(a) In a civil action for trespass to real or personal property or for a tort, unaccompanied by force, resulting in consequential injury, a defendant may set off against any judgment rendered against him any debt which he holds, jointly or severally, against the plaintiff, subject to the conditions contained in subsections (b) and (c) of this section.
(b) (1) This section shall not apply to a civil action for damages for taking property exempt from execution.
(2) No debt which was acquired by a defendant by purchase or assignment after the accruing of the cause of action upon which the judgment is rendered may be allowed as a set-off under this section.
(3) An assignment of the judgment by the plaintiff shall not affect the right of set-off and any such assignment shall be taken subject to the right of set-off.
(4) Any such set-off shall be claimed by filing a complaint in the court in which the judgment has been rendered within twenty-four hours after final judgment.
(5) No set-off may be allowed in cases where the defendant had the right of set-off on the trial of the case.
(c) (1) The court shall make any proper set-off immediately if the debt claimed is admitted by the plaintiff or evidenced by judgment.
(2) If a claimed set-off is not admitted or evidenced by judgment and is denied by the plaintiff, it shall not be allowed unless the defendant has instituted a suit therefor prior to the rendition of judgment in the original action. If any such suit is pending at the time of rendition of judgment for the plaintiff in the original action, the court rendering judgment shall stay execution thereon until the final termination of the suit. Upon termination of the suit, the court shall allow the set-off in the original action in accordance with the amount adjudged to be due on the set-off claim in the suit.
(1949 Rev., S. 7863, 7864; P.A. 82-160, S. 57.)
History: P.A. 82-160 rephrased the section and inserted Subsec. indicators.
No set-off can be allowed in trespass for levying on exempt property, though part of it was not exempt. 33 C. 236. Construction of clause de “taking” property exempt from execution. 45 C. 567. Set-off in tort actions generally. 66 C. 500; 82 C. 362. Unless procedure followed, right is waived; but equitable principles governing in receiverships may require set-off to be allowed. 78 C. 443; Id., 450. Cited. 221 C. 912; 225 C. 146; 233 C. 460.
Cited. 26 CA 322.
Cited. 5 CS 146.
Notes of Decisions
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Winters, 622 A.2d 536 (Conn. 1993).
· cites it 32× “The principal issues in these appeals 1 are (1) whether the trial court’s judgment is a “final judgment” that triggers the filing requirement for a complaint for setoff pursuant to General Statutes § 52-141, 2 and (2) whether the trial court abused its equitable discretion by…”
Stevens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 659 A.2d 707 (Conn. 1995).
· cites it 3× “We concluded that a trial court judgment is a “final judgment” under § 52-141 (b) (4) because, in light of the statute’s underlying policy and purpose, “it would be inappropriate for the timeliness of a complaint for setoff to depend upon a retrospective, artificial…”
OCI Mortg. Corp. v. Marchese, 774 A.2d 940 (Conn. 2001).
· cites it 2× “and involves mutual debts between parties in any action: (1) to recover on a debt pursuant to § 52-139; (2) by an assignee of a nonnegotiable chose in action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-140; (3) for trespass to real or personal property or other tort committed without…”
Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 600 A.2d 1048 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
· cites it 9× “(PaineWebber), appeals following the trial court’s denial of its motion for setoff pursuant to General Statutes § 52-141 (b) (4). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.”
Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 602 A.2d 11 (Conn. 1992).
· cites it 3× “Did the Appellate Court improperly conclude that the judgment in this matter was ‘final’ for purposes of General Statutes § 52-141 (b) (4) at the time when the trial court rendered judgment? “4.”
Drill Masters-Eldorado Tool, Inc. v. PCC Specialty Prods., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 188 (D. Conn. 2014).
· cites it 2× “and involves mutual debts between parties in any action: (1) to recover on a debt pursuant to § 52-139; (2) by an assignee of a nonnegotiable chose in action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-140; (3) for trespass to real or personal property or other tort committed without…”
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