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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 46b — Family LawChapter 815e — Marriage

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-21 (2025)

(Formerly Sec. 46-1). Marriage of persons related by consanguinity or affinity prohibited

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1980–2026 29citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 29 opinions since 1980, 3 of them in the last five years.

No person may marry such person's parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, parent's sibling, sibling's child, stepparent or stepchild. Any marriage within these degrees is void.

(1949 Rev., S. 7301; P.A. 78-230, S. 3, 54; P.A. 09-13, S. 6.)

History: P.A. 78-230 changed wording slightly and substituted “may” for “shall”; Sec. 46-1 transferred to Sec. 46b-21 in 1979; P.A. 09-13 made provision prohibiting a man or woman marrying person of the opposite sex related within certain degrees of consanguinity or affinity applicable regardless of sex of such other person, effective April 23, 2009.

See Sec. 53a-191 re incest.

Annotations to former section 46-1:

Does not prohibit marriage with deceased husband's brother. 12 C. 94. “Sister” includes half-sister for purpose of incest prosecution. 132 C. 165. The marriage of a niece and her uncle in Italy, though valid there and contracted without intent to evade the law of this state, held not valid in this state. 148 C. 288. Relationship of niece-in-law and uncle-in-law held not within enumerated relationships for crime of incest. 158 C. 461.

Annotations to present section:

Former section cited. 182 C. 344. Relationship as half-uncle and half-niece is void. 213 C. 637.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-21 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSingh v. Singh, 569 A.2d 1112 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 46b-21 26×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“That motion alleged that, although the judgment found that they were uncle and niece and, therefore, not legally qualified to marry, in fact, since the wife’s mother is the husband’s half sister, the wife is the husband’s half niece and not his niece.”
The case’s holding
A marriage between a half uncle and half niece is void and incestuous under Connecticut law.
2
REDState v. John M., 894 A.2d 376 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 46b-21 23×cited by 14 cases
Reversed by State v. John F.M. (2008): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 46b-21
“" Section § 46b-21 provides: "No man may marry his mother, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, sister, aunt, niece, stepmother or stepdaughter, and no woman may marry her father, grandfather, son, grandson, brother, uncle, nephew, stepfather or stepson.”
The case’s holding
Kindred persons engaged in homosexual relations are similarly situated to those engaged in heterosexual relations, so a statute barring only heterosexual kindred intercourse raises equal protection concerns.
Later courts cite it for
“kindred persons engaged in homosexual relations are similarly situated to those engaged in heterosexual relations.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENKerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 46b-21 8×cited by 111 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“See General Statutes § 46b-21. The plaintiffs also share the same interest in a committed and loving relationship as heterosexual persons who wish to marry, and they share the same interest in having a family and raising their children in a loving and supportive environment.”
The case’s holding
State laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples violate the equal protection rights guaranteed by the state constitution (equal protection analysis).
Later courts cite it for
“religious freedom will not be jeopardized by the marriage of same sex couples because religious organizations that oppose same sex marriage as irreconcilable with their beliefs will not be required to perform same sex marriages or otherwise to condone same sex marriage or relations.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. John F.M., 940 A.2d 755 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 46b-21 19×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“In arriving at this conclusion, the Appellate Court noted that § 53a-72a (a) (2) criminalizes sexual intercourse between persons who are prohibited from marrying under General Statutes § 46b-21, which, in turn, references only male-female unions within certain degrees of kindred.”
Later courts cite it for
“if, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the code shall not be considered.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. George B., 785 A.2d 573 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 46b-21 8×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“General Statutes § 53a-72a (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when such person ... (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the degrees of kindred…”
The case’s holding
The statutory degree of kinship for sexual assault includes relatives related by adoption as well as by blood.
Later courts cite it for
“the primary responsibility for conducting the balancing test to determine whether the evidence is more probative than prejudicial rests with the trial court, and its conclusion will be disturbed only for a manifest abuse of discretion.” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Snook, 555 A.2d 390 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 46b-21 5×cited by 99 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“General Statutes § 46b-21 provides: “No man may marry his mother, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, sister, aunt, niece, stepmother or stepdaughter, and no woman may marry her father, grandfather, son, grandson, brother, uncle, nephew, stepfather or stepson.”
The case’s holding
A continuing course of conduct does not preclude charging each separate act as a distinct violation under the applicable statute (State v. Snook).
Later courts cite it for
“the defendant on appeal bears the burden of proving that the prosecutions are for the same offense in law and fact.” · 4 citing courts
7
GREENDep't of Pub. Saf. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 6 A.3d 763 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 46b-21 4×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“2010) § 46b-21 provides: “No person may marry such person’s parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, sibling, parent’s sibling, sibling’s child, stepparent or stepchild.”
The case’s holding
The terms registration information and registry information are synonymous under state statutes regarding the disclosure of sex offender data.
Later courts cite it for
“the exemptions contained in various state statutes reflect a legislative intention to balance the public's right to know what its agencies are doing, with the governmental and private needs for confidentiality.... it is this balance of the governmental and private needs for confidentiality with the public right to know that must govern the interpretation and application of the act.” · 2 citing courts
8
REDState v. Joseph V., 230 A.3d 644 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020).
cites § 46b-21 4×cited by 5 cases
Reversed in part by State v. Joseph V. (2022): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case ("The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed insofar as that court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of sexual assa…
Where it cites § 46b-21
“’’ Although § 46b-21 was amended during the time frame within which the crimes at issue were alleged to have occurred, because that amendment is not relevant to the claims on appeal we refer to the current revision of § 46b-21.”
The case’s holding
A specific unanimity instruction is required only when a criminal count is based on multiple factual allegations that constitute distinct statutory subsections or elements.
9
GREENCarabetta v. Carabetta, 438 A.2d 109 (Conn. 1980).
cites § 46b-21 4×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“NOTES [1] Now General Statutes § 46b-21. [2] Now General Statutes § 46b-24.”
The case’s holding
A marriage solemnized by a religious ceremony without a license is not void, because the statute's licensing requirement carries only a fine as the penalty for violators.
Later courts cite it for
“in sum, we conclude that the legislature's failure expressly to characterize as void's a marriage properly celebrated without a license means that such a marriage is not invalid.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Faraday, 842 A.2d 567 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 122 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical injury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person…”
The case’s holding
A plea of nolo contendere has the same legal effect as a plea of guilty for all subsequent proceedings (dictum).
Later courts cite it for
“since there are two distinct components of the revocation hearing, our standard of review differs depending on which part of the hearing we are reviewing.” · 5 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Anthony L., 179 A.3d 1278 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 46b-21 3×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“6 The state argues that the defendant did not preserve his claim that the uncharged misconduct was the most direct evidence of his guilt because at trial, the defendant objected to that evidence only on the ground that it was more prejudicial than probative. We review the…”
12
GREENState v. James G., 844 A.2d 810 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 93 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“” A “daughter” falls within the degree of kindred specified in § 46b-21. General Statutes (Rev to 1999) § 53-21 provides in relevant part: “Any person who .”
The case’s holding
Evidence is unduly prejudicial when it has an adverse effect on a defendant beyond proving the specific fact or issue that justified its admission.
Later courts cite it for
“evidence is excluded as unduly prejudicial when it tends to have some adverse effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence” · 3 citing courts
13
GREENCote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 446 Mass. 350 (2006).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 46b-21, 46b-29, 46b-30 (West 2004); Conn.”
Later courts cite it for
“a party seeking a preliminary injunction must show that (1) success is likely on the merits; (2) irreparable harm will result from denial of the injunction; and (3) the risk of irreparable harm to the moving party outweighs any similar risk of harm to the opposing party.” · 8 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Huey, 505 A.2d 1242 (Conn. 1986).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 89 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“such other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person…”
The case’s holding
A sentencing judge may consider information inadmissible at trial, such as uncharged allegations or dismissed counts, provided the information has a minimal indicium of reliability.
Later courts cite it for
“as long as the sentencing judge has a reasonable, persuasive basis for relying on the information which he uses to fashion his ultimate sentence, an appellate court should not interfere with his discretion.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Hufford, 533 A.2d 866 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 87 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“such other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person…”
The case’s holding
A verdict on a single count charging alternative methods of committing the same crime is valid only if sufficient evidence supports each alternative charged.
Later courts cite it for
“words used in a criminal statute should not be accorded the narrowest technical meaning in disregard of their context and in frustration of the obvious legislative intent. . . .” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Vass, 469 A.2d 767 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“such other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person…”
The case’s holding
A defendant may be convicted of two offenses arising from the same criminal incident if each crime contains an element not found in the other.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant may be convicted of two offenses arising out of the same criminal incident if each crime contains an element not found in the other.” · 5 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Smith, 769 A.2d 698 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“on or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such other person to fear physical iryury to himself or herself or a third person, or (2) engages *833 in sexual intercourse with another…”
The case’s holding
Due process under the federal constitution does not require a court hearing with counsel before probation authorities modify a probationer's conditions of probation, because modification risks only potential future revocation.
Later courts cite it for
“although the defendant also claims a violation under the state due process clause, our decision is confined to the federal constitution because the defendant has failed to provide an independent analysis of the state constitutional issue.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Kelley, 643 A.2d 854 (Conn. 1994).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“(2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person whom the actor knows to be related to him or her within any of the degrees of kindred specified in section 46b-21.” General Statutes § 51-199 (b) provides in relevant part: “The following matters shall be taken directly to…”
The case’s holding
A defendant fails to establish relevance for cross-examination regarding a prior accusation if they do not provide evidence that the prior accusation was false.
19
GREENState v. Moye, 570 A.2d 209 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“such other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of use of force against such other person or against a third person, which reasonably causes such person to fear physical injury to such person or a third person, or (2) engages in sexual intercourse with another person…”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of a witness's failure to respond to a subpoena because such failure does not inherently establish a lack of veracity.
20
GREENState v. Martin, 445 A.2d 585 (Conn. 1982).
cites § 46b-21 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 46b-21
“sexual assault in the third degree: class d felony, (a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree when sueh person (1) compels another person to submit to sexual contact (A) by the use of force against sueh other person or a third person, or (B) by the threat of…”

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Citing cases by year
198020032026

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2008. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.16Conn. App. Ct.11Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1Mass.1
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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