Conn. Gen. Stat. » Title 49 — MORTGAGES AND LIENS · Chapter 846 — Mortgages
Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-15 (2026)

Opening of judgments of strict foreclosure

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section CT-CGAcga.ct.gov (official) JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
(a)(1) Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person having an interest in the judgment and for cause shown, be opened and modified, notwithstanding the limitation imposed by section 52-212a, upon such terms as to costs as the court deems reasonable, provided no such judgment shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer except as provided in subdivision (2) of this subsection.

(2) Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may be opened after title has become absolute in any encumbrancer upon agreement of each party to the foreclosure action who filed an appearance in the action and any person who acquired an interest in the real estate after title became absolute in any encumbrancer, provided (A) such judgment may not be opened more than four months after the date such judgment was entered or more than thirty days after title became absolute in any encumbrancer, whichever is later, and (B) the rights and interests of each party, regardless of whether the party filed an appearance in the action, and any person who acquired an interest in the real estate after title became absolute in any encumbrancer, are restored to the status that existed on the date the judgment was entered.

(3) If a judgment is opened pursuant to this subsection, the person who filed the written motion pursuant to subdivision (1) of this subsection shall record a certified copy of the court's order to open such judgment on the land records in the town in which the real estate is situated.

(b) Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition by a mortgagor under Title 11 of the United States Code, any judgment against the mortgagor foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure shall be opened automatically without action by any party or the court, provided, the provisions of such judgment, other than the establishment of law days, shall not be set aside under this subsection, provided no such judgment shall be opened after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer or the mortgagee, or any person claiming under such encumbrancer or mortgagee. The mortgagor shall file a copy of the bankruptcy petition, or an affidavit setting forth the date the bankruptcy petition was filed, with the clerk of the court in which the foreclosure matter is pending. Upon the termination of the automatic stay authorized pursuant to 11 USC 362, the mortgagor shall file with such clerk an affidavit setting forth the date the stay was terminated.

(1949 Rev., S. 7196; 1967, P.A. 286; P.A. 75-11; P.A. 79-602, S. 75; P.A. 02-93, S. 2; P.A. 03-202, S. 9; P.A. 04-127, S. 6; 04-257, S. 76; P.A. 09-209, S. 37.)

History: 1967 act deleted provision which specified that modification of foreclosure judgment is to be made “at the same term or the term next following that at which it was rendered”; P.A. 75-11 specified that modification of judgment may be made “notwithstanding that the term of court may have expired”; P.A. 79-602 replaced reference to expiration of term of court with reference to limitation imposed by Sec. 52-212a; P.A. 02-93 designated existing provisions as Subsec. (a) and added Subsec. (b) re automatic opening of judgment of strict foreclosure upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition by the mortgagor, effective June 3, 2002; P.A. 03-202 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provisions re the filing of a copy of the bankruptcy petition and affidavits by the mortgagor; P.A. 04-127 amended Subsec. (b) by deleting reference to Chapter 13 and making a technical change; P.A. 04-257 made a technical change in Subsec. (b), effective June 14, 2004; P.A. 09-209 designated existing provisions of Subsec. (a) as Subsec. (a)(1), added Subsec. (a)(2) and (3) re opening judgments of strict foreclosure, and made technical changes.

Error in opening judgment after law day may be waived. 115 C. 623. Petition for new trial by way of equitable relief after law day has passed. 118 C. 226; 128 C. 700. Plaintiff may move to open judgment if appropriation on day prejudicial or undesirable. 120 C. 26. Reopening as affected by bankruptcy proceedings; whether or not “term” is construed to mean “session” immaterial. 123 C. 9. Denial of motion to reopen correct when title had become absolute in plaintiff. 124 C. 610. In absence of waiver, reopening after law day erroneous. 128 C. 700. Cited. 130 C. 77. Title held not absolute in any encumbrancer so as to nullify court's right to open judgment. 137 C. 277. Cited. 179 C. 246; 181 C. 141; Id., 367; 187 C. 333; 193 C. 128; 216 C. 341; 219 C. 314. Appellate Court should have found abuse of discretion in trial court's refusal to implement purpose of statute; judgment of Appellate Court in 25 CA 688 reversed. 225 C. 105. Section did not deprive trial court of jurisdiction to exercise its equitable discretion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure to correct an inadvertent omission in mortgage foreclosure complaint. 244 C. 251.

Cited. 3 CA 508; 10 CA 160; 20 CA 163; 22 CA 396; Id., 468; 24 CA 42; Id., 469; Id., 688; 29 CA 508; Id., 541; Id., 628; 30 CA 541; 31 CA 1; Id., 80; Id., 621; 33 CA 401; 40 CA 115; 44 CA 588. Trial court action will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion. 48 CA 807. Legislature intended the phrase “after the title has become absolute in any encumbrancer,” to contemplate period commencing immediately after cessation of last day on which another party may redeem, not a full business day later. 66 CA 606. Trial court incorrectly determined that section prevented plaintiff from obtaining a judgment of strict foreclosure on second property absent a motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure, and nothing in text of section prohibits plaintiff from proceeding on portion of complaint that remained after partial judgment of strict foreclosure. 105 CA 806. Under Subsec. (a), because title to the subject property had become absolute in plaintiff, the court did not have authority to grant defendant's motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure without a specific finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. 129 CA 429. Where proceeding was equitable in nature, parties had notice of pending motions, and court pronounced an order to stay the law days, court had authority to open judgment despite court clerk's failure to issue notice of the order to stay. 131 CA 471. Subsec. (a)(1) permits the court, in its discretion, upon a finding of cause shown, to open and modify a judgment of strict foreclosure upon the motion of the mortgagor at any time after judgment has been rendered, so long as the law days have not passed. 160 CA 49. Law day valid where law day fell on same day as final day to timely appeal denial of motion to reopen because right to appeal ended at 5:00 pm and right to redeem ended at midnight, and thus did not shorten the time period in which to appeal. 184 CA 356.

Rule of 120 C. 16 discussed. 2 CS 55. Action to open judgment of foreclosure is precluded if title has vested in defendant. 14 CS 311. While motion to open judgment after title had become absolute in tax lienor town must be denied, foreclosed heirs may bring action in equity for relief from operation of judgment where enforcement of it would be against conscience. 27 CS 504.

(Return to Chapter
Table of Contents)		 (Return to
List of Chapters)		 (Return to
List of Titles)

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 116 cases (18 in the last 5 years), 1967–2025 · leading case: Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank v. Sullivan, 579 A.2d 1054 (Conn. 1990).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Farmers & Mechanics Sav. Bank v. Sullivan, 579 A.2d 1054 (Conn. 1990). · cites it 24× “The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred when it denied a motion to open and modify a judgment of strict foreclosure pursuant to General Statutes § 49-15.* 2 We conclude that the motion should have been granted and accordingly reverse.”
New Milford Sav. Bank v. Jajer, 708 A.2d 1378 (Conn. 1998). · cites it 24× “The issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes §§ 49-15 and 49-1 1 deprive the Superior *253 Court of jurisdiction to open a foreclosure judgment in order to correct the inadvertent omission of a parcel of the mortgaged property from the judgment.”
U.S. Bank Nat'l Assn. v. Christophersen, 180 A.3d 611 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 17× “General Statutes § 49-15 provides in relevant part: "(a) (1) Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person having an interest in the judgment and for cause…”
First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Luecken, 785 A.2d 1148 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). · cites it 9× “The opening of judgments of strict foreclosure is governed by General Statutes § 49-15. That section provides in relevant part that “[a]ny judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court rendering the same, upon the written…”
Tappin v. Homecomings Fin. Network, Inc., 830 A.2d 711 (Conn. 2003). · cites it 7× “The defendant bases its claim that the plaintiffs request for an injunction was an improper attempt to open a judgment of foreclosure on General Statutes § 49-15 (a), 15 which precludes opening a judgment of strict foreclosure once title has vested in an encumbrancer.”
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Pardo, 155 A.3d 764 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017). · cites it 10× “1 He claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) dismissed, pursuant to General Statutes § 49-15, 2 his motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure as moot.”
U.S. Bank, Nat'l Assn. v. Mamudi, 197 Conn. App. 31 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 10× “2 On appeal, the defen- dants claim that (1) the court abused its discretion in denying their motions to reargue as untimely where, as here, those motions asserted mistakes of law in the court’s rulings on the plaintiff’s motions for orders, (2) the court erred in ruling that…”
Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Kneller, 670 A.2d 324 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). · cites it 14× “Moreover, the defendant concedes that if General Statutes § 49-15 8 is strictly construed, an opening of the judgment under these circumstances would be deemed improper.”
Argent Mortg. Co. v. Huertas, 953 A.2d 868 (Conn. 2008). · cites it 6× “We also conclude, however, that the trial court should have dismissed as moot, rather than denied, the defendant’s motion to *570 open the judgment of strict foreclosure because title to the property had vested absolutely in Argent within the meaning of General Statutes § 49-15…”
L & R Realty v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 732 A.2d 181 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 5× “The trial court concluded, however, that General Statutes § 49-15 authorized the opening of the judgment of strict foreclosure for the purpose of setting law days.”
J & E Inv. Co. v. Athan, 27 A.3d 415 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). · cites it 15× “to 2007) § 49-15 2 despite *474 the fact that title previously had vested in the plaintiff 3 and (2) determined that the defendant’s mortgage encumbered the property and was senior to the plaintiffs mortgage.”
Falls Mill of Vernon Condo. Ass'n v. Sudsbury, 15 A.3d 1210 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). · cites it 10× “Resolution of this appeal involves the intersection of General Statutes § 49-15 (a) and Practice Book § 63-1 (b).”
Show all 116 citing cases →
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-15(a)(1) — 4 cases
U.S. Bank Nat'l Assn. v. Christophersen, 180 A.3d 611 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). “General Statutes § 49-15 provides in relevant part: "(a) (1) Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person having an interest in the judgment and for cause…”
GMAC Mortg., LLC v. Ford, 175 A.3d 582 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Owen, 165 A.3d 275 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Santander Bank, N.A. v. Harrison (2d Cir. 2021).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-15(b) — 6 cases
U.S. Bank Nat'l Assn. v. Christophersen, 180 A.3d 611 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018). “General Statutes § 49-15 provides in relevant part: "(a) (1) Any judgment foreclosing the title to real estate by strict foreclosure may, at the discretion of the court rendering the judgment, upon the written motion of any person having an interest in the judgment and for cause…”
E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Toor (In re Toor), 477 B.R. 299 (D. Conn. 2012).
Bank of New York, Tr. v. Savvidis, 165 A.3d 1266 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
U.S. Bank, N.A., Tr. v. Morawska, 139 A.3d 747 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
In Re Guarnieri, 297 B.R. 365 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2003).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.