The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure; but the foreclosure is not a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation as to any person liable for the payment thereof upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could not have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure. The judgment in each such case shall state the names of all persons upon whom service of process has been made as herein provided.
(1949 Rev., S. 7191; 1957, P.A. 443; P.A. 79-602, S. 74.)
History: P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording, substituting “the” for “such”, etc., but made no substantive changes.
See Sec. 49-14 re deficiency judgments.
Before statute, foreclosure was a bar to further action on the mortgage debt. 1 R. 203; 3 C. 63; 5 C. 535; 18 C. 136; 91 C. 586. Provisions of section requiring persons liable for the mortgage debt to be made parties to the foreclosure apply only to foreclosure proceedings begun after section was enacted. 56 C. 146. Section applies to mortgages of personalty. 58 C. 257. Consideration of separate action against endorser after foreclosure and deficiency judgment against maker only. 100 C. 710; 102 C. 648. Parties liable in separate action even though deficiency not claimed in foreclosure suit. 109 C. 333. Cited. 112 C. 611. Guarantors named in foreclosure allowed same credit as mortgagor. 113 C. 246. Cited. 116 C. 332. Failure to name one a party defendant merely bars the remedy. 119 C. 586. Cited. 120 C. 671. Effect of failing to name parties in foreclosure of prior mortgages. 122 C. 314. Cited. 141 C. 179. Does not change requirements of Sec. 49-14. 154 C. 216. Cited. 185 C. 579; 199 C. 368; 216 C. 443; 220 C. 152; Id., 643; 228 C. 929. Section prohibits a personal remedy against mortgagor but does not eliminate the underlying mortgage debt and does not supersede bank's continuing access to equitable foreclosure proceedings. 244 C. 251. Statute did not apply because original common charges debt was not extinguished by foreclosure action based on a statutorily created lien. 247 C. 575. Section does not evidence a clear intention to extinguish the otherwise independent obligations of the guarantors by making them effectively necessary parties to a claim that seeks the strict foreclosure of a mortgage. 312 C. 662.
Cited. 25 CA 159; 28 CA 809; 31 CA 80; Id., 476; 32 CA 309; 33 CA 388; 35 CA 81; 38 CA 198; 40 CA 434; 44 CA 588. Trustee's sale of property in another state does not bar action here since defendant not a person on whom service of process in Connecticut could have been made at commencement of trustee's sale in the other state. 48 CA 531. A foreclosure plaintiff who fails to file a timely motion for a deficiency judgment under Sec. 49-14 cannot recover additional damages from a guarantor based on the terms of a guaranty, the purpose of which was to secure the debt owed under the mortgage note. 137 CA 680; judgment reversed, see 312 C. 662.
Cited. 2 CS 98. When a mortgagee takes property on foreclosure, the taking of the property satisfies the debt only pro tanto to value of property on date it is appropriated. 3 CS 261. Distinction between this section and Sec. 49-14 discussed. 6 CS 123. Cited. Id., 300.
Notes of Decisions
Linden Condo. Ass'n v. McKenna, 726 A.2d 502 (Conn. 1999).
· cites it 24× “7 In support *582 of its claim, the plaintiff argues that § 49-14 does not permit a deficiency judgment when the foreclosing party does not obtain title to the property, and that neither General Statutes § 49-1 8 nor the doctrine of res judicata bars further action on a debt…”
First Bank v. Simpson, 507 A.2d 997 (Conn. 1986).
· cites it 15× “Nevertheless, the defendants claimed that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law under *370 General Statutes §§ 49-1 1 and 49-14, 2 which, they argued, require that the judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of Branford Savings Bank operate as a bar to any further…”
New Milford Sav. Bank v. Jajer, 708 A.2d 1378 (Conn. 1998).
· cites it 13× “” General Statutes § 49-1 provides: “The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person…”
People's Bank v. Bilmor Bldg. Corp., 614 A.2d 456 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
· cites it 12× “The only restriction on the mortgagee’s election of remedies is contained in General Statutes § 49-1, which provides that “[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for…”
RCN Capital, LLC v. Sunford Props. & Dev., LLC, 196 Conn. App. 823 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020).
· cites it 27× “The defendants filed an objection to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judg- ment and a supporting memorandum of law, in which Lam, in particular, contended that the plaintiff had failed to obtain a proper deficiency judgment and, there- fore, was barred from recovery pursuant…”
Lestorti v. DeLeo, 4 A.3d 269 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 12× “Finally, the Appellate Court determined that “the defendant is not entitled to restitution on a theory of unjust enrichment because the plaintiff, being effectively discharged from his obligation to [Wachovia by virtue of General Statutes § 49-1], 5 owed nothing at the *472 time…”
Fed. Deposit Ins. v. Napert-Boyer P'ship, 671 A.2d 1303 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
· cites it 9× “The defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) substituted the prime rate of Fleet Financial Group for the prime rate of the failed CBT, (2) found that a prior foreclosed $1 million mortgage did not merge with the two notes in question and that General Statutes § 49-1…”
Bank of Boston Connecticut v. Schlesinger, 595 A.2d 872 (Conn. 1991).
· cites it 5× “IV The defendants’ final claim is that because the plaintiff had initiated a foreclosure action, the trial court improperly failed to stay the attachment pursuant to General Statutes §§ 49-1 and 49-28. 7 We disagree.”
CTB Realty Ventures XXII, Inc. v. Markoski, 636 A.2d 379 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
· cites it 17× “The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that General Statutes §§ 49-1 and 49-14 barred the plaintiff from foreclosing the defendants’ mortgage.”
Eichman v. J & J Bldg. Co., 582 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1990).
· cites it 5× “2d 997 (1986); General Statutes § 49-1. 8 *449 Section 49-14 (a) provides in pertinent part that “any party to a mortgage foreclosure may file a motion seeking a deficiency judgment.”
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