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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 49 — Mortgages and LiensChapter 846 — Mortgages

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-1 (2025)

When foreclosure a bar to further action on debt

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1966–2021 46citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 46 opinions since 1966, 2 of them in the last five years.

The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure; but the foreclosure is not a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation as to any person liable for the payment thereof upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could not have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure. The judgment in each such case shall state the names of all persons upon whom service of process has been made as herein provided.

(1949 Rev., S. 7191; 1957, P.A. 443; P.A. 79-602, S. 74.)

History: P.A. 79-602 made minor changes in wording, substituting “the” for “such”, etc., but made no substantive changes.

See Sec. 49-14 re deficiency judgments.

Before statute, foreclosure was a bar to further action on the mortgage debt. 1 R. 203; 3 C. 63; 5 C. 535; 18 C. 136; 91 C. 586. Provisions of section requiring persons liable for the mortgage debt to be made parties to the foreclosure apply only to foreclosure proceedings begun after section was enacted. 56 C. 146. Section applies to mortgages of personalty. 58 C. 257. Consideration of separate action against endorser after foreclosure and deficiency judgment against maker only. 100 C. 710; 102 C. 648. Parties liable in separate action even though deficiency not claimed in foreclosure suit. 109 C. 333. Cited. 112 C. 611. Guarantors named in foreclosure allowed same credit as mortgagor. 113 C. 246. Cited. 116 C. 332. Failure to name one a party defendant merely bars the remedy. 119 C. 586. Cited. 120 C. 671. Effect of failing to name parties in foreclosure of prior mortgages. 122 C. 314. Cited. 141 C. 179. Does not change requirements of Sec. 49-14. 154 C. 216. Cited. 185 C. 579; 199 C. 368; 216 C. 443; 220 C. 152; Id., 643; 228 C. 929. Section prohibits a personal remedy against mortgagor but does not eliminate the underlying mortgage debt and does not supersede bank's continuing access to equitable foreclosure proceedings. 244 C. 251. Statute did not apply because original common charges debt was not extinguished by foreclosure action based on a statutorily created lien. 247 C. 575. Section does not evidence a clear intention to extinguish the otherwise independent obligations of the guarantors by making them effectively necessary parties to a claim that seeks the strict foreclosure of a mortgage. 312 C. 662.

Cited. 25 CA 159; 28 CA 809; 31 CA 80; Id., 476; 32 CA 309; 33 CA 388; 35 CA 81; 38 CA 198; 40 CA 434; 44 CA 588. Trustee's sale of property in another state does not bar action here since defendant not a person on whom service of process in Connecticut could have been made at commencement of trustee's sale in the other state. 48 CA 531. A foreclosure plaintiff who fails to file a timely motion for a deficiency judgment under Sec. 49-14 cannot recover additional damages from a guarantor based on the terms of a guaranty, the purpose of which was to secure the debt owed under the mortgage note. 137 CA 680; judgment reversed, see 312 C. 662.

Cited. 2 CS 98. When a mortgagee takes property on foreclosure, the taking of the property satisfies the debt only pro tanto to value of property on date it is appropriated. 3 CS 261. Distinction between this section and Sec. 49-14 discussed. 6 CS 123. Cited. Id., 300.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-1 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENLinden Condo. Ass'n v. McKenna, 726 A.2d 502 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 49-1 24×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“7 In support *582 of its claim, the plaintiff argues that § 49-14 does not permit a deficiency judgment when the foreclosing party does not obtain title to the property, and that neither General Statutes § 49-1 8 nor the doctrine of res judicata bars further action on a debt…”
The case’s holding
A condominium association may sue a unit owner for unpaid common charges based on personal liability in addition to the association's statutory right to foreclose on its lien.
Later courts cite it for
“the act, which is largely modeled after the uniform common interest ownership act, was created in order to provide unit owners and their associations with consumer protection rights, as well as to afford developers, lenders and title insurers with flexibility and certainty in establishing common interest communities . . .” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENFirst Bank v. Simpson, 507 A.2d 997 (Conn. 1986).
cites § 49-1 15×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“Nevertheless, the defendants claimed that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law under *370 General Statutes §§ 49-1 1 and 49-14, 2 which, they argued, require that the judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of Branford Savings Bank operate as a bar to any further…”
The case’s holding
A judgment of strict foreclosure extinguishes all rights of the foreclosing mortgagee on the underlying note except those enforceable through the deficiency judgment procedure.
Later courts cite it for
“under general statutes 49-1 a judgment of strict foreclosure ct page 2838 extinguishes all rights of the foreclosing mortgagee on the underlying note, except those enforceable through the use of the deficiency judgment procedure delineated in general statutes 49-14 .” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENNew Milford Sav. Bank v. Jajer, 708 A.2d 1378 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 49-1 13×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“” General Statutes § 49-1 provides: “The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person…”
The case’s holding
A trial court maintains continuing jurisdiction to open a judgment after the legal deadline expires to correct an inadvertent omission in a foreclosure complaint (4 of 8).
Later courts cite it for
“any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person having an interest in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and modified, notwithstanding the limitation imposed by section 52-212a, upon such terms as to costs as the court deems reasonable, provided no such judgment shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer . . . ,” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENPeople's Bank v. Bilmor Bldg. Corp., 614 A.2d 456 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
cites § 49-1 12×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“The only restriction on the mortgagee’s election of remedies is contained in General Statutes § 49-1, which provides that “[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for…”
The case’s holding
A judgment lien relates back to the date of an attachment for priority purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“a judgment lien relates back to the date of an attachment.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENJPMorgan Chase Bank v. Essaghof, 249 A.3d 327 (Conn. 2020).
cites § 49-1 14×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“Section 49-1 provides in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof .”
6
GREENRCN Capital, LLC v. Sunford Props. & Dev., LLC, 231 A.3d 201 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020).
cites § 49-1 27×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“4 Lam further argued that ‘‘[a]lthough . . . [Lam] was named as a party [to the foreclosure action] .”
7
GREENLestorti v. DeLeo, 4 A.3d 269 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 49-1 12×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“Finally, the Appellate Court determined that “the defendant is not entitled to restitution on a theory of unjust enrichment because the plaintiff, being effectively discharged from his obligation to [Wachovia by virtue of General Statutes § 49-1], 5 owed nothing at the *472 time…”
8
GREENFed. Deposit Ins. v. Napert-Boyer P'ship, 671 A.2d 1303 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
cites § 49-1 9×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“The defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1) substituted the prime rate of Fleet Financial Group for the prime rate of the failed CBT, (2) found that a prior foreclosed $1 million mortgage did not merge with the two notes in question and that General Statutes § 49-1…”
The case’s holding
A trial court cannot use judicial notice to determine the reasonableness of a substitute interest rate, and late fees do not accrue after a note is accelerated.
Later courts cite it for
“in the event of default in any monthly installment, maker agrees to pay holder a late charge equal to five percent (5) of said monthly installment.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENBank of Boston Connecticut v. Schlesinger, 595 A.2d 872 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 49-1 5×cited by 130 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“IV The defendants’ final claim is that because the plaintiff had initiated a foreclosure action, the trial court improperly failed to stay the attachment pursuant to General Statutes §§ 49-1 and 49-28. 7 We disagree.”
The case’s holding
Probable cause for a prejudgment remedy requires weighing both legal and factual issues to determine if a judgment will be rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
Later courts cite it for
“to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that a judgment will be rendered in favor of the plaintiff in a trial on the merits.” · 7 citing courts
10
GREENCTB Realty Ventures XXII, Inc. v. Markoski, 636 A.2d 379 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
cites § 49-1 17×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that General Statutes §§ 49-1 and 49-14 barred the plaintiff from foreclosing the defendants’ mortgage.”
11
GREENEichman v. J & J Bldg. Co., 582 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 49-1 5×cited by 89 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“2d 997 (1986); General Statutes § 49-1. 8 *449 Section 49-14 (a) provides in pertinent part that “any party to a mortgage foreclosure may file a motion seeking a deficiency judgment.”
The case’s holding
A trial court lacks an affirmative duty to determine property value in a deficiency judgment proceeding if the plaintiff fails to present credible evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“indeed, deficiency judgment hearings more closely resemble suits for collection than condemnation hearings.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENDeutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Beauvais, 188 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).
cites § 49-1 2×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“By contrast, at least one Indiana court in a “nearly identical situation” to Singleton, has cited with approval 8 Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 49-1 to 49-31v; Delaware: Del.”
The case’s holding
The installment nature of a mortgage loan continues until a final judgment of foreclosure is entered regardless of prior acceleration of the debt.
Later courts cite it for
“despite acceleration of the balance due and the filing of an action to foreclose, the installment nature of a loan secured by such a mortgage continued until a final judgment of foreclosure was entered and no action was necessary to reinstate it via a notice of 'deceleration' or otherwise.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENDerisme v. Hunt Leibert Jacobson P.C., 880 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. Conn. 2012).
cites § 49-1 4×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-1 . However, Conn. Gen.”
Later courts cite it for
“courts in this circuit have held that the 'fdcpa's protections are not triggered by communications initiated by someone other than the debt collector.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENU.S. Bank Nat'l Assn. v. Blowers, 212 A.3d 226 (Conn. 2019).
cites § 49-1 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“See General Statutes § 49-1 (setting forth general rule that "[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure");…”
The case’s holding
Allegations that a mortgagee's wrongful conduct during loan modification negotiations materially increased debt and frustrated the ability to avoid foreclosure satisfy the enforcement requirement for special defenses.
Later courts cite it for
“allegations that a mortgagee engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation and delay in postdefault loan modification negotiations before and after initiating a foreclosure action- thereby adding to the mortgagor's debt and frustrating the mortgagor's ability to avoid foreclosure-can establish legally sufficient special defenses and counterclaims in that action.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENDerisme v. Hunt Leibert Jacobson P.C., 880 F. Supp. 2d 339 (D. Conn. 2012).
cites § 49-1 4×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“” Conn. Gen.Stat. § 49-1. However, Conn. Gen.”
16
GREENInvestors Mortg. Co. v. Rodia, 625 A.2d 833 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
cites § 49-1 5×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“A nonforeclosing second mortgagee is not barred by § 49-1 from bringing further action on its underlying obligation; id.”
Later courts cite it for
“one cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of the action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENFactor v. Fallbrook, Inc., 593 A.2d 520 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
cites § 49-1 8×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“The sole issue is whether a deficiency judgment is barred in this case by General Statutes § 49-1. 1 We reverse the judgment of the trial court.”
18
GREENFed. Deposit Ins. v. Voll, 660 A.2d 358 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
cites § 49-1 3×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“The only restriction on the mortgagee’s election of remedies is contained in General Statutes § 49-1, which provides that ‘[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for…”
The case’s holding
Defenses that could have been raised during foreclosure proceedings may not be raised at a deficiency hearing.
Later courts cite it for
“defenses that could have been raised during the foreclosure proceedings may not be raised at the deficiency hearing” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENFed. Deposit Ins. v. Ret. Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 623 A.2d 517 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
cites § 49-1 3×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“General Statutes § 49-1 provides that “[t]he foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure .”
The case’s holding
Strict compliance with procedural requirements is required to permit a trial court to render a deficiency judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action.
Later courts cite it for
“strict compliance with the procedural requirements of 49-14 is required in order to permit the trial court to render a deficiency judgment in a mortgage foreclosure action.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENFed. Deposit Ins. v. Fonte, 712 A.2d 416 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 49-1 9×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 49-1
“The court then concluded that the action on the note was properly brought and that General Statutes § 49-1 4 did not bar the action.”

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Citing cases by year
196619932021

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2020. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Conn. App. Ct.19Conn.14D. Conn.7Bankr. D. Conn.2Conn. Super. Ct.1Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1N.C.1R.I.1
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