Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-200 (2026)

Disclosure not conclusive

✓ current as of May 2026
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When either party in any action has obtained from the other party a disclosure on oath, respecting the matters alleged in any pleading, the disclosure shall not be deemed conclusive, but may be contradicted like any other testimony.

(1949 Rev., S. 7952.)

Cited. 186 C. 275; 194 C. 35; 212 C. 661; 228 C. 42; 229 C. 716.

Cited. 2 CA 523; 4 CA 641; 11 CA 518; 13 CA 725; 40 CA 449.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1982–2020 · leading case: Collum v. Chapin, 671 A.2d 1329 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
Collum v. Chapin, 671 A.2d 1329 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). · cites it 2× “While the plaintiffs deposition testimony is not conclusive as a judicial admission; General Statutes § 52-200; it is sufficient to support entry of summary judgment in the absence of contradictory competent affidavits that establish a genuine issue as to a material fact.”
Esposito v. Wethered, 496 A.2d 222 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985). · cites it 2× “We conclude that there were genuine issues as to material facts which should have been determined at a trial.”
Piantedosi v. Floridia, 440 A.2d 977 (Conn. 1982). · cites it 2× “These restrictions on the effect of an interrogatory response are consistent with General Statutes § 52-200, which states that a disclosure on oath shall not be deemed conclusive but may be contradicted like any other testimony.”
Tessmann v. Tiger Lee Constr. Co., 634 A.2d 870 (Conn. 1993). · cites it 2× “” The plaintiffs also rely on General Statutes § 52-200, which provides that a disclosure on oath “shall not be deemed conclusive, but may be contradicted like any other testimony.”
Machado v. Taylor, 163 A.3d 558 (Conn. 2017). · cites it 2× “] ); see also General Statutes § 52-200 (same). The trial court ruled on the defendant's motion for a judgment of dismissal in its memorandum of decision rendering judgment *561 for the plaintiff, but it did not rule on the plaintiff's motion to open evidence.”
Campbell v. Gould, 478 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1984). · cites it 2× “The defendant points out that Campbell had replied to an interrogatory that he lost only one week of work.”
Howat v. Passaretti, 528 A.2d 834 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987). · cites it 2× “The plaintiff argues that the court erred in excluding Coffin and Glenn from consideration by the jury because it treated the stipulation of the parties as a judicial admission, and thus conclusive on the plaintiff, rather than as an evidentiary admission which could be…”
Balboni v. Stonick, 481 A.2d 82 (Conn. App. Ct. 1984). · cites it 2× ““These restrictions on the effect of an interrogatory response are consistent with General Statutes § 52-200, which states that a disclosure on oath shall not be deemed conclusive but may be contradicted like any other testimony.”
Rogers v. Delfino, 539 A.2d 156 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988). · cites it 2× “2 Furthermore, with regard to concessions of fact made by party witnesses in testimony at trial, our Supreme Court has also ruled that “ ‘[ujnless it amounts to such a stipulation or waiver as to have the force of a judicial admission, the testimony of a party to a fact is…”
Maselli v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. No. 10 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 2× “‘‘While [a party’s] deposition testimony is not conclusive as a judicial admission; General Statutes § 52-200; it is sufficient to support entry of summary judgment in the absence of contradic- tory competent affidavits that establish a genuine issue as to a material fact.”
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