As used in this chapter, sections
47a-21,
47a-23 to
47a-23c, inclusive,
47a-26a to
47a-26g, inclusive,
47a-35 to
47a-35b, inclusive,
47a-41a,
47a-43, and
47a-46:
(a) “Action” includes recoupment, counterclaim, set-off, cause of action and any other proceeding in which rights are determined, including an action for possession.
(b) “Building and housing codes” include any law, ordinance or governmental regulation concerning fitness for habitation or the construction, maintenance, operation, occupancy, use or appearance of any premises or dwelling unit.
(c) “Dwelling unit” means any house or building, or portion thereof, which is occupied, is designed to be occupied, or is rented, leased or hired out to be occupied, as a home or residence of one or more persons.
(d) “Landlord” means the owner, lessor or sublessor of the dwelling unit, the building of which it is a part or the premises.
(e) “Owner” means one or more persons, jointly or severally, in whom is vested (1) all or part of the legal title to property, or (2) all or part of the beneficial ownership and a right to present use and enjoyment of the premises and includes a mortgagee in possession.
(f) “Person” means an individual, corporation, limited liability company, the state or any political subdivision thereof, or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, two or more persons having a joint or common interest, and any other legal or commercial entity.
(g) “Premises” means a dwelling unit and the structure of which it is a part and facilities and appurtenances therein and grounds, areas and facilities held out for the use of tenants generally or whose use is promised to the tenant.
(h) “Rent” means all periodic payments to be made to the landlord under the rental agreement.
(i) “Rental agreement” means all agreements, written or oral, and valid rules and regulations adopted under section 47a-9 or subsection (d) of section 21-70 embodying the terms and conditions concerning the use and occupancy of a dwelling unit or premises.
(j) “Roomer” means a person occupying a dwelling unit, which unit does not include a refrigerator, stove, kitchen sink, toilet and shower or bathtub and one or more of these facilities are used in common by other occupants in the structure.
(k) “Single-family residence” means a structure maintained and used as a single dwelling unit. Notwithstanding that a dwelling unit shares one or more walls with another dwelling unit or has a common parking facility, it is a single-family residence if it has direct access to a street or thoroughfare and does not share heating facilities, hot water equipment or any other essential facility or service with any other dwelling unit.
(l) “Tenant” means the lessee, sublessee or person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a dwelling unit or premises to the exclusion of others or as is otherwise defined by law.
(m) “Tenement house” means any house or building, or portion thereof, which is rented, leased or hired out to be occupied, or is arranged or designed to be occupied, or is occupied, as the home or residence of three or more families, living independently of each other, and doing their cooking upon the premises, and having a common right in the halls, stairways or yards.
(P.A. 76-95, S. 1, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82; P.A. 79-571, S. 2; 79-631, S. 96, 111; P.A. 86-267, S. 4; P.A. 89-254, S. 1; P.A. 91-383, S. 13; P.A. 95-79, S. 171, 189; P.A. 10-137, S. 4; P.A. 21-78, S. 21; P.A. 23-207, S. 5; P.A. 24-143, S. 16.)
History: P.A. 76-435 deleted provision in Sec. 27 of P.A. 76-95 which specified that the act applied to “rental agreements entered into or extended or renewed on and after” January 1, 1977; P.A. 79-571 added Subdiv. (m) defining “tenement house” and revised list of applicable sections; P.A. 79-631 removed Sec. 47a-26 from list of applicable sections; P.A. 86-267 made definitions applicable to Sec. 47a-23c and rephrased definition of dwelling unit; P.A. 89-254 redefined “dwelling unit” to include realty “designed to be occupied” as a home or residence; P.A. 91-383 amended the definition of “landlord” to include the owner, lessor or sublessor of “the premises”, amended the definition of “rental agreement” to include rules and regulations adopted under “subsection (d) of section 21-70”, and amended the definition of “tenant” to include a person occupying “premises”; P.A. 95-79 redefined “person” to include a limited liability company, effective May 31, 1995; P.A. 10-137 applied definitions to Sec. 47a-11e and made a technical change; P.A. 21-78 applied definitions to Sec. 47a-7b; P.A. 23-207 applied definitions to Secs. 47a-4d and 47a-7c. (Revisor's note: In 2024 a reference to Sec. 47a-7b in the introductory language was deleted editorially by the Revisors for clarity because said section is included in “this chapter”); P.A. 24-143 applied definitions to Sec. 47a-4e.
Cited. 190 C. 364; 194 C. 129; 215 C. 367; 237 C. 679.
Cited. 4 CA 608; 25 CA 177; 28 CA 684; 40 CA 513. Defendant's argument that sublessor is not an owner is misplaced, as it overlooks Subdiv. (e)(2) which provides in part that owner is one who has a beneficial interest in the premises and the right to possession. 81 CA 486.
Cited. 36 CS 611; 37 CS 579; 38 CS 1; Id., 370; Id., 683.
Notes of Decisions
Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!! LLC, 33 A.3d 848 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 12× “” To interpret the language of § 47a-11, we must look to the definitions applicable to chapter 830 set forth in General Statutes § 47a-1. Of primary importance, the term “dwelling unit,” which is used throughout § 47a-11, is defined in § 47a-1 (c) as “any house or building, or…”
Baldwin v. Curtis, 939 A.2d 1249 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 11× “I respectfully write separately because although I concur with the holding of the majority that the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted at this time and would reverse the judgment of the trial court, I first would order further briefing on the applicability…”
Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (Conn. 2012).
· cites it 4× “; reasoning that this act's "broad purpose of balancing the interests of landlords and tenants applies equally to the statutory scheme governing mobile manufactured home site owners and mobile home residents who rent such home sites.”
A & M Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. Guay, 923 A.2d 628 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 8× “Accordingly, although it is clear that the plaintiff acted in violation of § 29-265 by permitting the defendants to occupy the premises in the absence of a certificate of occupancy, we specifically must determine whether public policy precludes the plaintiff from recovering rent…”
Rivers v. City of New Britain, 950 A.2d 1247 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 2× “, General Statutes § 46a-51 (10) (including within definition of term "`[e]mployer,'" for purposes of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, "the state and all political subdivisions thereof"); General Statutes § 47a-1(f) ("`[p]erson' means an individual, corporation,…”
Ah Min Holding, LLC v. Hartford, 217 Conn. App. 574 (Conn. App. Ct. 2023).
· cites it 15× “’’ 5 General Statutes § 47a-1 (c) defines a ‘‘ ‘[d]welling unit’ ’’ as ‘‘any house or building, or portion thereof, which is occupied, is designed to be occupied, or is rented, leased or hired out to be occupied, as a home or residence of one or more persons.”
City of Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Elec., Inc., 548 A.2d 744 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
· cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 47a-1 (h). Use and occupancy payments, by contrast, arise “[i]n the absence of [a rental] agreement” and are “the fair rental value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling unit.”
S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy, 428 A.2d 806 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981).
· cites it 4× “51; 1 Tiffany, Real Property (3d Ed.) § 141; 3 Thompson on Real Property § 1132.”
Muniz v. Kravis, 757 A.2d 1207 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
· cites it 2× “She limits her claim to the assertion that the allegations of count eight of her complaint state a cause of action for a CUTPA violation, and she seeks damages for that violation.”
Rodriguez v. Ancona, 868 A.2d 807 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
· cites it 4× “Because the legislative history is essentially inconclusive, we must turn to other methods of statutory construction.”
Bourque v. Morris, 460 A.2d 1251 (Conn. 1983).
· cites it 4× “4 General Statutes § 47a-1 (j) provides as follows: “ ‘Roomer’ means a person occupying a dwelling unit, which unit does not include a refrigerator, stove, kitchen sink, toilet and shower or bathtub and one or more of these facilities are used in common by other occupants in the…”
Rivera v. Santiago, 495 A.2d 1122 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
· cites it 2× “” A Connecticut case decided by the Appellate Session of the Superior Court held that defendants who did not pay rent, who were not holding pursuant to a lease agreement, and who did not hold superior title to the premises were not tenants as that term is defined in General…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-1(d) — 1 case
Baldwin v. Curtis, 939 A.2d 1249 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
“I respectfully write separately because although I concur with the holding of the majority that the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted at this time and would reverse the judgment of the trial court, I first would order further briefing on the applicability…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-1(e) — 1 case
Baldwin v. Curtis, 939 A.2d 1249 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
“I respectfully write separately because although I concur with the holding of the majority that the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted at this time and would reverse the judgment of the trial court, I first would order further briefing on the applicability…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-1(f) — 1 case
Rivers v. City of New Britain, 950 A.2d 1247 (Conn. 2008).
“, General Statutes § 46a-51 (10) (including within definition of term "`[e]mployer,'" for purposes of Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, "the state and all political subdivisions thereof"); General Statutes § 47a-1(f) ("`[p]erson' means an individual, corporation,…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-1(g) — 1 case
Baldwin v. Curtis, 939 A.2d 1249 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
“I respectfully write separately because although I concur with the holding of the majority that the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted at this time and would reverse the judgment of the trial court, I first would order further briefing on the applicability…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-1(i) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-1(l) — 1 case
S.H.V.C., Inc. v. Roy, 428 A.2d 806 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981).
“51; 1 Tiffany, Real Property (3d Ed.) § 141; 3 Thompson on Real Property § 1132.”
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