2d 666 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 2× “§ 4-1. Applying these principles, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Kanfer to testify that, out of approximately fifty cases that involved a child dying as a result of a blunt force trauma, the present case was the most severe.”
State v. Aaron L., 865 A.2d 1135 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 3× “§§ 4-1, 4-3 and 4-5 (b). 24 “ ‘When evidence of other offenses is offered to show a common plan or design the marks which the uncharged and the charged offenses have in common must be such that it may be logically inferred that if the defendant is guilty of one he must be guilty…”
Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. 1999). · cites it 4× “C.G.S. § 4-1 reaffirmed principles relating to the common law which had first been statutorily recognized for the Colony of North Carolina in 1715.”
State v. Calabrese, 975 A.2d 126 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009). · cites it 6× “Our first question is whether the proffered evidence was relevant.”
State v. Juan J., 344 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2022). · cites it 3× “§ 4-1, commentary . . . . Regarding the second component, ‘[t]he materiality of evidence turns [on] what is at issue in the case, which generally will be determined by the pleadings and the applicable sub- stantive law.”
Considine v. City of Waterbury, 905 A.2d 70 (Conn. 2006). · cites it 2× “§ 4-1 (evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”); State v.”
Viera v. Cohen, 927 A.2d 843 (Conn. 2007). · cites it 2× “§ 4-1; generally is admissible; Conn.Code Evid.”
Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988). · cites it 4× “The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that…”
State v. Lebrick, 178 A.3d 1064 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 4× “1 The defendant claims on appeal that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence (1) former testimony of a witness in violation of § 8-6 (1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence and the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution, and (2)…”
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