(a) Any franchisee may bring an action for violation of sections
42-133e to
42-133g, inclusive, in the Superior Court to recover damages sustained by reason of such violation, which action shall be privileged in respect to its assignment for trial and, where appropriate, may apply for injunctive relief as provided in chapter 916. Such franchisee, if successful, shall be entitled to costs, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees.
(b) A franchisee who leases real property under a franchise agreement, which lease expires upon termination of the franchise, and who receives notice from the franchisor in accordance with the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of section 42-133f that such franchise is terminated, shall have no right or privilege to occupy the premises which are the subject of such lease, as of the date specified in such notice for the termination of such franchise, unless such franchisee is granted a temporary injunction in accordance with the provisions of chapter 916.
(c) A franchisor who applies to a court to obtain possession of premises leased by the franchisor to the franchisee upon termination of the franchise, which premises the franchisee has no right or privilege to occupy under subsection (b) of this section, shall file with the court from which it seeks the order of possession: (1) An affidavit under oath from the clerk of such court, which affidavit shall state that the court records indicate that no temporary injunction has been granted to the franchisee, (2) the return of service of the notice required pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, (3) a copy of the notice served pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, and (4) an affidavit under oath, which affidavit shall state that the notice required by subsections (a) and (b) of section 42-133f, has been served, that the notice period required by said section has expired, and that no injunction to restrain termination has been issued.
(1972, P.A. 287, S. 3; P.A. 75-560, S. 2; P.A. 86-238, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 75-560 granted actions to recover damages privileged status in respect to assignment for trial; P.A. 86-238 added Subsecs. (b) and (c) providing that a franchisee who receives valid notice of the termination of a franchise and whose lease expires along with the franchise, has no right or privilege to occupy the franchise property, and requiring the franchisor to file certain items with the court when applying for possession of such property.
See Sec. 42-133h re applicability of section.
Cited. 179 C. 471.
Cited. 1 CA 439.
Sec. 42-133h. Applicability of sections 42-133e to 42-133g, inclusive. Sections 42-133e to 42-133g, inclusive, shall take effect October 1, 1972, and shall apply only to franchise agreements entered into, renewed or amended on or after that date, the performance of which contemplates or requires the franchisee to establish or maintain a place of business in this state.
(1972, P.A. 287, S. 4; P.A. 85-493, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 85-493 provided that Secs. 42-133e to 42-133g, inclusive, apply to franchise agreements “the performance of which contemplates or requires the franchisee to establish or maintain a place of business in this state”.
Cited. 179 C. 471.
Cited. 1 CA 439.
Notes of Decisions
Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 473 A.2d 318 (Conn. App. Ct. 1983).
· cites it 16× “On September 3,1982, the defendant instituted an action in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford against the plaintiff under General Statutes § 42-133g 2 for an injunction against the termination of the franchise, and for money damages…”
Hartford Elec. Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 736 A.2d 824 (Conn. 1999).
· cites it 2× “A The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly held that a franchise exists between the parties, pursuant to § 42-133e (b), an integral part of the franchise act. We conclude that it did. We begin by examining § 42-133e (b), which defines a franchise as “an…”
Broadhurst v. Steamtronics Corp., 48 B.R. 801 (D. Conn. 1985).
· cites it 2× “Finally, the state court action was nearly trial-ready and was entitled to privileged status under the Connecticut Franchise Act, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-133g. 2 The factors considered by the bankruptcy court were sufficient to support its decision that cause had been shown for the…”
Chem-Tek, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 816 F. Supp. 123 (D. Conn. 1993).
“It is § 42-133e that defines a franchise and the relationships which fall within the remedial provisions of § 42-133Í and § 42-133g. The language of § 42-133e is inclusive.”
Joseph Pepe Et Al. v. Gnc Franchising, Inc., 750 A.2d 1167 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000).
· cites it 3× “” General Statutes § 42-133g (a) provides in pertinent part that: “Any franchisee may bring an action for violation of sections 42-133e to 42-133g, inclusive, in the Superior Court to recover damages sustained by reason of such violation .”
Stodolink v. Yankee Barn Homes, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 557 (D. Conn. 1983).
· cites it 2× “, which secures the right of access to the state courts to redress any violations of the law, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 42-133g, and declares that any purported waiver of the rights of a franchisee is void.”
Aurigemma v. Arco Petroleum Prods. Co., 698 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Conn. 1988).
“Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Count Three is granted as to defendants’ liability under § 42-133g(a) for a violation of § 42-133f(a).”
Virzi Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 742 F.2d 677 (1st Cir. 1984).
“Conn. Gen.Stat. § 42-133g. SNE correctly points out that the case never proceeded to final judgment on the merits; indeed, there was no hearing or ruling on Virzi’s request for a preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo pending final adjudication.”
Columbia Aircraft Sales, Inc v. Piper Aircraft, Inc. (D. Conn. 2020).
· cites it 2× “It likewise relies on a separate anti- waiver provision of the CFA stating that “[a]ny waiver of the rights of a franchisee under sections 42-133f or 42-133g which is contained in any franchise agreement entered into or amended on or after June 12, 1975, shall be void.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-133g(a) — 2 cases
Aurigemma v. Arco Petroleum Prods. Co., 698 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Conn. 1988).
“Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Count Three is granted as to defendants’ liability under § 42-133g(a) for a violation of § 42-133f(a).”
Columbia Aircraft Sales, Inc v. Piper Aircraft, Inc. (D. Conn. 2020).
“It likewise relies on a separate anti- waiver provision of the CFA stating that “[a]ny waiver of the rights of a franchisee under sections 42-133f or 42-133g which is contained in any franchise agreement entered into or amended on or after June 12, 1975, shall be void.”
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